HCSS Centre for Strategic Studies

Turbulent Waters in a Maritime Black Hole

by Rem Korteweg

April was an eventful month in the waters off Somalia and it is unlikely to quiet down soon. A French luxury yacht, a Japanese oil tanker and a Spanish fishing boat in rapid succession witnessed the effects of the lawlessness of the turquoise-blue Somali waters.

Pirates hijacked, attacked and respectively boarded these vessels making this element of Somalia’s plight frontpage news in Western media. It also commanded the attention of Western politicians. In response to the ongoing threat of piracy the UN Security Council started discussions last week on a draft resolution introduced by France and the US. The resolution would permit states to pursue, arrest and prosecute pirates near Somalia’s coast.

The several thousand-kilometre long coast of Somalia has long been known for its lawlessness. For years the government has been unable to maintain authority over the capital, let alone could it thus be expected to successfully police its coast-line. In fact over the past decade Somalia has come to describe a geographic space rather than a functioning state. With two unrecognized break-away republics in the North, regular incursions by regional powers in the centre and south and a seemingly endless cycle of civil conflict fuelled by clan feuds and years of unsuccessful peace negotiations, Somalia’s chaos has eclipsed and piracy has flourished. In fact, as far as economics go, piracy along with smuggling is now one of the sole remaining sources of foreign income with hefty ransoms regularly paid by nervous shipowners abroad.

Economics, politics and security collide off the Horn of Africa. The area in the North, where most attacks occur, is of strategic importance as a vital artery for merchant shipping. The Gulf of Aden is a crucial waterway for the flow of oil and gas to Western markets. When the Japanese tanker Takayama was attacked on April 21 it sent the oil price soaring to new heights. And concern in Western capitals is that unless the situation improves the possibility of a maritime terrorist attack further increases, with the 2002 bombing of the Limburg off the coast of Yemen an eerie reminder. By all standards the Somali waters are a lawless black hole with a bite.

Since Somalia also continuously pops up on the counter-terrorism radar screen it is not surprising that Western militaries have deployed forces to the region. The French continue to maintain a naval base in Djibouti, the United States military have stationed roughly 1600 troops there, a Dutch frigate is escorting UN World Food Programme ships along the Somali coast and NATO member states have deployed a naval task force in the region. Sufficient power to deal with pirates driving small carbon-fiber speedboats one would say.

However, besides the sheer length of the Somali coast and the difficulty in tracking small pirate boats, the real dilemma lies with the sanctuary provided by Somalia’s territorial waters. On the high seas any state is authorized to take policing measures, yet that authority evaporates when an imaginary line lying at a dozen nautical miles from shore is crossed. There, territorial sovereignty begins and policing becomes the sole prerogative of the coastal state. However, according to Western states concerned with the instability that such undergoverned spaces breed, that exclusive prerogative should encompass a responsibility. The reasoning goes, if the state cannot or will not take the responsibility to govern its territory, others should. The resolution under consideration in New York is thus the next chapter in a changing interpretation of statehood; statehood now implying responsibility, being a good government and abiding by certain standards of behaviour or else being subject to outside action. This doctrine was used by Western states during the Kosovo war in 1999 when NATO intervened in response to human rights violations. By the United States in 2003 to justify its intervention against a rogue regime believed to produce weapons of mass destruction. And now has entered the realm of undergoverned territories.

In the case of Somalia the government itself appealed to the United Nations for help because it could not perform the task. Granting permission and surrendering sovereignty for operations that was earlier granted for actions on the drier part of its territory against terrrorists (login required). The sensitive political question however remains what can be done against piracy when the coastal state has not granted permission, or if Somalia suddenly withdraws its authorization.

If the international community authorizes actions against piracy, it will become responsible for improving the situation. Capabilities are required. In a March 2008 report on Somalia’s security, the Secretary General suggested a maritime task force of four frigates with helicopters as part of a contingency plan to deter piracy. Another option would be to mandate the mission to the NATO contingent already in the region. In that case the NATO task force would need to be expanded. Either way, close coordination with the naval initiatives already present is a must.

Fighting and deterring piracy means addressing but one symptom of the lawlessness present in Somalia, albeit an important symptom. Unless the international community is willing to play a permanent role in maritime policing the sustainable solution lies in enabling the Somali government to address the security deficit off its coastline and shrink its maritime black hole. It means addressing Somalia’s wider chaos. For this much more effort will be required than the scope of the draft resolution considers. Yet it may prove to be the first step to a new consolidated push for improving Somalia’s troubles. If not, it will be but a temporary answer and we will see the security risks from Somalia’s turbulent turquoise sea persist.

from: HCSS, 05/06/08