Conflicts between states have taken on new forms and hybrid operations play an increasingly important role in this volatile environment. Belligerent powers introduce a new model of conflict fought by proxy, across domains, and below the conventional war threshold to advance their foreign policy goals while limiting decisive responsiveness of their victim.   

Given these hybrid threats, how should Western states respond? Are there any tools available Western states have that can draw red lines into blurred lines of hybrid conflict? 

Download this case study here. 

About this Paper

In 2016 and 2018, both the U.S. and France found their electoral infrastructure under attack from Russian malicious cyber operations. Notably, this included the hacking of the Presidential campaigns of Hilary Clinton and Emmanuel Macron. How should Western governments respond to these attacks? Are there any effective tools they could use to deter such behavior? 

This case study details how Western governments used a mix of sanctions, indictments, and diplomatic expulsions to respond to these intrusions, as well as their second-order normative effects. As such, a norm emerged which prohibited the cyberoperations against electoral infrastructure. This case study details how this norm emerged, which actors were key, and the challenges we face today in keeping it alive. 

About the Paper Series

This paper is part of a series that argues that the West does have one powerful tool that can help shape hybrid threat actors. That tool is international norms. Norms set international expectations of acceptable state behavior – yardsticks which the international community can leverage when calling out unscrupulous states.  

But norms do not develop out of nothing. This report applies the norm lifecycle theory, which analyzes norm development from emergence to cascade and internalization, to five case studies to to better understand the real-life strategies, tools of influence, dilemmas, and trade-offs that empower state-led norm processes. The report not only considers how norms develop, but also what role they play within the counter-hybrid posture of a state, and how they, in conjunction with countermeasures, shape adversarial hybrid behavior. 

This report also explores four other case studies on Russian, Chinese, and ISIS hybrid conflict actions. The case studies are published individually as a paper series and compiled in a full report with complete overview of the theoretical underpinnings of norm development and the key insights that emerge from the analysis, as well as the concluding remarks and policy recommendations. The policy recommendations explore ways for the Netherlands and its partners to help promote and enforce norms of restraint beyond classic like-minded groups of states while being cognizant of unintended consequences.  

Please find an overview of the other case studies below.

• Case Study 2: Responding to Russian Disinformation in Peacetime
  Download Case Study | Download Factsheet
   
• Case Study 3: Countering ISIS Propaganda in Conflict Theatres
  Download Case Study | Download Factsheet
   
• Case Study 4: Responding to Chinese Economic Espionage
  Download Case Study | Download Factsheet
   
• Case Study 5: Upholding Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea
  Download Case Study | Download Factsheet

Conflicts between states have taken on new forms and hybrid operations play an increasingly important role in this volatile environment. Belligerent powers introduce a new model of conflict fought by proxy, across domains, and below the conventional war threshold to advance their foreign policy goals while limiting decisive responsiveness of their victim.   

Given these hybrid threats, how should Western states respond? Are there any tools available Western states have that can draw red lines into blurred lines of hybrid conflict? 

Download the full report here. 

This paper series argues that the West does have one powerful tool that can help shape hybrid threat actors. That tool is international norms. Norms set international expectations of acceptable state behavior – yardsticks which the international community can leverage when calling out unscrupulous states.  

But norms do not develop out of nothing. This report applies the norm lifecycle theory, which analyzes norm development from emergence to cascade and internalization, to five case studies to to better understand the real-life strategies, tools of influence, dilemmas, and trade-offs that empower state-led norm processes. The report not only considers how norms develop, but also what role they play within the counter-hybrid posture of a state, and how they, in conjunction with countermeasures, shape adversarial hybrid behavior. 

As many norm entrepreneurs often seem to underestimate, the pursuit of countermeasures may lead to unintended second-order normative effects that undermine their long-term strategic interests. For instance, overt cyber pre-deployment in adversary systems can introduce a norm of mutually assured debilitated, while overt offensive cyberspace operations in response to disinformation can weaponize information in the same ways as Russia. This scenario is explored in-depth in the second case study of this report dealing with Russian disinformation campaigns. 

This report also explores four other case studies on Russian, Chinese, and ISIS hybrid conflict actions. The case studies are published individually as a paper series and compiled in a full report with complete overview of the theoretical underpinnings of norm development and the key insights that emerge from the analysis, as well as the concluding remarks and policy recommendations. The policy recommendations explore ways for the Netherlands and its partners to help promote and enforce norms of restraint beyond classic like-minded groups of states while being cognizant of unintended consequences.  

Please find an overview of the separate case studies below: 

• Case Study 1: Protecting Electoral Infrastructure from Russian cyber operations
  Download Case Study | Download Factsheet
   
• Case Study 2: Responding to Russian Disinformation in Peacetime
  Download Case Study | Download Factsheet
   
• Case Study 3: Countering ISIS Propaganda in Conflict Theatres
  Download Case Study | Download Factsheet
   
• Case Study 4: Responding to Chinese Economic Espionage
  Download Case Study | Download Factsheet
   
• Case Study 5: Upholding Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea
  Download Case Study | Download Factsheet

"Imagine Carl von Clausewitz sitting on a tripod stool playing with Lego"

On June 30th, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) and the Netherlands Defence Academy (NLDA), hosted a Global Expert Symposium on NATO’s Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC), in coordination with NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT). At the Symposium the NWCC Team presented unclassified findings from the Capstone Concept, followed by discussions between experts. Now, HCSS and the NLDA present the key findings of the Symposium.

Even though the Alliance’s historical track-record shows that future success is possible, this is not guaranteed. NATO’s military superiority is under threat, with China and Russia actively recalibrating more offensive military postures. Today, Members of the Alliance are already subject to persistent attacks under traditional thresholds of war. Conflicts close to the Alliance borders also harness considerable spillover risk to Allied territories. Tomorrow, conflicts will be characterized by the widening of the battlespace, the fusion of physical and non-physical dimensions, and the rise of borderless warfare.

The report presents the main takeaways from the Symposium, which guide NATO’s future capability development so that it can continue to defend and protect the interests and values of its members.

Read the complete report here.

Wat zijn de gevolgen van Covid-19 voor de Europese veiligheid? In een nieuwe notitie gaan HCSS onderzoekers Tim Sweijs, Femke Remmits, Hugo van Manen en Frank Bekkers in op de veiligheidsimplicaties van de pandemie voor Europa en geven zij aanbevelingen voor het Nederlands buitenland- en veiligheidsbeleid om deze het hoofd te bieden.

Hoe zal de coronacrisis de internationale machtsverhoudingen veranderen? Welk spoor trekt de virusuitbraak door bestaande bondgenootschappen? Welke lering kunnen we trekken uit de gevolgen van pandemieën uit het verleden? En wat zijn de belangrijkste te verwachten veiligheidsdynamieken voor de komende vijf jaar?

Covid-19 is in de eerste plaats een versneller van al langer zichtbare veiligheidstrends in en aan de randen van Europa op het gebied van democratie, goed bestuur en mensenrechten, sociale veiligheid, politieke stabiliteit, interstatelijke competitie en geopolitieke rivaliteit.

Het beteugelen van het virus vereist maatregelen zonder precedent en zal uiteindelijk grote sociale en politieke gevolgen hebben, ook voor Nederland. De coronacrisis kan in de toekomst leiden tot erosie van democratische normen en principes, het vergroten van de maatschappelijke polarisatie en het destabiliseren van kwetsbare landen aan de randen van het Europese continent. Bovendien gooit de pandemie olie op het vuur van interstatelijke competitie.

Hoe kan Nederland deze aanzienlijke gevolgen het hoofd bieden? Onze notitie benadrukt de volgende aandachtspunten voor het Nederlands buitenland- en veiligheidsbeleid:

• Nederland moet zich internationaal blijven inzetten voor democratische normen, goed bestuur en de bescherming van mensenrechten, speerpunten van het Nederlands beleid;
• Het voorkomen van verdere escalatie van maatschappelijke onrust en politieke instabiliteit in en aan de randen van Europa vergen Nederlandse inspanningen en inzet op het gebied van conflictpreventie, conflictstabilisatie en conflictindamming;
• De mondiale weerbaarheid tegen een volgende pandemie zal versterkt moeten worden. Deze weerbaarheid stoelt op voldoende reactiecapaciteit van de zorg; op R&D-capaciteit om vaccins te ontwikkelen én te produceren; en op het verbeteren van internationale early warning capaciteiten.

Download de notitie nu door op de “Download PDF”-knop te drukken.

Deze notitie is onderdeel van een serie waarin onderzoekers van Instituut Clingendael en het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies (HCSS) hun licht laten schijnen op de consequenties van deze pandemie. Eerder aan bod kwamen de geopolitieke gevolgen van de Coronacrisis, en wat dit betekent voor de Europese Unie (EU) en voor het multilaterale veiligheidsstelsel.

Disclaimer:

Het onderzoek naar en de productie van deze notitie is uitgevoerd binnen de PROGRESS kaderovereenkomst voor onderzoek. De verantwoordelijkheid voor de inhoud en meningen berust uitsluitend bij de auteurs en moet niet worden opgevat als een standpunt van de Nederlandse Ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie.

Challenges related to the water situation in Iraq are numerous and complex. While the supply of water from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers is decreasing, water demand is rapidly increasing. Iraq’s water supply has fallen by 30% since the 1980’s as a result of lower levels of rainfall, the construction of dams, heavy water use by the oil industry and the impacts of war on vital water infrastructure. By 2025, overall water supply is predicted to decrease by up to 60%, compared to 2015. Water quality has also deteriorated, resulting in  health crises and widespread protests.

The water challenges in Iraq have an interprovincial dimension that has received little attention at the national and international level. Even though the relationship between water and stability is complex and dependent on context, it can be asserted that geographical, legal, economic and socio-political factors impact the likelihood of water-related conflict.

How should this urgent and complex crisis be addressed? In this working paper, Water, Peace and Security (WPS) experts Dorith Kool, Laura Birkman and Bianca Torossian analyze this pressing and under-researched crisis and outline the building blocks to effectively address water-related conflict in Iraq.

Download the working paper here or by clicking on the “Download PDF” button on the top right of this page.

Water, Peace and Security:

This working paper is an outcome of The Water, Peace and Security (WPS) partnership. The partnership was founded in 2018 to pioneer the development of innovative tools and services that help identify and address water-related security risks. These tools and services can link hydrological, social, economic, ecological and political factors to pinpoint changes in short-term water availability and their potential impacts on society. Based on this information, evidence-based actions can be taken to mitigate human security risks, which WPS facilitates through capacity development and dialogue support.

WPS is a collaboration between the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a consortium of six partners: IHE Delft (lead partner), World Resources Institute (WRI), Deltares, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), Wetlands International and International Alert.

The Expert Group of the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS) released a new report, “Climate and Security in the Indo-Asia Pacific”, urging leaders to make climate change a security priority in the Indo-Asia Pacific.

This unprecedented report clearly outlines how climate change is already affecting the security situation in the Indo-Asia Pacific region and what the future security risks are.

The IMCCS is a group of senior military leaders, security experts, and security institutions across the globe – currently hailing from 38 countries in every hemisphere – dedicated to anticipating, analyzing, and addressing the security risks of a changing climate.

The emergence and ongoing consequences of Covid-19 have exposed serious societal vulnerabilities, even in wealthy nations, and demonstrated that foreseeable crises can have severe social, economic, political and security consequences. Furthermore, the Covid-19 crisis is a wake-up call for using science as a basis for risk management. Likewise, climate science should be incorporated into security policy and planning to avoid worst outcomes.

The report, which is part of the World Climate and Security Report 2020 Briefer Series, articulates six main points:

• Addressing the root causes of climate change should be a security priority for the region;
• Climate change should be higher on the regional security agenda;
• Climate change is worsening underlying security tensions in the region;
• Many security dynamics in the region are highly sensitive to climate change;
• Security communities in the Indo-Asia Pacific have a responsibility to prepare for and prevent these foreseeable security challenges;
• Better coordination between security communities is critical for combating climate-related security threats.

Download the high-res PDF of the “Climate and Security in the Indo-Asia Pacific” report here, or by clicking on the PDF button on the right. 

“The COVID-19 crisis has showed us how vulnerable we are to changes in our environment. We can’t hide from them behind our national boundaries and we have to address them collectively. The crisis also taught us what happens if we let time slip through our fingers; the longer we wait to prepare and to respond, the more severe the consequences will be. To me, COVID-19 is a prelude of the disruptions we can expect from our changing climate. This unprecedented report clearly outlines how climate change is already affecting the security situation in the Indo-Asia Pacific region and what the future security risks are. It’s not often that we have such foresight of future security threats. We have a responsibility to be prepared, to build resilience and to not let time slip through our fingers.”

General Tom Middendorp, Chair of the IMCCS and former Chief of Defence of the Netherlands

"The Indo-Asia Pacific experiences some of the highest levels of exposure and vulnerability to climate change in the world, while also accommodating populations with the lowest capacity to respond and adapt. The IMCCS is working on a risk matrix that assesses the nexus between climate change and security. This can strengthen vulnerability assessments and support and inform relevant decision-makers by including accurate, up-to-date insights of the security impacts of climate change and supporting efforts to integrate climate change into defense planning and operations."

Michel Rademaker, Executive Member IMCCS, Deputy Director The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies

"Climate science provides us with deep knowledge about what we can expect in terms of extreme weather and other risk factors. What is missing is a better understanding of the threat nexus between climate change and security. The IMCCS provides tools and services that support more accurate and timely early warning systems, improved and sustainable defense planning, and smarter civil-military collaborations in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. This IMCCS report provides a useful overview of the climate-driven security risks facing the Indo-Asia and Pacific regions and how these insights can be more effectively shared, bundled, and integrated into decision making processes."

Laura Birkman, Climate Security Analyst, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies

The character of war is changing, and the long-held U.S. superiority is under threat. New weapon systems require investment in modern defenses, but does absolute reliance on technology make our Alliance safer, or are we fooling ourselves and leaving open vulnerabilities? This snapshot by Patrick Bolder and Dorith Kool provides some insights and food for thought on future defense spending and the inherent strategic dilemmas it presents.

Investment in technology will be necessary to maintain security. The proliferation of artificial intelligence, robotics and autonomous and unmanned systems level the playing field between the U.S. and its adversaries. The rise of China, military modernization of Russia, nuclear developments in North Korea and Iran, and technologically empowered terrorist networks increasingly undermine U.S. power.

To counteract their adversaries’ technological edge, the U.S. has embarked on a Third Offset Strategy that pushes for more investment in state-of-the-art military technologies to bring U.S. dominance back. This will not be easy. Unlike the First and Second Offset Strategies of the Cold War, the Third Offset Strategy must deal with a multi-threat and multi-actor security environment.

Absolute reliance on military-technological advantage will not be a sustainable or effective strategy, however. While both China and Russia invest in new technology, they seem to understand the importance of investing in conventional and asymmetric capabilities and have somewhat strayed away from the technological hype.

Should we throw all our cards in high-end technology? Have the U.S. and its allies in NATO fallen for novel and savvy technologies too quickly?

Read the new snapshot by Strategic analysts Patrick Bolder and Dorith Kool and download the PDF here.

New snapshot by Richard Ghiasy.

While many fixate on the South China Sea, the vast Indian Ocean region (IOR), stretching from East Africa to South East Asia, and down to Australia, has become a tense multipolar security space. HCSS first flagged this development in the IOR in 2010.  Since then, developments have accelerated. Foreign military facilities and naval forces are proliferating around the Arabian Peninsula.

Simultaneously, the U.S. Navy's role as the primary security provider in the Indian Ocean, including for the safe passage of global trade and energy, has eroded. Consequently, the security dynamics and maritime order of the region are in a state of flux, and a long list of countries are seeking a foothold in the region. The most prominent of these is China.

But China’s rise is not the only factor behind the growing complexity in the IOR’s maritime order. New Delhi aims to become a key security provider in the region: India views the IOR as its natural sphere of influence and access to the Indian Ocean is crucial to Indian national security. In addition, smaller regional powers, particularly in the Middle East and the Gulf, harbor ambitions in the IOR. They aim to expand their areas of influence, notably along the East Africa littoral and the Red Sea.

The vast IOR is home to 32 littorals, numerous emerging markets, and about one-third of the world's population. The region is enjoying rapid economic growth and rapid urbanization, but is also particularly vulnerable to climate change and is a prime candidate for conflict over scarce resources. The IOR is a crucial trade and energy conduit, encompassing key ports and economic zones, and international sea lanes crisscross the IOR's northern stretches.

The result of this geopolitical ferment is a process of intensifying militarization of the region, but despite the increasing strategic significance of the IOR, the prospect of protracted armed conflict in this region remains small. All of the actors have an interest in maintaining a flourishing seaborne trade system. Nevertheless, one miscalculation or skirmish could set off a chain of events that could escalate into a major conflict and involve many stakeholders.

Download the snapshot by clicking on the PDF button.

Photo credit: US Navy

The global challenges caused by the Covid-19 crisis call for a combined effort of nations worldwide; however, the pandemic unfolds against the backdrop of a world that is increasingly characterized by great power competition. This new paper by HCSS and DISCvision highlights possible future interplays between nations in the aftermath of the corona crisis. Comparing four different post-Corona scenarios, it discusses the expected behaviour of world leaders of the U.S., India, China, Russia, France and Germany, based on their cultural context and specific leadership styles.

The findings show distinct features and scenarios. While the consequences of the ongoing pandemic require multilateral collaboration, it seems that the corona crisis further fuels the competition between world powers. The field of international relations is becoming an area of zero-sum games resulting in a world in which international cooperation is increasingly hard to achieve.

The U.S. and China are leading towards no future collaboration whereas Russia is showing no particular interest in improving global stability and cooperation. Only Germany and France perceive future collaboration as a necessary condition. The position of India is still not clear. While the outcomes are limited in their predictive value, the likelihood of intensified international cooperation seems rather poor in the near future.

Download the paper here, or by clicking on the PDF button.

About the authors

André Doffer is co-founder of DISCvision. He was employed by ACNielsen, Marketresponse and SmartAgent and is a well-known expert dealing with leisure and retail research and investments. After the merger of Marketresponse with SmartAgent he is responsible for the (geo-) data analytics, retail and real estate investments within DISCvision.

Douwe Reitsma is inspired by exploring the unknown. After being employed by the central government, being manager with a large municipal housing association he became founding partner of the global consultancy firm Ecorys. In 2000 he founded the market research company SmartAgent, which was followed in 2016 by the new venture dealing with behavioural economics: DISCvision.

Jetse Reitsma is trainee at DISCvision and an alumnus of the International Relations MA and the Philosophical Perspectives on Politics and Economy MA programmes at Leiden University. He completed thesis studies on the geopolitical context of the Russian energy industry, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and an analysis on the compatibility of Confucianist and liberal values.

State fragility presents an increasing global security threat. For years the international community has spent considerable effort to promote stability, by reforming and strengthening security sectors in fragile and conflict prone states.

These efforts have met with mixed results. Empirical evidence shows that security sector reform missions have frequently failed to bring stability. In fact, when the security sector forms part of (and sustains) dysfunctional security structures, SSR interventions risk further undermining rather than promoting stability. Evidence suggests that a security sector that is accountable and inclusive and abides by the rule of law can effectively provide stability to the state and its people.

To assess security sectors’ potential contribution to stability, our report which has been commissioned by the Team Conflict Prevention from the Dutch Ministry of Defence, offers a security sector assessment framework (SSAF). The SSAF yields a security sector typology of six security sectors based on an empirical mapping of security sectors in 82 countries: the criminal, the repressive, the oppressive, the fragmented, the transitioning and the stable.

The SSAF is intended to facilitate understanding of security sectors by providing a workable frame that helps policymakers better understand how and why security sectors contribute to or undermine stability, and tailor the design of policy accordingly.

Download the report here, or by clicking on the PDF button. 

In een nieuwe notitie gaat Rob de Wijk in op de geopolitieke effecten van Covid-19, de gevolgen voor de veiligheid en hoe Nederland hierop kan reageren. Download de notitie hier.

Momenteel vallen drie crises samen: de uitbraak van Covid-19, een recessie zonder weerga en een geopolitieke paradigmaverandering, terwijl de Brexit en klimaatverandering ook aandacht vragen. Deze perfect storm in combinatie met het opkomend populisme stelt beleidsmakers zodanig op de proef dat het de vraag is of de nationale politieke systemen en daarmee internationale organisaties als de EU en de NAVO dit aankunnen.

Als dat niet het geval is, kunnen de economische veiligheid, de territoriale integriteit en de maatschappelijke en politieke stabiliteit van Nederland in gevaar komen. Een beleidsomslag zonder precedent is noodzakelijk. Nederland staat daarbij voor een keuze: het multilateralisme versterken en werken aan de verdieping van de Europese samenwerking, met alle pijnlijke politieke keuzes van dien, of toestaan dat de EU teruggaat naar een vrijhandelszone of implodeert.

Download de notitie hier als PDF. 

Disclaimer

Het onderzoek naar en de productie van deze notitie is uitgevoerd binnen de PROGRESS kaderovereenkomst voor onderzoek. De verantwoordelijkheid voor de inhoud en meningen berust uitsluitend bij de auteurs en moet niet worden opgevat als een standpunt van de Nederlandse Ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie.

New snapshot out now! Download here. 

This snapshot considers the path forward for Dutch defense planning. While the Netherlands has a relatively small defense budget, wise investment in innovation for the future will allow these funds to go a long way in preparing for coming developments in warfare, especially as the coronavirus crisis highlights the need for better governmental budgeting. In particular, it is necessary to anticipate the rising importance of the cyber and hybrid-warfare domains and increase capabilities in these areas. This requires research, testing, and implementation of new technologies with collaboration across the different parts of the Dutch military forces, as well as a rethinking of the nature of military tasks and aims. In general, a move from nationally oriented, classical defense to modern, future-oriented strategies and skills is vital to maintaining and augmenting the Netherlands’ relevance on the international defense stage as a valuable partner in NATO and the European Union.

Download the snapshot here, or by clicking the PDF button on the right. 

Photo credit: US Airforce

Satellites, Space Exploration, and the Netherlands’ National Security

New Strategic Alert! Download here.

The economic relevance of space is substantive and growing. Currently, space’s value is primarily derived from satellites orbiting Earth. A 2019 study found that 87.5% of the $277bn in revenues generated in space could be attributed to commercial satellite services. These services are of critical importance to the functioning of the (inter)national economy. Positioning, timing, and navigation (PNT), communications, and Earth observation services form the backbone of many essential processes, such as fleet management or bank transactions. They are also key to the Netherlands’ military capabilities. Several strategic processes, from the execution of beyond line of sight (BLOS) operations to nuclear deterrence, are dependent on satellites. In the long term, space is also likely to play a role in the global energy transition. For example, the rare earth elements (REEs) contained in celestial bodies are in increasingly limited supply on Earth and are required for many renewable technologies.

As interstate competition heats up, an increasing number of states – more than 80 in 2018, compared to 50 in 2008 – have launched satellites into orbit. This, along with reductions in the cost of launching payloads, introduces both threats and opportunities from the Dutch perspective. Well-managed, commercially proactive, and internationally regulated initiatives to unlock and safeguard the space domain’s huge potential could contribute to European strategic autonomy, to the energy transition, and to a continued economic growth. Badly managed initiatives could see an intensification of interstate competition and the deterioration of public services.

Download the Strategic Alert by clicking on the PDF button. 

DISCLAIMER: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence.

New policy brief out now! Download here.

This policy brief discusses the methodology for assessing the impact of the lifestory approach on preventing and countering violent extremism. It recommends a mixed-methods approach of qualitative and quantitative elements including interviews, ethnographic observations, questionnaires, and project activities reception. Using these methods to explore the impact of the lifestories on violent extremists, directly affected individuals, and practitioners will provide valuable insight into the effectiveness of the approach in reducing extremist views and preventing radicalization.

This brief is an abridged version of the full report, which can be found at https://hcss.nl/report/measuring-impact-lifestory-approach-preventing-and-countering-violent-extremism.

Download the brief here, or by clicking the PDF button on the right.

New report out now! Download here.

Lifestory videos, which are the personal stories of affected individuals, can be very persuasive in changing attitudes and thus reducing violent extremist sentiments. However, it is important to be able to gauge how effective lifestories have been as an approach to reducing extremism in a community. Therefore, this report lays out a methodology for assessing the success of lifestories in countering and preventing violent extremism. Importantly, the lifestory campaign must be designed with measurable outcomes in mind, and so a pre- and post-story interview discussing the impact with the participant is a useful tool. The paper also recommends a mixed-methods approach that includes quantitative and qualitative research in the form of interviews, ethnographic observations, questionnaires, and project activities reception. Online indicators such as the number of clicks, views, length of viewing, generation of comments, number of redirected users, and the number of users in the lifestories database/website via Google Analytics are also a fruitful source of insight into the impact of the lifestory videos, providing valuable information about how to successfully prevent and counter violent extremism.

Download the report here, or by clicking the PDF button on the right.