Since the dawn of the atomic age, nuclear deterrence in Europe has been primarily provided by the US, first through bilateral alliances and later within the NATO framework. Within this structure, US tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) are currently based in the Netherlands (although this has never been confirmed nor denied by The Hague) and four other European non-nuclear NATO allies, and US strategic nuclear weapons cover European NATO territory.
Since the dawn of the atomic age, nuclear deterrence in Europe has been primarily provided by the US, first through bilateral alliances and later within the NATO framework. Within this structure, US tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) are currently based in the Netherlands (although this has never been confirmed nor denied by The Hague) and four other European non-nuclear NATO allies, and US strategic nuclear weapons cover European NATO territory.
In recent years the strength and cohesion of NATO has been jeopardized by rising tensions in the transatlantic relationship based on disagreements on defense spending. At the same time, Russia has been accused of violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, while EU-Russia relations have significantly worsened because of a series of other conflicts. This dynamic has weakened the perception of extended deterrence and increased the fear of decoupling USA and EU. It has prompted recent debates in EU states, for instance in Germany, on whether a European nuclear deterrent may be the way forward.
This snapshot gives a concise overview of the status quo of nuclear deterrence in Europe and the design of NATO nuclear sharing, explains the theoretical concept of extended nuclear deterrence, and offers a set of policy options for the EU and its member states to start addressing their changing strategic environment.
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Authors: Mihailo Jovetic (former Assistant Analyst) and Michel Roelen (Strategic Analyst).
The Global Security Pulse tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide.
This month’s edition explores trends identified within the realm of political violence. This Pulse presents new and underappreciated developments regarding the effects of large-scale foreign infrastructure projects, the premature repatriation of refugees, and resource mismanagement on the prevalence of political violence, as well as how these recent trends and developments affect the contemporary international order.
The Global Security Pulse tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide.
This month’s edition explores trends identified within the realm of political violence. This Pulse presents new and underappreciated developments regarding the effects of large-scale foreign infrastructure projects, the premature repatriation of refugees, and resource mismanagement on the prevalence of political violence, as well as how these recent trends and developments affect the contemporary international order.
The Global Security Pulse (GSP) is made using an advanced horizon-scanning methodology that relies on the manual monitoring of hundreds of validated foresight resources, the structured coding of signals, and expert assessment. The GSP product is based on the Clingendael Radar and has been further developed by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and the Clingendael Institute. It is part of the Strategic Monitor Program, which receives funding from the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
Authors: Reinier Bergema, Esther Chavannes, Willem Oosterveld, Bianca Torossian (HCSS). Contributors: Peter Knoope (ICCT), Pieter Bindt, Tim Sweijs (HCSS), Danny Pronk (Clingendael).
Use the button on the right to download the Pulse or click here to access the mobile version.
Click here to access the methodology document.
DISCLAIMER
The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
In the beginning of 2018, the People’s Republic of China formally invited countries in Latin America and the Caribbean to join its Belt and Road initiative (BRI). Created in 2013, the BRI has mainly be seen as an endeavor to secure steady supplies of raw materials, principally from Africa and the Middle East, and to tie the economic fates of its Asian neighbors to that of China. The big question: why would China want to include the Caribbean and South Pacific in the BRI? As neither region is highly promising in terms of critical raw materials, speculation about Chinese engagement has focused on geopolitical motives.
HCSS’ latest report, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative Looks East,’ aims to understand the consequences of China’s dealings with the nations in the Caribbean and the South Pacific, and offers recommendations to the Netherlands and its strategic partners on how to respond to these developments.
In both regions, the Chinese engage in large-scale infrastructure projects, including building highways, hospitals and schools but also government buildings and presidential palaces. As is the case with BRI and related projects elsewhere, China’s economic inroads also have geopolitical consequences, and affects good governance at the local level. In the Caribbean, Beijing benefits from the strategic neglect on the part of the United States, which traditionally considered the Caribbean as its own backyard. In the South Pacific, China has shown actual interest in establishing permanent military bases, while countries in the region could face pressure to facilitate this because of their sizeable external debt to China.
The most important policy recommendations for the Netherlands and its partners include advice on how to help the islands’ societies to become more resilient to Chinese influence, economically, socially, and politically. This can be done by offering alternatives for Chinese loans and investments, including through supporting existing regional organizations; supporting good governance in the region through civil society; empowering local media outlets; teaming up with like minded countries who have interests in the region; and, when opportune, to reach out to China in seeking to make it a responsible security partner both in the Caribbean and in the South Pacific.
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Tim Sweijs, Director of Research at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, spoke recently at the SEDE Public Hearing on "Artificial Intelligence and Its Future Impact on Security".
Tim Sweijs, Director of Research at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, spoke recently at the SEDE Public Hearing on "Artificial Intelligence and Its Future Impact on Security".
This event was held at the European Parliament in Brussels and is a result of the increasing need for awareness and discussion surrounding artificial intelligence and its role in the future of security and defense. Within his testimony, Tim drew reference to two HCSS reports: “Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Defense” and “Playing To Your Strengths: A Different Perspective on Future Capabilities for the Royal Netherlands Army”.
Download the testimony via the button on the right or click here.
In this new HCSS Energy Transition Program article, Jan Frederik Braun and Lucia van Geuns argue that effective carbon pricing and climate-related disclosure should be key pillars of the Dutch commitment to formulate a new climate agreement before the end of the year.
In this new HCSS Energy Transition Program article, Jan Frederik Braun and Lucia van Geuns argue that effective carbon pricing and climate-related disclosure should be key pillars of the Dutch commitment to formulate a new climate agreement before the end of the year.
Strengthening these pillars contribute to an international level playing field for climate action and is the only meaningful way for the Netherlands to contribute to lower global CO2 emissions.
Download the article via the button on the right or click here for the mobile version.
Also available is a shortened opinion piece in Dutch, which was originally published in the October edition of the Dutch Environment Magazine. Please click here to view.
This report contains the results from a research project aimed at identifying new capabilities for the future Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA). Rather than sketch a full future force profile, it concentrates on promising new, or to be renewed capabilities. The results are intended to feed ongoing transformation efforts within the RNLA and inform the Army leadership in anticipation of the Defense Review 2020 [de Herijkingsnota].
This report contains the results from a research project aimed at identifying new capabilities for the future Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA). Rather than sketch a full future force profile, it concentrates on promising new, or to be renewed capabilities. The results are intended to feed ongoing transformation efforts within the RNLA and inform the Army leadership in anticipation of the Defense Review 2020 [de Herijkingsnota].
In the context of the changing character of conflict on the one hand, and the burgeoning costs of traditional military platforms on the other, force providers should actively explore new capabilities for their armed forces that play to their strengths.
For small and medium sized force providers, their agility puts them in a relatively propitious position to pursue innovative concepts and capabilities, instead of trying to merely be smaller versions of the great powers’ militaries.
This report presents six themes, each suggesting a diverse set of new or to be renewed capabilities for the RNLA.
1. Rethinking Phase Zero: Shaping the Human Domain;
2. Multi-Domain, Multi-Level Operations;
3. AI in the OODA Loop;
4. Robotic and Autonomous Systems;
5. Mosaic Warfare: Distributed and Networked Capabilities;
6. Empowering the Agents of Resilience
This report offers a concise description of each of these themes, examines relevant developments for the Army, and identifies promising and typically underexplored capabilities or lines of capability development that the RLNA can pursue in conjunction with a particular theme. This is summarized in Table 3 on page 53.
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The Global Security Pulse tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide.
This month’s edition explores trends connected to the existing nexus between crime and terrorism, and presents new and underappreciated developments regarding European disengagement strategies, rising right-wing extremism, countering FinTech abuse, and the effects on the international order.
The Global Security Pulse tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide.
This month’s edition explores trends connected to the existing nexus between crime and terrorism, and presents new and underappreciated developments regarding European disengagement strategies, rising right-wing extremism, countering FinTech abuse, and the effects on the international order.
The Global Security Pulse (GSP) makes use of an advanced horizon-scanning methodology that relies on the manual monitoring of hundreds of validated foresight resources, the structured coding of signals, and expert assessment. The GSP product is based on the Clingendael Radar and has been further developed by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and the Clingendael Institute. It is part of the Strategic Monitor Program, which receives funding from the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
Authors: Reinier Bergema, Esther Chavannes (HCSS), Renske van der Veer, Walle Bos (ICCT). Contributors: Alastair Reed (TU Delft), Kristina Tranakieva, Tim Sweijs, Arlinda Rrustemi (HCSS), Danny Pronk, Aaron Arends (Clingendael).
Use the button on the right to download the Pulse or click here to access the mobile version.
Click here to access the methodology document.
DISCLAIMER
The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
Authors: Willem Oosterveld & Kristina Tranakieva
In a time of Brexit and growing populism in Europe, economic conditions are never too far from the picture. Rising unemployment and inflation can be important drivers of Euroscepticism, sometimes even in times of economic growth.
Authors: Willem Oosterveld & Kristina Tranakieva
In a time of Brexit and growing populism in Europe, economic conditions are never too far from the picture. Rising unemployment and inflation can be important drivers of Euroscepticism, sometimes even in times of economic growth.
This snapshot explains the connection between the economy and changing attitudes towards the E.U. While economic conditions are important for Euroscepticism, individuals cannot always accurately perceive them, often leaving room for politically-motivated narratives to fill the gap.
Download the Snapshot via the button on the button on the right or click here for the mobile version.
The Global Security Pulse tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide.
This month the Global Security Pulse focuses on the subject of political warfare. It specifically assesses how it plays a role in the foreign relations of Russia and consists of three separate parts:
The Global Security Pulse tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide.
This month the Global Security Pulse focuses on the subject of political warfare. It specifically assesses how it plays a role in the foreign relations of Russia and consists of three separate parts:
- A table of the main trends regarding the threat of political warfare, with Russia remaining the most active and aggressive actor;
- A table on the impact of political warfare on the overall state of the international order, based on a set of qualitative indicators/proxy’s;
- The results of a structured Horizon Scan.
All (raw) results are available with the authors.
Use the button on the right to download the Pulse or click here to access the mobile version.
The Global Security Pulse (GSP) makes use of an advanced horizon-scanning methodology that relies on the manual monitoring of hundreds of validated foresight resources, the structured coding of signals and expert assessment. The GSP product is based on the Clingendael Radar and has been further developed by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and the Clingendael Institute. It is part of the Strategic Monitor Programme, which receives funding from the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence.
Authors: Aaron Arends, Danny Pronk (Clingendael). Contributors: Sico van der Meer, Jurgen Oppel, Tony van der Togt (Clingendael); Reinier Bergema, Katarina Kertysova, Michel Roelen, Kristina Tranakieva (HCSS).
DISCLAIMER
The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
Over the last few years the oil price has experienced significant changes. From well over 100 dollars per barrel in the pre-2014 high oil price world, the price dropped to as low as 30 dollars per barrel in early 2016. Since then, it has embarked on a trajectory of gradually rising prices, reaching close to 70 (WTI) or 80 (Brent) dollars per barrel by mid 2018.
Over the last few years the oil price has experienced significant changes. From well over 100 dollars per barrel in the pre-2014 high oil price world, the price dropped to as low as 30 dollars per barrel in early 2016. Since then, it has embarked on a trajectory of gradually rising prices, reaching close to 70 (WTI) or 80 (Brent) dollars per barrel by mid 2018.
In this paper we aim to discuss the questions and uncertainties that, in our view, matter the most for the future of oil markets and the oil industry. Whilst discussing different scenarios we will not refrain from focusing on the scenario that we consider the most likely (rather than giving an extensive overview of potential scenarios). We will do so for three different timeframes:
- Short term, up to 2020, with a focus on shale oil
- Medium term, 2020-2025, with a focus on conventional oil
- Long term, 2025-2040, with a focus on peak oil (demand)
Authors: Jilles van den Beukel, independent energy analyst (formerly a principal geoscientist at Shell) & Lucia van Geuns
Download the paper via the button on the right or click here for a mobile version.
Listen to the podcast with Jilles and Lucia exploring the same topic.
The Global Security Pulse tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide.
This month’s edition explores trends on the vertical tensions between individuals, national governments, and the European Union, and presents novel developments regarding Euroscepticism, trust in governing institutions in the Netherlands and Europe, and the effects on the international order.
The Global Security Pulse tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide.
This month’s edition explores trends on the vertical tensions between individuals, national governments, and the European Union, and presents novel developments regarding Euroscepticism, trust in governing institutions in the Netherlands and Europe, and the effects on the international order.
The Global Security Pulse (GSP) makes use of an advanced horizon-scanning methodology that relies on the manual monitoring of hundreds of validated foresight resources, the structured coding of signals, and expert assessment. The GSP product is based on the Clingendael Radar and has been further developed by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and the Clingendael Institute. It is part of the Strategic Monitor Program, which receives funding from the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence.
Authors: Reinier Bergema, Kristina Tranakieva, Willem Oosterveld, Tim Sweijs (HCSS). Contributors: Adriaan Schout , Danny Pronk, Minke Meijnders (Clingendael), Lucie Kattenbroek (HCSS).
Use the button on the right to download the Pulse or click here to access the mobile version.
Click here to access the methodology document.
DISCLAIMER
The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
Joint publication of the Atlantic Council, the University of Denver’s Pardee Center for International Futures and HCSS.
Joint publication of the Atlantic Council, the University of Denver’s Pardee Center for International Futures and HCSS.
The Method Appendix to the study Influence and Power in a Globalized World reviews the theoretical justifications of each sub-dimension included in the Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity (FBIC) Index. It also includes a broader discussion of the data series supporting each sub-index based on an extensive review of the literature. The FBIC Index includes forty-two economic, political, and security indicators with over 200 million individual observations from 1963 to the present. The multidimensional, dyadic measurement of influence of the FBIC Index makes it possible to conduct a broader analysis of different aspects of international relations than traditional power, resource-based approaches.
Click on the button on the right to download the appendix or click here for a mobile version.
Jonathan D. Moyer, Tim Sweijs, Matt Burrows and Hugo Van Manen, 2017. "Appendix to Power and Influence in a Globalized World." Working paper December 2018. Pardee Center for International Futures, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, Denver, CO.
The study Influence and Power in a Globalized World can be accessed here.
The Global Security Pulse tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide. This month we conduct an open scan, identifying threats and novel insights on the international order, particularly in the categories of trade and economics, climate and environment, technology, and megatrends.
The Global Security Pulse tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide. This month we conduct an open scan, identifying threats and novel insights on the international order, particularly in the categories of trade and economics, climate and environment, technology, and megatrends.
The Global Security Pulse (GSP) makes use of an advanced horizon-scanning methodology that relies on the manual monitoring of hundreds of validated foresight resources, the structured coding of signals, and expert assessment. The GSP product is based on the Clingendael Radar and has been further developed by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and the Clingendael Institute. It is part of the Strategic Monitor Programme, which receives funding from the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence.
Authors: Karlijn Jans, Kristina Tranakieva. Contributors: Tim Sweijs, Stephan De Spiegeleire, Reinier Bergema (HCSS), Minke Meijnders, Kars de Bruijne, Aaron Arends (Clingendael).
Use the button on the right to download the Pulse or click here to access the mobile version.
Click here to access the methodology document.
DISCLAIMER
The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
The Dutch government is about to reach a general agreement on an ambitious national climate accord. This accord is designed to prepare the Netherlands for a greenhouse gas emission reduction of at least 49% by 2030.
The Dutch government is about to reach a general agreement on an ambitious national climate accord. This accord is designed to prepare the Netherlands for a greenhouse gas emission reduction of at least 49% by 2030.
Read the Policy Comment on the Dutch ambitions by Strategic Analyst Jan Frederik Braun and Strategic Advisor Lucia van Geuns. This first publication in the HCSS Energy Transition Program paper series argues that effective decarbonization at home requires cross-border climate action from both companies and government.
Download the paper via the button on the right or click here.
Cyberspace is managed by stakeholders from civil society, the private sector, and, to a lesser degree, by governments. The latter, however, is increasingly asserting its role in cyberspace, leading to a redistribution of power in which States are not only competing with other stakeholders, but also amongst each other. All cyberspace users thus face a power struggle between States that stands to affect the private sector and civil society, the multi-stakeholder approach to managing Internet resources, and therefore cyberspace writ large.
Cyberspace is managed by stakeholders from civil society, the private sector, and, to a lesser degree, by governments. The latter, however, is increasingly asserting its role in cyberspace, leading to a redistribution of power in which States are not only competing with other stakeholders, but also amongst each other. All cyberspace users thus face a power struggle between States that stands to affect the private sector and civil society, the multi-stakeholder approach to managing Internet resources, and therefore cyberspace writ large.
This article appropriates a realist model in international relations– the balance of power theory (BOP) – and adjusts it with neoliberal concepts of power to help better understand the challenge of stability between States in and on cyberspace. It specifically enables the “cybered” international relations of governments to be analysed against the backdrop of the complex ecosystem of stakeholders. This does not presuppose that States are or should be the most important or influential actors in cyberspace. Instead, this article focuses on State interests. It identifies two conditions of the BOP theory and applies them to cyberspace in three different scenarios previously suggested by States, and offers one suggestion on the way forward.
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This article was published in the European Cybersecurity Journal Volume 3 (2018) Issue 4.