Previous HCSS monitors found India to be significantly less assertive than the other great powers. In our 2016 Great Power Assertivitis study, we even claimed that the subcontinent was the sole exception to the rule that great powers seem to exhibit a quasi-pathological proclivity to throw around their weight in negatively assertive ways. In our recently published Changing International Order (Geodynamics) Alert, however, which covers the first half of 2017, some of the indicators we use to track global GPA - especially our global event datasets - started painting a different picture of India. An analysis of the quantitative and qualitative evidence over the last 6 months reveals a significant uptick in the country’s economic and military assertiveness, specifically towards its great North-Eastern neighbor, China. Since the Indian subplot of the great power story receives so much less attention from Western governments, institutions and media, HCSS decided take a closer look at some of the domestic and international dynamics at work here.

To many, the world seems to be on fire. A small, newly nuclear-armed authoritarian country is incessantly taunting the world's sole remaining superpower. That superpower itself is now increasingly seen even by some of its staunchest allies as a "threat to world peace". Russia's large military exercise along its Western borders has Europeans on their seat's edge. And less mediatized, but no less impactful for the world was the tense military standoff between the two giant and nuclear-armed Asian great powers. In the midst of these events are unprecedented technological changes and climate-related cataclysms, that potentially herald fundamental shifts. Are all these events glimpses of a larger underlying iceberg or merely a statistical anomaly of our fascination with extreme events? And how can we even be sure?

These questions are not purely of academic interest - also not (limited) to the Netherlands. On January 1, 2018, the Kingdom of the Netherlands will take a seat at the most prominent and prestigious international table - the United Nations Security Council - for a period of one year. It will even chair the Security Council during the month of March 2018. As it prepares for this weighty responsibility, getting a better evidence-based understanding of the actual geodynamics behind the current international order is of the utmost importance. This alert presents a few selected highlights from our datasets in 'nowcasting' geodynamics in the period Jan- Jul 2017.

Click here to read more.

Photo credit: Kate-2112 via Visualhunt.com / CC BY
 

This study looks at the foreign and security policies of 17 Populist Sovereignist political parties and analyzes the implications for international security and defense.

Populist Sovereignism (PopSov) did not begin with Brexit nor did it end with Marine Le Pen losing the French Presidential election in May 2017. PopSov Parties reject the current political establishment and advocate taking back national control. They are far from a fringe movement. Currently, populist sovereignist parties rule alone or are part of the governing coalitions in 8 countries, including the US, and they hold more than 10 percent of a total of 11 countries’ seats in the European Parliament.

Consequences: risky business or a healthy feedback signal?

Many observers warn that PopSov parties threaten to upend a decades old liberal consensus about the benefits of free trade in promoting economic growth and welfare, the importance of global and regional governance to solve transnational challenges, and the benefits of liberal democracy. Threats – and actions – to exit the European Union, leave NATO, and dissolve free trade agreements certainly sound like the death toll of that consensus.

Stephan De Spiegeleire, one of the authors of the study argues that Popsovism is best framed as ‘a potentially healthy feedback signal about certain negative aspects of the recent rush towards a supposed global liberal utopia that have been underestimated by national, European, and international policymakers.’ But he also adds a note of caution: ‘the health of a democracy depends on such signals being voiced and – even more importantly – heard.' 

Foreign and security policies: what PopSov parties want

In order to better understand the potential consequences for the international order, the authors analyzed the party manifestos of 17 PopSov parties in Europe and the US and identified their positions on national security and foreign and security policy. Amongst the key findings are:

• PopSov Parties are not illiberal per se, and they are not necessarily isolationist. Yet, their proposed reforms at times sit uncomfortably with the tenets of liberal democracy, in particular where it concerns protections for minorities.

• Popsov Parties are strongly in favour of reasserting the sovereignty of the nation-state by reducing the power of international organizations and push back against a decades-old trend of increasing multilateral cooperation through strong, rules-based institutions.

• Most PopSov Parties support NATO, but most are also supportive of warm relations with Russia. With the exception of 1, all parties want to significantly boost military and defense capabilities over current levels.

On the basis of a scenario analysis, the report offers four recommendations to policymakers in nation states and the EU:

• Foreign and Security Policy Starts at Home. The real center of gravity of PopSovism is not formed by the political strongmen and -women who are spearheading them, but by those parts of our societies that are and/or feel left behind by technological change and globalization. The social contract between state and society must be restored by getting domestic policies ‘right’ for all constituencies. 

• Resist Knee-Jerk Reactions and Address Legitimate Grievances. Instead of dismissing the concerns of PopSov supporters as backwards or unfounded, policymakers should get better at parsing fact from fiction and legitimate from contrived grievance and – most importantly – at addressing both.

• Give Democracy a Chance. Recent developments in the US and in various European countries show the resilience of the more traditional democratic model.

• Develop Homeland Defense and Bolster Resilience. Societal, economical and political resilience is crucial. Aspects that may require specific and increased attention by defense and security organizations lie less in the realm of the ‘agents of conflict’ (’the enemy’) than in the realm of the ‘agents of resilience.’

Dutch foreign policies and the EU

With respect to Dutch foreign policies, the report concludes that its interests can best be upheld (ironically) through the vehicle of the European Union. The US is distancing itself from Europe, and the Dutch relationship with Russia is likely to remain difficult: there will be few alternatives but to pursue an even more proactive position in the European Union.

Energy transition, necessary for the successful implementation of the Paris Agreement and the delivery of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, requires development and large-scale deployment of low-carbon technologies. These will increase global demand for different minerals and metals, what mandates a wide range of adjustments at the state level. The need to re-think, reduce, replace, recycle, redesign and re-distribute the use of scarce commodities is particularly heightened.

The message put forward at the 2017 Raw Materials Conference on June 23rd in The Hague was threefold: 1) realizing energy transition requires large amounts of raw materials and a significant upscaling of mining activities; 2) such activities have to be carried out in a sustainable manner, and should respect human rights, the needs of local communities, and the environment; 3) transition to a circular economy model in product chains is required to mitigate existing and emerging challenges in the short run. Circular design of windmills and solar panels is needed.

The challenges, takeaways and recommendations outlined in this policy paper were compiled on the basis of extensive in-house research, information gleaned at the round-table and the raw materials conference, and reflect the informed opinions of relevant stakeholders representing the government, private industry and knowledge institutes.

Download the policy paper via the button on the right. 

Na de ontdekking van het Groningen aardgasveld in 1959, het grootste gasveld in West-Europa, is Nederland meer dan een halve eeuw zelfvoorzienend geweest met deze energiebron. Het keerpunt kwam door de aardbeving in Huizinge in de provincie Groningen in augustus 2012 met een kracht van 3,6 op de schaal van Richter. die gebeurtenis heeft geleid tot een plafond voor de jaarlijkse productie van 21,6 miljard kubieke meter (Billion Cubic Metres, BCM), ruim de helft minder dan in de jaren vóór 2014.

Er zijn veel vragen over de leveringszekerheid in de toekomst: wat zijn de consequenties op langere termijn van de voorgenomen beslissingen over Groningen? Kan de productie in Groningen in de toekomst nog verder worden verlaagd? Wat is de rol van de productie van aardgas uit de kleine velden? Is ondergrondse gasopslag nodig? Kan de import van aardgas dan wel de inzet van duurzame energiebronnen de productie van Groningen vervangen? Wat zijn daarvan de kosten en geopolitieke consequenties? Hoe realistisch is een snelle vermindering van de aardgasvraag in Nederland eigenlijk gegeven de Nederlandse energieagenda? Deze en veel andere vragen komen in dit paper, aan de orde. Het paper is een gezamenlijke studie van TNO en HCSS. 

Download het paper via de knop rechts. 

China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) project was formally introduced by Chinese President Xi-Jinping in 2013. The project, aimed at integrating trade and investment in Eurasia, encompasses over $900 billion in planned investments of infrastructure across Central and South Asia, the Middle East, and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

A dedicated forum for cooperation with CEE countries has been around now for several years. Originally created in April 2012, ‘the so-called ‘16+1’ framework constitutes a platform which brings heads of state together annually to strengthen dialogue and cooperation between China and the CEE region. Chinese investment interests within the CEE region appear strongly related to privatization opportunities, including large scale infrastructure projects and public procurement opportunities.

China’s interest in the CEE region, and the creation of the ‘16+1’ format in particular, also gives rise to concerns that China is attempting to use the region as a medium through which to influence the EU from within. This influence manifests itself primarily in the form of initiatives which aim to persuade and/or pressure CEE countries to adopt favorable policies vis-à-vis China. These concerns stem from two directions. First, there is a fear that some deals concluded with China may not comply with EU rules on public procurement, or other regulations and guidelines. Second, there is a fear of political influencing, which some see exhibited by the EU in avoiding direct references or statements towards China’s legal defeat over the South China Sea after the objection by some member states

China’s engagement in the Middle East is arguably the most important component of the OBOR initiative as far as its strategic objectives are concerned. Beijing enunciates a clear interest in developing strong structural ties within the region, particularly with fossil fuel exports being the centerpiece, at least for the initial stage. This also means of course that China will almost inevitably get embroiled in political matters, and thus pose a challenge to the interests of other key players such as Russia, the US and the EU. While China seeks to avoid becoming yet another outside power that meddles in the region’s affairs, it does already show signs of being prepared to become politically engaged. In its engagement in the Middle East, China’s policy is banked on the hopes of being the newish entrant in the region, which absolves it from any imperialist or interventionist baggage. This notwithstanding, regional players, are going to be tempted to play the China card when dealing with the other major (outside) powers, which will effectively pull China into the region’s political vortices.

Given OBOR’s unprecedented scale, this new study by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) investigates the extent to which ‘Belt and Road’ related investments in CEE and the greater Middle East bring sufficient economic weight to both regions that at the same time can be turned into political influence. If this is indeed the case, a pertinent question to ask is whether China is prepared and willing to play a greater political (and/or security) role in CEE and the Middle East in the first place? In addition, the paper seeks to understand whether China’s role can be judged as positive or negative for regional security, as seen from the viewpoint of Europe and the Netherlands.

The study can be downloaded via the button on the right.

The report was also featured by the Morning Vertical; Radio Free Europe's daily Russia brief.

Political violence is real and present. How, why and when political violence manifests itself is crucial for turning early warning into early action. The earlier decision- and policymakers are made aware of the potential for imminent outbursts of violence, the sooner they can act to manage or mitigate the consequences or even deter the occurrence altogether. With a wealth of data and models available, it is time to reap the fruits of the data revolution. Looking at the HCSS Political Violence Monitor: what are the 10 countries most at risk of civil wars, coup d’états or state led mass killings?

Download the alert via the button on the right or go to the interactive online environment.

The rising demand for natural resources including energy, minerals and agricultural products, has been driven mainly by population growth in developing countries and an improvement in living standards in many countries around the world. Various factors however serve to limit the availability of natural resources. First of all, resources are not equally distributed across the globe. Second, there are serious environmental consequences to expanding production and consumption of natural resources, such as climate change. Third, natural resource extraction and export can be hampered by armed conflict. Finally, large exporters at times choose to restrict the export of certain commodities, for instance to promote domestic growth.

Open, transparent, and well-functioning markets for metals, minerals and other natural resources are essential for ensuring access to supply and to safeguard the economic wellbeing of nations worldwide. However, corruption, political instability and violence are factors that act as important constraints to growth in the production of natural resources and cause economic pain in countries that depend on their import.

As the second largest importer and transit hub of critical raw materials in the European Union (EU), the Netherlands has a vital interest in ensuring that global resource markets function in an open and transparent manner within a rule-based order. This report, commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), takes a closer look at the global institutional architecture that focuses on the governance of natural resources, abiotic minerals and metals in particular. In doing so, this study seeks to identify gaps in the thematic coverage and actor representation, and come up with ways in which the Dutch MFA can improve the way it advances Dutch interests with respect to the functioning of natural resource markets. Thematically, the study devotes particular attention to the issue of security of supply, as well as sustainability (e.g., resource efficiency and environmental care) and transparency (due diligence, human rights etc.). Finally, the study identifies points of intervention in relation to specific organizations and raw materials where the MFA can exert the most influence.

The report can be downloaded using the button on the right.

May 25th marks the first visit of U.S. President Trump to Europe. It will also be the first time the newly-elected U.S. President will attend a NATO gathering. Besides opening NATO’s new headquarters, leaders will discuss NATO’s burden sharing, counterterrorism actions and tense relations with Russia. High on the meeting’s agenda will be the 2% GDP defense spending pledge, a topic that has dominated NATO’s airwaves again since President Trump took office. The US administration has been clear about its demand for its European partners to spend more of their national budgets on defense and adhere to the Wales 2% GDP spending pledge. The EU-NATO partnership has meanwhile gained in importance. The potential of enhanced cooperation between the EU and NATO is clear: more efficient defense spending will yield both more and better capabilities, and in turn boost NATO’s defense posture. This alert sets out the key strategic challenges and opportunities and offers four recommendations for the leaders of state meeting in Brussels.

Read the alert by downloading the document via the button on the right. 

Photo credit: DOD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

De NAVO-Top markeert het eerste bezoek van de Amerikaanse President Trump aan Europa, waar hij ook de pas gekozen Franse President Macron zal ontmoeten. Naast de opening van het nieuwe hoofdkwartier van de NAVO, zullen de leiders spreken over de lastenverdeling binnen de NAVO, de gespannen betrekkingen met Rusland en maatregelen in de strijd tegen het terrorisme.

De discussie rondom de 2% BBP NAVO-norm zal de berichtgeving domineren, maar deze Alert stipt vooral het belang van het partnerschap tussen de EU en de NAVO in de lastenverlichtingsdiscussie aan. Het potentieel van een betere samenwerking tussen de EU en de NAVO is duidelijk, maar de bredere en snel ontwikkelende strategische context binnen het NAVO bondgenootschap (Brexit, de ontwikkelingen in Turkije en de onvoorspelbaarheid van het Amerikaans leiderschap) zullen hun uitwerking hebben op het succes van deze samenwerking.

Deze Strategic Alert bevat, naast de belangrijkste strategische uitdagingen rondom de NAVO special meeting, vier aanbevelingen voor de leiders in Brussel. Het document is te downloaden via de knop rechts.

De volgende Strategic Alert zal in september verschijnen op de Strategische Monitor-website, die in ontwikkeling is. Zodra deze website online gaat, zal hierover nader worden bericht.

Photo credit: DOD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

Artificial intelligence (AI) is on everybody’s minds these days. Most of the world’s leading companies are making massive investments in it. Governments are scrambling to catch up. Every single one of us who uses Google Search or any of the new digital assistants on our smartphones has witnessed first-hand how quickly these developments now go. Many analysts foresee truly disruptive changes in education, employment, health, knowledge generation, mobility, etc. But what will AI mean for defense and security?

In a new study HCSS offers a unique perspective on this question. Most studies to date quickly jump from AI to autonomous (mostly weapon) systems. They anticipate future armed forces that mostly resemble today’s armed forces, engaging in fairly similar types of activities with a still primarily industrial-kinetic capability bundle that would increasingly be AI-augmented. The authors of this study argue that AI may have a far more transformational impact on defense and security whereby new incarnations of ‘armed force’ start doing different things in novel ways. The report sketches a much broader option space within which defense and security organizations (DSOs) may wish to invest in successive generations of AI technologies. It suggests that some of the most promising investment opportunities to start generating the sustainable security effects that our polities, societies and economies expect may lie in in the realms of prevention and resilience. Also in those areas any large-scale application of AI will have to result from a preliminary open-minded (on all sides) public debate on its legal, ethical and privacy implications. The authors submit, however, that such a debate would be more fruitful than the current heated discussions about ‘killer drones’ or robots. Finally, the study suggests that the advent of artificial super-intelligence (i.e. AI that is superior across the board to human intelligence), which many experts now put firmly within the longer-term planning horizons of our DSOs, presents us with unprecedented risks but also opportunities that we have to start to explore.

The report contains an overview of the role that ‘intelligence’ - the computational part of the ability to achieve goals in the world - has played in defense and security throughout human history; a primer on AI (what it is, where it comes from and where it stands today - in both civilian and military contexts); a discussion of the broad option space for DSOs it opens up; 12 illustrative use cases across that option space; and a set of recommendations for - especially - small- and medium sized defense and security organizations.

The report can be downloaded via the button on the right. 

Authors Stephan De Spiegeleire and Tim Sweijs were interviewed (in Dutch) by NOS op 3 about AI and concerns about 'killer robots.' The interview can be read here.

The nexus between natural resources and security needs to be better understood and more closely monitored. Climate change exacerbates environmental challenges and natural resources scarcity which are contributing factors to the onset of political violence both within and between states. A more granular grasp of the dynamics involved in these risk multipliers through the use of integrated datasets will allow for enhanced situational awareness and enable timely action. It requires concerted action and closer coordination by vital political, military, diplomatic and societal stakeholders from the public and private sector across the globe. This Issue Brief summarizes the key takeaways of a meeting of a Global Expert Group that convened at the Future Force Conference held in The Hague, the Netherlands, in February 2017. The Brief highlights the contributions by principal experts from the panel and the audience and outlines ten recommendations for future action.

Authors: Yulia Aleshchenkova, Alberto Pallecchi, Kitty van der Heijden, Tim Sweijs

Download the Issue Brief via the button on the right. 

At the Paris Climate Conference held in December 2015, 195 countries adopted the Paris Agreement – the first universal, legally binding global climate deal. The signatory parties committed themselves to a global action plan that aims to keep global warming to well below 2°C and to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5°C.

As part of our Geo-Economics research initiative, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies has investigated the geopolitical consequences of climate mitigation and energy transition among a number of countries richly endowed in hydrocarbons who potentially stand to lose a significant part of their revenue stream as a result of demand changes for fossil fuels. If demand for oil and gas demand were to decrease as a result of successful climate mitigation policies, the financial and social stability of these countries will – ceteris paribus – be negatively affected, especially if they fail to reform their domestic economies.

The presented study, entitled The Geopolitical Impact of Climate Mitigation Policies, employs a number of innovative investigative methods and analytical approaches to generate insights regarding sociopolitical stability in the wake of the world’s transition to renewable energy systems in a number of major oil- and gas-exporting nations near Europe. On top of this, the report looks closely at the energy situation in Sub-Saharan Africa and analyzes in detail which choices developing nations face with respect to their future energy mix.

Given the deep, and complex relationship between the global energy sector and international politics, these findings have numerous implications – both short and long term – for our future efforts to combat climate change while simultaneously fending off any consequential drivers of sociopolitical instability.

Download the study via the button on the right.

Op 20 februari hebben het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies (HCSS) en Instituut Clingendael hun Monitors gepresenteerd. Beide instituten brengen sinds 2012 jaarlijks hun monitor uit als onderdeel van de Strategische Monitor van de Nederlandse overheid. Bert Koenders, minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, nam de studies namens het kabinet in ontvangst.

Rob de Wijk sprak hierover met het NCTV magazine Nationale Veiligheid en Crisisbeheersing: “De grote uitdagingen zijn een goed moment om ons te bezinnen over de wijze waarop wij invulling willen geven aan het veiligheidsbeleid van Nederland, te meer omdat het kabinet uitgaat van comprehensive security."

Het volledige artikel kunt u rechts downloaden en werd gepubliceerd in het Magazine Nationale Veiligheid en Crisisbeheersing.

De HCSS Strategische Monitor vindt u hier.

In mei 2015 kondigde de minister van Veiligheid en Justitie aan dat de Strategie Nationale Veiligheid (SNV) wordt herijkt.Er werd gekozen voor een nieuwe aanpak waarvan het nieuwe Nationaal Veiligheidsprofiel een belangrijk zichtbaar resultaat is. Dit veiligheidsprofiel is inderdaad een breuk met het verleden en vormt een nieuwe start voor de verdere ontwikkeling van de SNV.

Rob de Wijk schreef hier een artikel over voor het Magazine Nationale Veiligheid en Crisisbeheersing. 

U kunt het volledige artikel rechts downloaden.