Dit is hét moment voor de Europese Unie om zijn status als ontluikende wereldmacht te verstevigen, en Nederland moet hierbij een actieve rol vervullen. Dat is de belangrijkste conclusie van de Strategische Monitor 2020-2021, het jaarlijkse rapport dat trends en ontwikkelingen in de internationale orde volgt en een risicoanalyse presenteert over de nationale veiligheid van Nederland.

De Monitor wordt ontwikkeld door denktanks Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies (HCSS) en het Clingendael Instituut, in opdracht van de ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie. 

Download hier de Strategische Monitor | English version here

Zes uitdagingen

Het rapport beschrijft zes belangrijke uitdagingen waarmee Nederland en de EU de komende tien jaar in de post-corona wereld geconfronteerd zullen worden.

1. Multilateralisme verandert van karakter.
2. De interactie tussen de grote mogendheden gaat een grotere rol spelen bij de vormgeving van het mondiale systeem.
3. Middenmachten gaan zich assertiever opstellen bij het behartigen van hun belangen, nu het multilaterale systeem zwakker wordt en de concurrentiestrijd tussen de grote mogendheden toeneemt.
4. Als gevolg van de verzwakking van het multilaterale systeem en toenemende concurrentiestrijd tussen de grote mogendheden niet-statelijke actoren meer macht en invloed krijgen.
5. Het 'grijze gebied' tussen oorlog en vrede wordt het voornaamste strijdtoneel in de internationale concurrentiestrijd.
6. De invloed van klimaatverandering op de internationale vrede en veiligheid de komende jaren steeds groter zal worden.

Geen ‘return to normal’

Er komt geen “return to normal” van de trans-Atlantische betrekkingen, ook niet onder President Biden, zo stellen de onderzoekers. Europa zal meer verantwoordelijkheid moeten nemen voor haar eigen defensie en een onafhankelijk buitenlands beleid moeten voeren. Nederland kan hier een overbruggende rol spelen, maar dat vraagt om meer Europese samenwerking. Dit is nodig om de invloed van een relatief klein land als Nederland te kunnen vergroten, maar ook om één vuist te kunnen vormen tegen de verdeel- en heerstactieken van China. Terwijl China een belangrijke economische partner blijft, is het nodig om met een verenigd Europees antwoord te komen op de steeds agressievere houding van zowel China als Rusland.

Assertiviteit, samenwerking en trans-Atlantische brugfunctie

De Strategische Monitor geeft aanbevelingen voor het Nederlandse buitenland- en veiligheidsbeleid om deze gevarieerde uitdagingen het hoofd te bieden.

1. Een meer assertieve geopolitieke opstelling om de Nederlandse én Europese belangen en waarden te beschermen.
2. Een meer assertieve en vooral uniforme houding ten opzichte van China.
3. Een meer uitgekiende en ook in dit geval een uniforme benadering voor de omgang met Rusland.
4. Nederland moet vanwege de historisch nauwe banden met de VS ernaar streven een trans-Atlantische brugfunctie te vervullen op specifieke beleidsterreinen. Ook moet het binnen de NAVO streven naar een gelijkwaardiger lastenverdeling met de VS en meer doen om de vrede en veiligheid in de eigen regio te bevorderen.
5. Nederland moet strategisch samenwerken met andere belangrijke middenmachten, zowel op het gebied van handel als op veiligheid.
6. De ontwikkeling van een aanpak is nodig voor de omgang met niet-statelijke actoren. Daarin wordt een effectief engagement gekoppeld aan ontmoediging van de onvermijdelijke keerzijden van samenwerking met niet-statelijke actoren die uit eigenbelang handelen.
7. Als laatste, en misschien wel belangrijkste, moet Nederland voortvarend de samenwerking aangaan met andere actoren om de gevolgen van de wereldwijde klimaatverandering aan te pakken.

Deze aanbevelingen zijn niet uitputtend maar bieden een globale blauwdruk voor het toekomstige Nederlandse buitenland- en veiligheidsbeleid, zowel om de status van de EU als ontluikende wereldmacht te helpen verstevigen als om de complexe uitdagingen van nu en de komende tien jaar doeltreffend te kunnen aanpakken. Vanuit het gezichtspunt van dit rapport is dat onontbeerlijk in de geopolitieke genesis van Nederland, aldus de onderzoekers.

De Strategische Monitor is hier te downloaden.

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Auteurs: Jack Thompson (HCSS), Danny Pronk (Clingendael Instituut) & Hugo van Manen (HCSS).

De Strategische Monitor 2020-2021 is uitgevoerd in opdracht van de ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie in het kader van de PROGRESS raamovereenkomst Lot 5 (Strategische Monitoring & Foresight). De verantwoordelijkheid voor de inhoud en voor de geuite meningen berust uitsluitend bij de auteurs. Publicatie vormt geen goedkeuring door de Nederlandse ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie.

The world is entering a new and highly consequential phase of the Space Age.

This brings with it many threats and opportunities. The Netherlands boasts a productive and innovative space industry. Globally, launch costs have been reduced dramatically. Yet this democratization of space access also brings with it many challenges. Increased access means increased congestion, risk of collisions, space debris and a growing dependence by the Netherlands on space-based infrastructure.

The extra-terrestrial realm contains vast quantities of raw materials which bring the prospect of enormous economic gains. The increasing number of actors operating in space raises the scope for geopolitical competition. This in turn has led major powers to begin militarizing and weaponizing space in support of terrestrial warfighting capabilities on Earth, while moving towards the establishment of extra-terrestrial footholds.

Our new Strategic Alert delves into the challenges and opportunities of the Space Age and how the Netherlands, and the world, should deal with them.

Authors: Hugo van Manen, Tim Sweijs, Patrick Bolder, with contributions from Jens Emmers and Benedetta Girardi.

Download the PDF here.

The consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic in Iraq, in parallel with the country’s water issues, are exacerbating existing health, economic, socio-political, and security challenges. This brief outlines the ways in which COVID-19 interacts with and impacts these four pressing and interrelated challenges. The analysis focuses on the impacts on Iraq as a whole and the four provinces selected for further engagement by the WPS partnership: Basrah, Dhi-Qar, Wasit, and Missan. It also looks at the broader set of considerations on the need for an integrated approach for addressing water, security and health challenges in the country.

The report was prepared by Dorith Kool, Laura Birkman and Giorgio Berti for the Water, Peace & Security (WPS) partnership and can be downloaded here.

In order to remain on top of the rapid changes in the international environment, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence have tasked The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) and the Clingendael Institute to conduct research within the framework of the Strategic Monitor, which monitors trends and developments in the international order and presents a risk analysis on the national security of the Netherlands.

The main theme of the 2020-2021 Strategic Monitor, “Geopolitical Genesis: Dutch Foreign and Security Policy in a Post-COVID World”, is that now is the time for the European Union to consolidate its status as a nascent global power, and that the Netherlands must play an active role in this. In spite of the election of President Biden, transatlantic relations will not return to the pre-2016 status quo, the researchers argue. Europe will have to take more responsibility for its own defense and pursue a more assertive and strategic foreign policy. As a relatively small country, the Netherlands can play a bridging and facilitating role in a few key areas, but  a more unified European approach will also be necessary in order to be able to resist the divide and conquer tactics of countries such as China and Russia. While China will remain an important trading partner, it poses significant economic and political challenges.

Download the Strategic Monitor PDF here. 

The report describes six major challenges that the Netherlands and the EU will face in the post-corona world over the next ten years:

1. The nature of multilateralism is changing. Cooperation will continue to be a central feature of the international system, but it will frequently occur in ad hoc and rapidly shifting arrangements.
2. Interaction between the major powers will play a greater role in shaping the global system.
3. Middle powers are becoming more assertive in defending their interests, as the multilateral system changes and competition between major powers intensifies.
4. As a result of the evolution of the multilateral system and increasing competition between the great powers, non-state actors are gaining more power and influence.
5. Gray zone operations, or hybrid warfare, are an increasingly important feature of the international system, one that presents more challenges for democracies than for authoritarian states.
6. The impact of climate change on international peace and security will continue to increase in the coming years.

The Strategic Monitor 2020-2021 provides recommendations for Dutch foreign and security policy to meet these challenges:

1. It recommends a more independent and active geopolitical approach in order to protect Dutch and European interests and values.
2. A more assertive and, unified stance toward China.
3. A more sophisticated and more unified approach to dealing with Russia.
4. Due to its historically close ties with the US, the Netherlands should strive to fulfill a transatlantic bridging function in specific policy areas. Within NATO, the Netherlands and Europe should aim for a more equal burden-sharing arrangment with the US and do more to promote peace and security in its own region.
5. The Netherlands should collaborate strategically with other middle powers, especially in the Global South, both in the fields of trade and security.
6. The Netherlands and its European partners should develop a more sophisticated approach to non-state actors, who play an increasingly important role in the international system. This approach should leverage the crucial work done by non-state actors in areas such as public health and climate change, but also disincentivize the problematic behaviors that are inevitable with these self-interested actors.
7. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Netherlands should do even more to engage with other actors, both at the state level and in cooperation with sub-state and non-state actors, to fight climate change and to mitigate the worst consequences.

This list of recommendations is not exhaustive, but it does offer a broad blueprint for the Netherlands and its EU partners to begin moving beyond their long-standing political and security dependence on the United States. Doing so is necessary, both in order to solidify the European Union’s status as a global power – and Dutch influence within the EU – and to more effectively address the complex challenges they face. Indeed, from the perspective of this to this report, it is an indispensable phase in their geopolitical genesis.

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The Strategic Monitor 2020-2021 was commissioned by the Netherlands’ ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence within the PROGRESS framework agreement, Lot 5 (Strategic Monitoring & Foresight). Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed rests solely with the authors. Publication does not constitute an endorsement by the Netherlands’ ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence.

The Hague, March 3rd, 2021 - Researchers Danny Pronk and Jack Thompson from the Clingendael Institute and HCSS present the Strategic Monitor to the Minister of Defense, Ank Bijleveld.

The decline in domestic gas production has resulted in the Netherlands, once a self-sufficient country, becoming increasingly dependent on imports of natural gas from Russia and of LNG from the US and Qatar, among others. While the economic consequences of Dutch import dependency have been widely discussed, this paper gives particular attention to geopolitical and environmental concerns from the perspective of the Netherlands.

Growing dependence on Russia weakens the geopolitical position of the Netherlands and, by extension, of the EU as a whole. A country that the EU and the Netherlands have repeatedly condemned and opposed, has the permanent ability to interfere with the energy provision of member states and of the EU’s neighboring countries. At the same time, the import of foreign gas is associated with increased greenhouse gas emissions and methane leakages, undermining the Netherlands’ capacity to reach its ambitious climate goals. These risks are exacerbated by the fragmentation in EU member states’ energy policies, allowing centralized and geopolitically-motivated actors like Russia to turn countries against each other.

 A purely economic approach fails to take into account a significant array of risks associated with gas dependence, necessitating a multi-vector approach to analysing gas security in the Netherlands.

Geopolitical and environmental dilemmas of Dutch gas supply security can be found in our latest paper by Irina Patrahau and Lucia van Geuns.

Download the PDF here. 

De Europese afhankelijkheid van buitenlandse technologie heeft tot een discussie over soevereiniteit en digitale autonomie geleid, waarin meerdere invalshoeken aan bod komen: rechtsbescherming, veiligheid, onderwijs en economie.

Terwijl deze discussie enthousiast in Brussel werd gevoerd, leek het debat in Nederland te ontbreken. Daarom hebben het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies (HCSS) en TNO in januari 2021 een workshop georganiseerd met experts uit het bedrijfsleven, academici en de overheid om deze discussie aan te gaan. De bevindingen en aanbevelingen van die workshop worden in dit rapport uitgebreid uitgelegd.

Download de PDF hier

Auteurs: Louk Faesen (HCSS), Tom van Schie (TNO), Michel Rademaker (HCSS), en Paul Timmers (European University Cyprus) en Matthijs Veenendaal (TNO).

With the growing complexities of modern warfare, grey zone conflicts, and the increasing diversity of both local and global actors, there is a need for the military to carefully consider ways in which actors’ behavior is influenced. Use of force alone does not guarantee victory, it is necessary to outmaneuver the adversaries in the human environment.

In this report, Klaudia Klonowska and Frank Bekkers delineate behavior-oriented methods to improve the capacity of the armed forces to accurately interpret human behavior in a military context and efficiently anticipate conflict situations. Their mixed-methods investigation yields insights into conceptual, methodological, and procedural aspects of influencing behavior of relevant actors.

The report reveals that behavior-oriented operations, in the context of the Dutch military operations, are sidelined or misunderstood as a separate sphere of actions, independent from physical capabilities. In stark contrast, their analysis showed that influencing behavior should be a central element in military planning, integrated into a military doctrine, and effectively and consistently embedded in the analysis of the operational environment.

The report presents a systematic methodology which builds upon current practices to improve the ability to measure, visualize, and anticipate human behavior. Furthermore, the report provides recommendations how to embed a behavior-oriented approach more centrally in the military planning and practice.

Find out in this new HCSS report by Klaudia Klonowska and Frank Bekkers.

Update 8 March 2021: HCSS has been notified that the text contained some factual inconsistencies regarding the Behavioural Dynamics Methodology (BDM). These have been corrected on pages 37, 39, 44, 46 and 47. We have also added a concise description of the BDM in Appendix I, for which we would like to thank Emic Consulting. We urge our readers to download the current version of the report for future reference.

As the US retreats from its leadership role in Europe, Turkey has pursued an increasingly independent defense policy, attempting to position itself as a regional power and producing tensions with fellow NATO allies.

While strong interdependencies remain, conflict, not just of values, but of interests, has made the relationship between Turkey and NATO a tenuous one. The absence of European defense on the Biden agenda means that even in a post-Trump era, frictions between Turkey and NATO are set to remain.

What does this mean for the future of NATO-Turkey relations?

Find out in this new HCSS snapshot by Dorith Kool (HCSS), Patrick Bolder (HCSS) and Colonel (ret.) Murat Dogan (Turkish Army).

Geopolitieke verhoudingen verharden en dreigingen nemen toe in aantal, variëteit en complexiteit. De Defensievisie 2035 stelt dat het groeiende beroep dat in de komende jaren op Defensie wordt gedaan en de beschikbare middelen nu niet op elkaar aansluiten. Defensie kampt met een structureel tekort aan personeel, zowel wat betreft de kwantitatieve personele vulling, als de kwalitatieve vulling; dit vormt een van de belangrijkste risico’s voor Defensie. De integratie van mens en technologie biedt hier een mogelijke oplossing.

Het verder ontwikkelen van een technologisch hoogwaardige defensieorganisatie moet erop gericht zijn om de arbeidsproductiviteit en daarmee de effectiviteit te verhogen. Technologie kan worden ingezet om defensiepersoneel te ondersteunen juist in die rollen waar een tekort is, zoals vliegers of technische en geneeskundige rollen. Automatisering, digitalisering en robotisering bieden kansen om een deel van het routineuze, vieze en gevaarlijke werk over te nemen. Tegelijkertijd kunnen mensen worden ingezet daar waar zij de meeste meerwaarde hebben: waar interactie, inlevingsvermogen en ethische afwegingen van belang zijn.

De integratie tussen mens en technologie kan dus leiden tot meer effectief inzet van beperkte middelen om de arbeidsproductiviteit van defensiepersoneel te verhogen. Dit betekent echter niet dat Defensie een organisatie van hoogopgeleide of technische mensen moet gaan worden. Juist de integratie met technologie maakt het mogelijk om laag of andersopgeleide mensen meer effectief in te zetten, en vergroot daarmee de wervingspool voor Defensie.

Om deze voordelen te realiseren, is het nodig om de kansrijke gebieden te identificeren waar technologische modernisering het meest de arbeidsproductiviteit kan vergroten.

Download het rapport hier. 

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Dit document vormt de eindrapportage van het Beleidsonderzoek Arbeidsextensieve Technologische Oplossingen dat in opdracht van de DG Beleid van het Ministerie van Defensie in de periode september-december 2020 door het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies (HCSS) en PricewaterhouseCoopers Nederland (PwC) is uitgevoerd.

Auteurs: Frank Bekkers (HCSS) en Sanne Maas (PwC), met bijdragen van Naveen Srivatsav (PwC) en Dorith Kool (HCSS).

Militaries around the world are developing, integrating and using robotic and autonomous systems (RAS) in line with the evolution of warfare. Further thinking needs to be done regarding the conditions under which this process takes place within the Netherlands and what challenges and implications are likely to arise as a consequence. The HCSS project ‘RAS in a Military Context’ sought to contribute to this discussion.

Over a two year period, the project yielded five public research papers covering a range of topics relevant to the implementation of RAS in a military context. These research papers cover military applicability, ethical considerations, legal discourse, requirements for cooperation and the implementation of RAS in a military context. All papers are combined in this Capstone document, including a Synthesis, which briefly summarizes the analyses, and a series of six factsheets.

Download the RAS Capstone report here. 

Our approach was focused on acquiring the expertise of practitioners, researchers, ethicists, legal specialists, industry professionals, technicians, civil society organizations, military personnel and other members of the defense community. Doing so enabled us, not only to gather a multi-faceted understanding of the subject matter, but also to uniquely connect these stakeholders together and foster challenging discussions between them. Over the course of the project we held five meetings with a diverse group of Sounding Board members who steered our research trajectory and provided valuable input into our position papers and draft research papers. We also gathered expertise from over 200 stakeholders who joined our six expert sessions, which involved various methodologies including scenario based discussions, design sessions, serious gaming exercises and interviews.

Our secondary objective was to inform public debate and create a more nuanced conversation about RAS in a military context that resisted prevailing ideas of ‘killer robots’. To this end, we held public symposiums on the ethical dilemmas RAS pose, released five De Strateeg podcasts in cooperation with BNR Nieuwsradio, organized conferences and roundtables and in February 2021, we released an 18-minute documentary, available on YouTube.

The RAS Project Team would like to thank all who have been involved in this project for generously offering their time and expertise, particularly our Sounding Board members. Our hope is that readers find our research and practical recommendations helpful in structuring their thinking and that the discussion on this important topic will continue to develop and thrive.

Michel Rademaker, Project Leader

Over the last two years, HCSS has conducted research on Robotic and Autonomous Systems (RAS) in a military context concerning several aspects and dilemmas. Throughout this paper on the implementation of RAS, we hope to inspire thinking and stimulate the reader to reflect on the future use of RAS, draw recommendations towards the year 2035 that fit within the ‘Operationeel Kader voor het Landoptreden’ (and align these recommendations with the foreseen ‘Defensievisie 2035’) and consider recommendations for the implementation of RAS towards the year 2045.

The rationale behind looking far into the future is twofold. First, significant questions must be addressed early in the development and implementation of RAS. Many technologies are still in their infancy and similarly, our understanding of the political, strategic, tactical and, operational application of RAS is in its early stages. The second reason stems from the idea that people tend to overestimate the maturation of technologies in the short term and underestimate the speed of technological developments in the long term. Thus, by using both shorter- and long-term time horizons, room is created to think out-of-the-box whilst simultaneously lending opportunity to plan against a plausible, but—not yet ready—future.  

This paper assesses some relevant elements for the implementation of RAS into the armed forces and especially the Army. It raises questions regarding the formulation of concepts and doctrines, how command & control over RAS is organized, and the consequences of these changes for personnel (including their training), logistics, infrastructure, organizational processes, and leadership. Against this background, this paper develops recommendations regarding which lines of development or policies must be developed, the timeframe by which this should occur, and the prerequisites for these policies.

Climate Change is widely being recognized as a matter of national and international security as well as human security. Climate-related disasters such as floods, tropical storms, landslides and other extreme weather events are likely to occur more often as well as increase in scope. Natural hazards can and will pose substantial risks to overall human suffering, societal stability and security. This report by Femke Remmits, Elisabeth Dick and HCSS Deputy Director Michel Rademaker presents a unique and innovative methodology for assessing climate hazards and security of nations and regions: the Climate Security Risk Index.  

Download report PDF here

Climate change acts as a threat multiplier by triggering or aggravating existing cleavages within societies. More specifically, when climate change overburdens a countries' governmental capacity, societies become more vulnerable to social or political instability.  

The Climate Security Risk Index focuses on the risks to national security and human suffering generated by climate-related disasters and comprises of elements such as territorial integrity, ecological security, economic security, physical security, human security and social and political stability. This unique methodology supports the combination of multiple indicators and plots both the probability of a climate-related disaster to occur and the potential impact of said natural hazard.  

Using this new risk assessment tool, decision-makers on the global, national and regional level can identify specific targets to prevent, mitigate and/or avert the security impact and human suffering of climate-related extreme weather events. Additionally, this methodology can be utilized for tracking the progress and effectiveness of disaster-risk reduction measures or strategies.  

This Climate Security Risk Methodology and Assessment was coordinated with the International Military Committee on Climate and Security, sponsored by HCSS and co-sponsored by the Luxembourg Government, and shouldered by the Water, Peace & Security (WPS) partnership and Progress WP6.

“Climate Change is widely being recognized as also a matter of national and international security. The COVID-crisis shows us the importance of being prepared and of being able to anticipate. Militaries around the world have learned the importance of early warning based on clear defined warners and indicators. They also learned what the consequences are of NOT being prepared. There currently is no adequate forecasting tool for assessing the security impact of climate change. This Climate Security Risk Methodology and Assessment fills that gap and provides a unique forecasting tool based on a very innovative big data analysis of related global databases." - Tom Middendorp

“Climate change is a threat multiplier disrupting society and threatening global security and stability.  To combat the climate crisis and begin to “climate-proof” our societies, we need predictive tools that allow us to reliably assess risk and make responsible decisions based on well understood warnings and indicators.  This important Climate Security Risk Methodology Report does just that. It allows readers to assess the specific climate perils – wildfire, drought, flooding, etc – in the context of probability and impact on countries and regions. This tool should be an essential component of national security planners in forecasting levels of risk from climate perils and acting today to build resilience and reduce emissions.“ - Sherri Goodman, Secretary General, International Military Council on Climate & Security and Senior Strategist and Advisory Board Member, Center for Climate & Security 

 

Digitalisering is de afgelopen decennia de drijvende kracht geweest achter economische groei en wereldwijde integratie. De toenemende geopolitieke instabiliteit in de wereld, de snelgroeiende macht van China en de afnemende bereidheid tot samenwerking vanuit de VS, hebben er toe geleid dat Europa zich ook bewust is geworden van zijn afhankelijkheid van buitenlandse grondstoffen, producten en diensten.

Vooral op het terrein van digitale technologieën dreigt de EU achterop te raken. Deze toenemende afhankelijkheid heeft ertoe geleid dat, vooral vanuit de EU, vele initiatieven zijn ontplooid om de strategische autonomie te versterken.

De mogelijkheid voor Nederland om haar economische en veiligheidsbelangen te beschermen en te bevorderen hangt in belangrijke mate af van de (innovatie)kracht van de technologiesector en de digitale weerbaarheid van de samenleving. Achterblijvende investeringen bedreigen echter de strategische positie van Nederland en de EU doordat de toekomst van het digitale domein voor een groot deel wordt vormgeven en beheerd door niet EU-partijen.

Digitale weerbaarheid is echter geen zero-sum game waarbij alles wat niet in eigen hand of door de meest vertrouwde partners is ontwikkeld of kan worden gecontroleerd, onveilig is.

Om de strategische autonomie voor de lange termijn te kunnen blijven waarborgen moet Nederland fors investeren in de eigen innovatie- en concurrentiekracht. Dit moet zoveel mogelijk in EU-verband worden uitgewerkt. Alleen zo kan voldoende massa worden gecreëerd om wereldwijd relevant te blijven ten aanzien van de hoogtechnologische ontwikkelingen die noodzakelijk zijn om de digitale weerbaarheid te waarborgen.

Dit whitepaper is in samenwerking tussen TNO en The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) tot stand gekomen.

Auteurs: Matthijs Veenendaal (TNO), Tom van Schie (TNO), Michel Rademaker (HCSS) Louk Faesen (HCSS)

Russia’s dependence on revenues from oil and gas production is now higher than that of the Soviet Union in the 1980’s. The prospects for fossil fuels however, have deteriorated in recent years.

US shale oil gives a downward pressure on oil prices and the ever-increasing determination to actively combat climate change is expected to result in decreased oil demand. In addition, it is becoming increasingly challenging to maintain Russia’s oil production at its current level. Although Russia’s gas reserves are plentiful, making money from them is getting more and more difficult, partially because LNG has become the dominant way for long distance gas transport.

How does the Russian oil and gas industry, and the Putin regime in general, deal with these challenges and what are its prospects?

Find out in this new HCSS paper by Jilles van den Beukel and Lucia van Geuns.

Download the Factsheet here. 

Moderne conflictvoering neemt steeds vaker hybride vormen aan, waarbij het onderscheid tussen oorlog en politiek, conflict en vrede, soldaat en burger en gevechtsveld en veilig gebied vervaagd. Hierbinnen zijn militaire organisaties permanent actief, in een bredere omgeving en vanuit een breder palet aan te bereiken effecten. Militaire cyberoperaties vormen daarom een belangrijke spil in het takenpakket van een moderne krijgsmacht.

In dit nieuwe rapport identificeren Louk Faesen, Tim Sweijs, Frank Bekkers en Timon Domela Nieuwenhuis Nyegaard wat de mogelijke rol van de Koninklijke Landmacht in het cyberdomein kan of moet zijn en welke capaciteiten de Landmacht dient te ontwikkelen.

Drie tactische effecten staan centraal:

• het beschermen van netwerken, individuen en platformen
• het vergroten van situational awareness & understanding
• het vermeerderen van de slagkracht

De auteurs doen concrete aanbevelingen op het gebied van doctrine, organisatie en commandovoering, opleiding en training, personeel, materieel en faciliteiten, beleid, en interoperabiliteit.

Download het rapport hier.