The Global Security Pulse (GSP) tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide, allowing you to stay ahead in new security developments. This month we present novel developments and must-reads on international peace and security in cyberspace. Conflict between states are taking new forms, with cyber operations taking a leading role. In recent years, the risk of a major cyber exchange between nation states, has often been described as a major threat in national security incidents.
The Global Security Pulse (GSP) tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide, allowing you to stay ahead in new security developments. This month we present novel developments and must-reads on international peace and security in cyberspace. Conflict between states are taking new forms, with cyber operations taking a leading role. In recent years, the risk of a major cyber exchange between nation states, has often been described as a major threat in national security incidents. While this dire outlook is partially connected to the overall level of geopolitical tension, there is a significant concern that the ability of governments to successfully manage the threat of major conflict is hampered as they only make up one of three actor groups in the overall cyberspace regime complex.
The GSP is a product made in collaboration with the Clingendael Institute. It uses an advanced horizon-scanning methodology which involves a systematic scan of literature, conferences, twitter, and validated expert input. The GSP product is based on the Clingendael Radar and has been further developed by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and the Clingendael Institute. It is part of the Strategic Monitor Program (2018–2019 can be found here, and older publications are listed here), which receives funding from the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
Authors: Louk Faesen, Bianca Torossian, Carlo Zensus (HCSS) Contributors: Tim Sweijs, Hugo van Manen (HCSS), Danny Pronk (Clingendael)
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DISCLAIMER
The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
This report contains the results from a research project aimed at identifying new capabilities for the future Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN).
This report contains the results from a research project aimed at identifying new capabilities for the future Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN).
With the type of naval operations and tasks for the period up to 2030-35 largely enduring, the current "regional power projection" profile of the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) must be strengthened and renewed. We envisage the core of the future naval force to remain a versatile mix of surface and sub-surface combatants, shipborne helicopters and unmanned systems for intelligence purposes and extended force projection, modern amphibious forces and long-range land attack capability to counter Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) threats. All main vessels should be ocean-going, able to navigate the main operating theaters in the European seas and the Carib under all conditions. But even while we expect that naval operations and tasks, as well as the overall force profile of the RNLN, will evolve rather than drastically change, the RNLN must substantially innovate — but not beyond recognition — its personnel, materiel, doctrines and processes, organization and structures.
Some key lines of development for the naval capability portfolio for the period up to 2030-35 are:
- Unmanned systems in the air, space and on and below the sea, so-called UxVs, will increasingly take over the operational functionality of the manned ‘mother ships’ from which they are launched (and which, for the period up to 2030-35, remain the central command hubs at sea).
- Next to the flexibility offered by adaptive configurations of UxVs, modularity by design and provisions-for, e.g. multifunctional launch containers, will make it easier and less costly to introduce new technology on board of naval platforms.
- In warfighting scenarios, opponents will increasingly know the position of surface vessels in real time, making them vulnerable to long-range precision weapons. Submarines, which remain largely stealthy, will therefore play a growing role in forward offensive operations in disputed waters. The RNLN should continue to offer a highly valued contribution to allied capabilities within its niche of oceangoing, non-nuclear powered submarines.
- Naval land attack capabilities are required in a multi-domain approach to counter advanced A2AD capabilities. Amphibious and special operations (partially merging) launched from the sea also feature in this integrated approach.
- Space assets for communication, navigation and maritime situational awareness are increasingly vital to naval operations.
- For the next generation naval combatants, new weapon types such as energy weapons, railguns, hyper-velocity missiles and intelligent torpedoes should be contemplated, but quite possibly not initially acquired.
- (Counter-)mine capabilities will increasingly merge. Sea mines, as a cheap means for area denial, play an important role in e.g. various terrorist and escalating gray zone conflict scenarios. Continuous development capacity is required to keep ahead of the operational developments.
- In the period up to 2030-35, operations will increasingly be multi-domain and multi-level. High-quality and timely situational awareness and understanding is key, shared across domains and levels on the basis of 24/7 connectedness. Using AI and big data analysis techniques, better tools to produce actionable intelligence are vital.
HCSS CEO Paul Sinning will hand over the first copy of the printed report to vice-admiral Rob Kramer, commander of the RNLN, on July 4, 2019.
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EU enlargement campaigns have historically been met with caution in the Netherlands at the policy level and by the Dutch society. Through a historical analysis of periods of EU enlargement, it becomes apparent that the Netherlands has often delayed expansion.
EU enlargement campaigns have historically been met with caution in the Netherlands at the policy level and by the Dutch society. Through a historical analysis of periods of EU enlargement, it becomes apparent that the Netherlands has often delayed expansion. Despite this, a balanced approach has tended to prevail in these instances, as processes were merely stalled, rather than spoiled.
Though Dutch skepticism is rooted in legitimate concerns, the extent to which these concerns are invoked does not reflect the realities on the ground. Therefore, the Netherlands should take a balanced approach on EU enlargement, through greater collaboration between government entities, civil society, and media.
In doing so, the Netherlands could assist in ameliorating the image of the EU, and thereby promote its brand of liberal democracy to strengthen democratic processes in EU neighbor countries. With regard to South Eastern European countries, said efforts can serve to counterbalance the rising influence of China, Turkey, and Russia, among others, as well as to increase security and stability on the EU's border, and prevent relapse to conflict.
Read the policy brief here.
This synthesis report is part of our Strategic Monitor 2018 - 2019, which monitors trends and developments in the international order and presents a risk analysis on national security of the Netherlands. This is a translation of the original version in Dutch.
This synthesis report is part of our Strategic Monitor 2018 - 2019, which monitors trends and developments in the international order and presents a risk analysis on national security of the Netherlands. This is a translation of the original version in Dutch.
This report is a summary of the analyses, trends and developments presented in the Strategic Monitor 2018-2019.
The end of the post-war multilateral world order based on cooperation and rules has been loudly proclaimed in recent years. And yet there is no robust evidence for it. The multilateral world order is certainly on the wane, but as of yet there is no new, dominant type of order. In short, there is an interregnum. In this Strategic Monitor authors Tim Sweijs and Danny Pronk conclude that the international system is currently undergoing a phase transition between different system states, and that such a transition is characterised by unusual dynamics and events.
At the same time, the trend analysis shows a predominantly negative threat assessment. Rather than improving, this is expected to worsen in the years ahead. International cooperation in the international order is declining. In most areas we are seeing a shift from cooperation towards confl ict, accompanied by the systematic violation of rules and norms. This picture is not expected to change in the years ahead.
All these developments will put pressure on the traditional principles of Dutch foreign and security policy, including international cooperation in the EU and NATO as the primary multilateral arenas for the promotion of our interests. The high interconnectedness of security threats requires a policy in which different instruments of state power are deployed synergistically, not only in the internal-external security nexus but also across the different policy domains.
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HCSS Energy Transition Program releases new report “Energy R&D Made in Germany: Strategic Lessons for the Netherlands.”
The Netherlands and Germany are close partners in the energy transition. They share ambitious climate targets and a need to accelerate the energy transition in a cost-effective manner.
HCSS Energy Transition Program releases new report “Energy R&D Made in Germany: Strategic Lessons for the Netherlands.”
The Netherlands and Germany are close partners in the energy transition. They share ambitious climate targets and a need to accelerate the energy transition in a cost-effective manner.
Written by HCSS Strategic Energy Analyst Jan F. Braun, the report aims to promote a strategic discussion between the Netherlands and Germany on long-term bilateral cooperation in energy R&D.
The report provides an overview of Germany’s complex energy R&D policy, detailing actors, aims and financial means. The key message is that the Netherlands can learn from Germany’s long-term and strategically coherent policy approach.
Research findings invite stakeholders from the Netherlands and Germany to step up their cross-border cooperation on a range of energy R&D issues of common interest in a more consistent manner. In strengthening bilateral cooperation between the two countries, the report recommends the establishment of a bilateral ‘Energy Priority Program’.
Shared Dutch-German strategic interests in specific energy R&D subjects include heat, hydrogen, e-mobility and storage. Due to economic and political interdependence, as well as to geographical proximity to the Netherlands, the report pays particular attention to the energy R&D policy of North Rhine-Westphalia.
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Contact:
Dr. Jan Frederik Braun, Strategic Energy Analyst
Email: janfrederikbraun@hcss.nl
Tel.: +31 (0)6 18 59 31 60
Dit rapport is het resultaat van een beschouwing over de rollen, taken en ontwikkelingen voor de Koninklijke Luchtmacht voor de komende tien tot vijftien jaar. Veel vervangingsbesluiten voor de luchtmacht zijn recent genomen en moderniseringsprogramma’s zijn in uitvoering of in planning. Dat bepaalt al een groot deel van de toekomstige capaciteiten. Die zullen bestaan uit bemande jachtvliegtuigen (F-35), onbemande verkenningsvliegtuigen (MQ-9), luchttransport en tankervliegtuigen (MRTT), diverse helikopters en middelen in de ruimte.
Dit rapport is het resultaat van een beschouwing over de rollen, taken en ontwikkelingen voor de Koninklijke Luchtmacht voor de komende tien tot vijftien jaar. Veel vervangingsbesluiten voor de luchtmacht zijn recent genomen en moderniseringsprogramma’s zijn in uitvoering of in planning. Dat bepaalt al een groot deel van de toekomstige capaciteiten. Die zullen bestaan uit bemande jachtvliegtuigen (F-35), onbemande verkenningsvliegtuigen (MQ-9), luchttransport en tankervliegtuigen (MRTT), diverse helikopters en middelen in de ruimte. Desondanks zijn er voor de komende periode relevante ontwikkelingen aan te wijzen die het optreden en de middelen van de Luchtmacht zullen beïnvloeden.
Zo zal de techniek en kennis van onbemande systemen, in combinatie met Artificiële Intelligentie en Big Data-analyse, steeds belangrijker worden. In het komend decennium gaat het om een effectieve teaming van mens en machine. Big Data zal voorts in de logistieke processen rolbepalend worden. Informatie komt steeds centraler te staan, niet alleen als middel (informatiegestuurd optreden), maar ook als doelwit en wapen. Middelen in de ruimte, worden steeds belangrijker, zeker om invulling te geven aan de toenemende behoefte aan goede, snelle en brede Situational Awareness en Situational Understanding (SA/SU). De rollen en taken van Airpower zullen in de kern niet veranderen, maar wel steeds meer ingebed worden in een geïntegreerde benadering van alle instrumenten van macht waarin snel geschakeld moet kunnen worden tussen besluitvormingsniveaus: een multi-domein/multi-niveau aanpak. Daarin dient het CLSK haar rol als effectintegrator te pakken, mede door te investeren in het vermogen tot strategisch denken en handelen. De luchtmacht dient zich blijvend voor te bereiden op expeditionaire missies, terwijl ook de ‘oude’ taken van afschrikking en verdediging weer aandacht vereisen en ook de uitdagingen van hybride conflictvoering niet mogen worden veronachtzaamd.
Al met al is de Koninklijke Luchtmacht op het juiste pad met haar ‘5e generatie luchtmacht’-visie, maar zijn er relevante ontwikkelpaden die aanknopingspunten voor verdere ontwikkeling bieden.
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The Global Security Pulse (GSP) tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide, allowing you to stay ahead in new security developments. This month we present novel developments and must-reads on interstate military competition. As geopolitical competition is regaining prominence and technological advancements are proliferating, interstate military competition is picking up. Simultaneously, the international order has a hard time coping.
The Global Security Pulse (GSP) tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide, allowing you to stay ahead in new security developments. This month we present novel developments and must-reads on interstate military competition. As geopolitical competition is regaining prominence and technological advancements are proliferating, interstate military competition is picking up. Simultaneously, the international order has a hard time coping. This month’s Pulse includes topics such as states ramping up investment in dual-use AI, the strategic impacts of geo-engineering, and increased attention for the regulation of possible conflicts in space.
The GSP is a product made in collaboration with the Clingendael Institute. It uses an advanced horizon-scanning methodology which involves a systematic scan of literature, conferences, twitter, and validated expert input. The GSP product is based on the Clingendael Radar and has been further developed by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and the Clingendael Institute. It is part of the Strategic Monitor Program (2018–2019 can be found here, and older publications are listed here), which receives funding from the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
Authors: Hugo van Manen, Esther Chavannes, Tim Sweijs, Alen Hristov (HCSS). Contributors: Connor Dunlop (HCSS), Peter van Ham, Minke Meijnders, Danny Pronk (Clingendael).
Use the button on the right to download the Pulse.
DISCLAIMER
The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
In March 2018, the Dutch government decided to stop natural gas production from the Groningen field as soon as the demand for Groningen gas allows. This implies that gas production will stop in 2030 at the latest and that about 500 BcM of gas will be left in the ground. In this paper we give an overview of the developments leading to this decision; from a geological, financial, political and societal point of view.
In March 2018, the Dutch government decided to stop natural gas production from the Groningen field as soon as the demand for Groningen gas allows. This implies that gas production will stop in 2030 at the latest and that about 500 BcM of gas will be left in the ground. In this paper we give an overview of the developments leading to this decision; from a geological, financial, political and societal point of view.
From 2012 onwards, a number of legal and regulatory measures were taken that made a long-term continuation of gas production increasingly difficult. A reversal of the burden of proof for damage to houses and the application of a relatively strict safety norm (implying a major house strenghtening program) meant that a long term continuation of production would lead to costs of several tens of billion euros.
These measures were taken in a setting where the social license to operate for Groningen gas production was gradually lost. Decision makers put a greater emphasis on safety and the environment, at the expense of financial and economic considerations. It is the loss of the social license to operate that we see as the core reason for the termination of Groningen gas production.
As a result of the rapid increase in costs the Groningen gas field had by 2017 become a major liability to Shell and ExxonMobil (the NAM shareholders). The road forward chosen in 2018 also included a more equitable division of costs between NAM and the Dutch state (needed to ensure the continuation of production by NAM) and implied a large reduction in the house strengthening program.
It is not peak fossil demand (and stranded assets due to lack of demand) that may turn out to be the biggest future risk for oil and gas companies but the loss of the social license to operate, which can result in legal and regulatory measures that can turn out to be extremely costly.
Authors: Jilles van den Beukel, independent energy analyst (formerly a principal geoscientist at Shell) & Lucia van Geuns
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The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) has worked in close cooperation with the Leiden Asia Centre (LAC) on an extensive study mapping the risks and challenges of academic and research collaboration with Chinese partners. To this end, the LAC and HCSS conducted over 40 interviews with scientists and university staff in the Netherlands and abroad who have first-hand experience of working with China. Research was also conducted in Poland, Germany and Denmark, and various Chinese researchers were interviewed in order to write this checklist.
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) has worked in close cooperation with the Leiden Asia Centre (LAC) on an extensive study mapping the risks and challenges of academic and research collaboration with Chinese partners. To this end, the LAC and HCSS conducted over 40 interviews with scientists and university staff in the Netherlands and abroad who have first-hand experience of working with China. Research was also conducted in Poland, Germany and Denmark, and various Chinese researchers were interviewed in order to write this checklist.
Deze publicatie is geproduceerd als onderdeel van het ‘Progress-programma’ voor het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken en het Ministerie van Defensie. Om deze checklist ook met internationale partners te kunnen delen heeft het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken de Nederlandse tekst naar het Engels laten vertalen.
The strengthening of the stability of the South-East Europe/Western Balkans (SEE/WB) constituted a specific thematic priority of the Austrian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, which ran from July until December 2018.
The strengthening of the stability of the South-East Europe/Western Balkans (SEE/WB) constituted a specific thematic priority of the Austrian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, which ran from July until December 2018.
In this context, experts from EU Member States, the European External Action Service, and SEE/WB convened in Vienna at the occasion of the EU StratCom Seminar, hosted by the Austrian Ministry of Defence in cooperation with The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) in July 2018. The delegates participated in a StratCom Capability Game in which they conducted an in-depth analysis of existing StratCom capabilities at the EU, Member State and SEE/WB State level; identified which capabilities required (further) strengthening; and devised a set of concrete recommendations for both the participants and their constituencies, as well as the broader communities with regard to the development and implementation of a stronger set of StratCom capabilities.
This HCSS Security Paper describes the results of the StratCom Capability Game. It shows that the EU as a whole, its Member States and the SEE/WB partners already possess a large number of StratCom capabilities that help enhance the EU’s profile and the profile of its Member States and partners, expose disinformation, and increase media literacy of populations and policymakers across Europe. The strongest need to strengthen existing capabilities was identified at the Member State level, while the strongest need to develop new capabilities was identified at the SEE/WB level. A number of capabilities were prioritised, most prevalent amongst them were those aimed at promoting SEE/WB within the EU, both at the EU and at the Member State level.
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Manifestations of hybrid threats are in the news. The general public has become aware, maybe not of the full concept, but certainly of some of the more striking incidents. Institutions like NATO and the EU write policy papers and organize symposia and workshops to discuss it. Government officials warn us about it. But what exactly is this hodgepodge of little green men, disinformation campaigns, online recruiting of jihadists, cyber-attacks, strategic acquisitions, meddling with elections, etc.?
Manifestations of hybrid threats are in the news. The general public has become aware, maybe not of the full concept, but certainly of some of the more striking incidents. Institutions like NATO and the EU write policy papers and organize symposia and workshops to discuss it. Government officials warn us about it. But what exactly is this hodgepodge of little green men, disinformation campaigns, online recruiting of jihadists, cyber-attacks, strategic acquisitions, meddling with elections, etc.? TNO and HCSS have joined forces to explain to the interested lay person what hybrid threats are. In a small booklet the What ( what is it?), the Why (why should we care?), and the How (how should we deal with its challenges?) of everything hybrid is discussed. A number of key issues and themes are introduced, and illustrated by examples. But be warned: the booklet does not provide final answers. Not because we want to keep the answers to ourselves, or that these answers are too complicated to explain, but for the simple reason that the very nature of the phenomenon itself makes it impossible to pinpoint what hybrid threats exactly are.
In this paper, an analysis is made of the stability of the international order across Europe’s periphery. The purpose is to see to what extent various cornerstones of the international order are under threat: is the Westphalian system failing in the Middle East? Will disputes over water lead to conflict? Specifically, this paper looks at five different ‘regimes’, or sets of international rules: the state sovereignty regime, the human rights regime, the international justice regime, the environmental regime, and the sea transportation regime.
In this paper, an analysis is made of the stability of the international order across Europe’s periphery. The purpose is to see to what extent various cornerstones of the international order are under threat: is the Westphalian system failing in the Middle East? Will disputes over water lead to conflict? Specifically, this paper looks at five different ‘regimes’, or sets of international rules: the state sovereignty regime, the human rights regime, the international justice regime, the environmental regime, and the sea transportation regime. The main conclusion is that for those domains in which states — including external power — have a direct stake, the rules-based systems are holding. Meanwhile, in those where they do not — human rights and international justice — the system has collapsed, for all intents and purposes.
Read the paper here.
Photo: Georges Jansoone (JoJan) CC BY-SA 3.0], from Wikimedia Commons
The notion of Middle Powers is well established in academic literature, but not always used with success in practice. In a volatile world, there is much value in seeking partners that can help to uphold the current international order. In this paper, we develop criteria to define middle powers, and distinguish between ‘established’ middle powers (which share a liberal-democratic outlook) and ‘emerging’ middle powers (which can go either way).
The notion of Middle Powers is well established in academic literature, but not always used with success in practice. In a volatile world, there is much value in seeking partners that can help to uphold the current international order. In this paper, we develop criteria to define middle powers, and distinguish between ‘established’ middle powers (which share a liberal-democratic outlook) and ‘emerging’ middle powers (which can go either way). Secondly, the paper identifies specific middle power partners for the Netherlands across a number of relevant policy domains in the area of peace and security. Finally, the geopolitical ramifications of the ‘power shift to the East’, away from the US to China, are considered for middle powers, with a suggestion to create a global alliance of like-minded middle powers that is willing to uphold liberal-democratic values.
Read the paper here.
Authors: Willem Oosterveld and Bianca Torossian.
Photo: © PR UN, New York
The European periphery sometimes appears to present an unending series of violent events and sudden upheavals. For policy-makers, this raises questions about what to expect in terms of trends in political violence, their impact on the international order, and how to tackle the underlying causes. In this paper, we analyze trends in political violence and corresponding threats that could possibly materialize in Europe and the Netherlands. The main conclusion is that political violence remains at substantial levels across the periphery, and this is likely to remain so.
The European periphery sometimes appears to present an unending series of violent events and sudden upheavals. For policy-makers, this raises questions about what to expect in terms of trends in political violence, their impact on the international order, and how to tackle the underlying causes. In this paper, we analyze trends in political violence and corresponding threats that could possibly materialize in Europe and the Netherlands. The main conclusion is that political violence remains at substantial levels across the periphery, and this is likely to remain so.
Read the paper here.
Authors: Willem Oosterveld and Bianca Torossian.
Photo by alisdare1 on Visualhunt.com / CC BY-SA
European Defence Fund: Challenges and Opportunities for Dutch Participation
European Defence Fund: Challenges and Opportunities for Dutch Participation
Confronted with numerous challenges at home and abroad, European defence is at a turning point. The European Commission has launched various initiatives to boost and strengthen European defence in general and the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base in particular. The European Defence Fund (EDF) constitutes a core element in these efforts. The EDF is intended to facilitate Member States in cooperating on research and development of key strategic defence capabilities, and in making defence materiel cooperation the norm.
Although the foundations have been laid, many aspects of the EDF remain to be determined. The window of opportunity for Member States (including the Netherlands) to shape the EDF agenda according to national interests and priorities is still open. The coming two years will be crucial for the establishment of a solid base for a national strategy on the EDF, and for the identification of the objectives to be pursued during the first seven-year cycle of the Programme. It is therefore crucial that the Netherlands is fully committed and prepared from the onset of the EDF, and that it maximises the preparation efforts necessary to become a successful participant.
This HCSS Security Paper examines the opportunities and the challenges for the Netherlands associated with the implementation of the EDF, outlines steps that can be taken at the national level to overcome these challenges, and offers a number of recommendations for relevant stakeholders to ensure optimal added value of the EDF for the Netherlands.
Authors: Eric Wilms, Lotte de Jong, Katarina Kertysova, Frank Bekkers, Karlijn Jans