The accelerating arms race in Artificial Intelligence and the diffusion of cheap, technologically advanced military systems among state and non-state actors, compel countries to adopt robotic and autonomous systems (RAS). This is due to not only the prospect of lagging behind allies, but the notion that adversaries use RAS to gain a significant military advantage and escalation dominance. How can countries stay competitive, without violating core national and international ethical principles?

This paper discusses the key ethical challenges spanning human agency, human dignity and responsibility in the operation of RAS. It presents a three-part framework for how to view human control over RAS in an ethical manner:

• Life cycle perspective
• Sub-system functionality perspective
• Observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop perspective

Based on the framework above, the paper presents the following concrete recommendations for actors engaging in the design, development, testing, operation and decommissioning of RAS at the strategic and operational levels:

• The fundamental principle is to work with ‘ethics by design’: ethical considerations are incorporated in not just the operating of RAS, but all throughout a system’s life cycle;
• Create an institutional culture of shared accountability concerning all actors involved throughout the RAS life cycle;
• Build a wider understanding of system behavior by involving end users as early as in the design and testing stages. This way, the users within the military can trace, understand and predict a system’s decision-making process;
• Develop best practice guidelines for (1) outsourcing to external contractors; and (2) interoperability with technologically advanced allied armed forces that co-deploy RAS;
• Identify within what sub-system functions of RAS increasing automation and autonomy will present benefits to the military without eliciting major ethical concerns, such as movement controls and computer vision;
• Embed core rules of engagement (ROEs), along with an open architecture that allows for mission-specific ROEs by mission command;
• Improve transparency on the uses and contexts of use of RAS in the military domain with the general public and inform policymakers of realistic opportunities and limitations of complex system design.

Dowload the report here.

Disclaimer: Responsibility for the content and for the opinions expressed rests solely with the authors. Publication does not constitute an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministry of Defence.

Dit rapport is in februari 2019 verschenen in het Engels onder de titel: Groningen gas: a loss of a social license to operate.

Dit artikel is gepubliceerd door Jilles van den Beukel, geofysicus en energieanalist & Lucia van Geuns, adviseur energie HCSS.

In Maart 2018 besloot de Nederlandse regering om, zo snel als de vraag naar Groningen gas het toelaat, te stoppen met de gasproductie in Groningen. Dit impliceert dat de gasproductie waarschijnlijk rond 2025, en op zijn laatst in 2030, zal stoppen en dat ongeveer 500 miljard kubieke meter gas zal achterblijven in de bodem. In dit artikel geven wij een overzicht van wat er gebeurd is rond Groningen gas, vanuit een geologisch, financieel, politiek en maatschappelijk oogpunt. Daarbij ligt de focus vooral op de periode van 2012 tot 2018. Het is het verlies van de license to operate, in combinatie met de geleidelijke toename in seismiciteit per eenheid geproduceerd gas, die aan de basis stonden van de beslissing om met de gaswinning in Groningen te stoppen.

Tegen een achtergrond van een verlies aan maatschappelijke acceptatie brachten een omkering van de bewijslast en de toepassing van een relatief strikte norm voor veiligheid (ongeacht het grote economische belang van Groningen gas) een grote toename van de kosten met zich mee (die voor een groot deel door operator NAM werden gedragen). Electoraal viel een lange termijn voortzetting van de Groningen gas productie niet meer te verdedigen; met name niet in combinatie met de herverdeling van kosten en baten tussen staat en NAM die noodzakelijk was om de NAM te bewegen tot een voortzetting van de productie.

Vanuit maatschappelijk oogpunt was het verlies van de license to operate (de achtergrond waartegen politieke en juridische maatregelen tussen 2012 en 2018 genomen werden) de meest in het oog springende ontwikkeling.

Voor de Engelse versie/for the English version: https://hcss.nl/report/groningen-gas-loss-social-license-operate.

This report was commissioned by and executed for the Hague Security Delta (https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/).

Our society is undergoing a digital transformation. The characteristics of this transformation are determined by the convergence of technologies and social activities that blur the boundaries between physical, digital, and biological systems. Moreover, the speed of this transformation is dizzying. Developments such as ‘big data’, ‘cyber crime’, ‘blockchain’, ‘autonomous systems’, artificial intelligence (AI), and ‘smart cities and societies’ will soon be replaced by another pantheon of terms and themes. These technological breakthroughs result in major societal, social and economic changes, leading to considerable challenges, not least in relation to security.

This report was commissioned by and executed for the Hague Security Delta (https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has made exponential progress in recent years, especially in terms of Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI) and machine learning. As the amount of data breaches and cybersecurity incidents grow, AI is increasingly being hailed for its new way to automatically spot any malware on a network, guide incident response, and detect intrusions before they even occur. The 2018 Ponemon Institute’s “Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Cyber-Security” study, for example, shows that AI is able to detect 63% of previously undetectable zero-day exploits.1 However, despite the potential benefits of AI being touted as a game-changer, estimates on its impact on cybersecurity still vary widely. Cybersecurity is a field where absolute security is impossible. Instead its objective is to reduce the attack surface to a minimum. The rosy view of what AI can deliver is not entirely wrong, but what next-generation techniques actually do is more muddled and incremental than marketers would want to admit. Fortunately, researchers developing new defense techniques at companies and in academia largely agree on both the potential benefits and challenges. This study explores how machine learning, in particular unsupervised learning, can play a role in cybersecurity.2 Chapter 2 introduces the body of AI and the different forms of machine learning. Chapter 3 looks at the possible application and weaknesses of machine learning to improve cybersecurity, while chapter 4 identifies the macro bottlenecks for the technology. Overall, the study uses recent literature on the subject in light of contextual examples, and presents some suggestions and recommendations for Dutch stakeholders seeking to understand how to best profit from the development from a socio-economic context.

The threats and opportunities associated with Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies force liberal societies to grapple with a range of fundamental issues, many of which directly affect the existing economic, social, political, and even the security fabrics that underpin the domestic and global orders.

From automated production lines to networked drone swarms on to automated mass surveillance, the combination of ever-more-sophisticated sensory arrays, never-before-seen computing power, and coding know-how is driving paradigm shifts in the creation of wealth, the governance of polities, and the functioning of societies.

This HCSS study seeks to attain a better understanding of threats and opportunities associated with this rapidly evolving technology by conducting an in-depth analysis of Chinese, European, Russian, and American AI programs, and to advise Dutch and European policymakers on optimal correction courses.

The report outlines mitigation options to address challenges within the economic, sociopolitical, and military-security domains. In addition, it formulates five overarching (non-domain-specific) recommendations for addressing shortcomings in the EU’s current AI ecosystem:

1. Support small and medium e-tech companies.

2. Formulate balanced privacy standards.

3. Facilitate academic sector R&D.

4. Ensure shared understanding of AI among Member States.

5. Leverage the EU’s economic weight in international norm-setting.

Download the report via the button on the right.

DISCLAIMER

The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

At the fourth annual Planetary Security Conference (PSC 2019), participants had the opportunity to enrol in the Climate & Security Strategic Capability Game, a serious board game developed jointly by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) with support from the Clingendael Institute.

This briefing note summarises key takeaways coming out of the game. This is of interest, as the participants represented a good mix of policy makers, diplomats, military personnel, development professionals, local and regional leaders, scientists and private sector representatives from across the globe.

The game was designed with the aim to increase awareness about relevant capabilities and capacities that are needed for conflict prevention in the context of climate change; to address what climate change will mean for the planning of policies, activities and operations of different ministries; and to discuss the role of militaries in climate change prevention, response and after-care.

The Climate & Security Capability game is based on serious gaming methodology. Serious gaming introduces game participants to strategic capability thinking, facilitates strategic discussions on what organisations are and/or are not capable of; makes it possible to assess existing capabilities and to identify capabilities that are lacking; and supports the transfer of knowledge on capability building as well as network development. In addition to helping identify promising new capabilities, exercises using serious gaming methodology help raise awareness and understanding of issues at stake.

The game was built around five climate change scenarios: 1) Deltas under pressure scenario; 2) increasing temperatures and heat waves in cities scenario; 3) long-term droughts scenario; 4) disappearance of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) scenario; and 5) the Arctic warming scenario.

For more information, visit the PSI website.

The Global Security Pulse (GSP) tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide, allowing you to stay ahead in new security developments. This month we present novel developments and must-reads on international peace and security in cyberspace. Conflict between states are taking new forms, with cyber operations taking a leading role. In recent years, the risk of a major cyber exchange between nation states, has often been described as a major threat in national security incidents. While this dire outlook is partially connected to the overall level of geopolitical tension, there is a significant concern that the ability of governments to successfully manage the threat of major conflict is hampered as they only make up one of three actor groups in the overall cyberspace regime complex.

The GSP is a product made in collaboration with the Clingendael Institute. It uses an advanced horizon-scanning methodology which involves a systematic scan of literature, conferences, twitter, and validated expert input. The GSP product is based on the Clingendael Radar and has been further developed by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and the Clingendael Institute. It is part of the Strategic Monitor Program (2018–2019 can be found here, and older publications are listed here), which receives funding from the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

Authors: Louk Faesen, Bianca Torossian, Carlo Zensus (HCSS) Contributors: Tim Sweijs, Hugo van Manen (HCSS), Danny Pronk (Clingendael)

Use the button on the right to download the Pulse or Click Here.

 DISCLAIMER

The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

This report contains the results from a research project aimed at identifying new capabilities for the future Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN).

With the type of naval operations and tasks for the period up to 2030-35 largely enduring, the current "regional power projection" profile of the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) must be strengthened and renewed. We envisage the core of the future naval force to remain a versatile mix of surface and sub-surface combatants, shipborne helicopters and unmanned systems for intelligence purposes and extended force projection, modern amphibious forces and long-range land attack capability to counter Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) threats. All main vessels should be ocean-going, able to navigate the main operating theaters in the European seas and the Carib under all conditions. But even while we expect that naval operations and tasks, as well as the overall force profile of the RNLN, will evolve rather than drastically change, the RNLN must substantially innovate — but not beyond recognition  — its personnel, materiel, doctrines and processes, organization and structures.

Some key lines of development for the naval capability portfolio for the period up to 2030-35 are:

• Unmanned systems in the air, space and on and below the sea, so-called UxVs, will increasingly take over the operational functionality of the manned ‘mother ships’ from which they are launched (and which, for the period up to 2030-35, remain the central command hubs at sea).
• Next to the flexibility offered by adaptive configurations of UxVs, modularity by design and provisions-for, e.g. multifunctional launch containers, will make it easier and less costly to introduce new technology on board of naval platforms.
• In warfighting scenarios, opponents will increasingly know the position of surface vessels in real time, making them vulnerable to long-range precision weapons. Submarines, which remain largely stealthy, will therefore play a growing role in forward offensive operations in disputed waters. The RNLN should continue to offer a highly valued contribution to allied capabilities within its niche of oceangoing, non-nuclear powered submarines.
• Naval land attack capabilities are required in a multi-domain approach to counter advanced A2AD capabilities. Amphibious and special operations (partially merging) launched from the sea also feature in this integrated approach.
• Space assets for communication, navigation and maritime situational awareness are increasingly vital to naval operations.
• For the next generation naval combatants, new weapon types such as energy weapons, railguns, hyper-velocity missiles and intelligent torpedoes should be contemplated, but quite possibly not initially acquired.
• (Counter-)mine capabilities will increasingly merge. Sea mines, as a cheap means for area denial, play an important role in e.g. various terrorist and escalating gray zone conflict scenarios. Continuous development capacity is required to keep ahead of the operational developments.
• In the period up to 2030-35, operations will increasingly be multi-domain and multi-level. High-quality and timely situational awareness and understanding is key, shared across domains and levels on the basis of 24/7 connectedness. Using AI and big data analysis techniques, better tools to produce actionable intelligence are vital.

HCSS CEO Paul Sinning will hand over the first copy of the printed report to vice-admiral Rob Kramer, commander of the RNLN, on July 4, 2019.

Download the report via the button on the right.

EU enlargement campaigns have historically been met with caution in the Netherlands at the policy level and by the Dutch society. Through a historical analysis of periods of EU enlargement, it becomes apparent that the Netherlands has often delayed expansion. Despite this, a balanced approach has tended to prevail in these instances, as processes were merely stalled, rather than spoiled. 

Though Dutch skepticism is rooted in legitimate concerns, the extent to which these concerns are invoked does not reflect the realities on the ground. Therefore, the Netherlands should take a balanced approach on EU enlargement, through greater collaboration between government entities, civil society, and media.

In doing so, the Netherlands could assist in ameliorating the image of the EU, and thereby promote its brand of liberal democracy to strengthen democratic processes in EU neighbor countries. With regard to South Eastern European countries, said efforts can serve to counterbalance the rising influence of China, Turkey, and Russia, among others, as well as to increase security and stability on the EU's border, and prevent relapse to conflict.

Read the policy brief here.

This synthesis report is part of our Strategic Monitor 2018 - 2019, which monitors trends and developments in the international order and presents a risk analysis on national security of the Netherlands. This is a translation of the original version in Dutch.

This report is a summary of the analyses, trends and developments presented in the Strategic Monitor 2018-2019.

The end of the post-war multilateral world order based on cooperation and rules has been loudly proclaimed in recent years. And yet there is no robust evidence for it. The multilateral world order is certainly on the wane, but as of yet there is no new, dominant type of order. In short, there is an interregnum. In this Strategic Monitor authors Tim Sweijs and Danny Pronk conclude that the international system is currently undergoing a phase transition between different system states, and that such a transition is characterised by unusual dynamics and events.

At the same time, the trend analysis shows a predominantly negative threat assessment. Rather than improving, this is expected to worsen in the years ahead. International cooperation in the international order is declining. In most areas we are seeing a shift from cooperation towards confl ict, accompanied by the systematic violation of rules and norms. This picture is not expected to change in the years ahead.

All these developments will put pressure on the traditional principles of Dutch foreign and security policy, including international cooperation in the EU and NATO as the primary multilateral arenas for the promotion of our interests. The high interconnectedness of security threats requires a policy in which different instruments of state power are deployed synergistically, not only in the internal-external security nexus but also across the different policy domains.

Read the paper here or download via the button on the right.

HCSS Energy Transition Program releases new report “Energy R&D Made in Germany: Strategic Lessons for the Netherlands.”

The Netherlands and Germany are close partners in the energy transition. They share ambitious climate targets and a need to accelerate the energy transition in a cost-effective manner.

Written by HCSS Strategic Energy Analyst Jan F. Braun, the report aims to promote a strategic discussion between the Netherlands and Germany on long-term bilateral cooperation in energy R&D.

The report provides an overview of Germany’s complex energy R&D policy, detailing actors, aims and financial means. The key message is that the Netherlands can learn from Germany’s long-term and strategically coherent policy approach.

Research findings invite stakeholders from the Netherlands and Germany to step up their cross-border cooperation on a range of energy R&D issues of common interest in a more consistent manner. In strengthening bilateral cooperation between the two countries, the report recommends the establishment of a bilateral ‘Energy Priority Program’.

Shared Dutch-German strategic interests in specific energy R&D subjects include heat, hydrogen, e-mobility and storage. Due to economic and political interdependence, as well as to geographical proximity to the Netherlands, the report pays particular attention to the energy R&D policy of North Rhine-Westphalia.

Download the report via the button on the right

Contact:

Dr. Jan Frederik Braun, Strategic Energy Analyst

Email: janfrederikbraun@hcss.nl

Tel.: +31 (0)6 18 59 31 60

Dit rapport is het resultaat van een beschouwing over de rollen, taken en ontwikkelingen voor de Koninklijke Luchtmacht voor de komende tien tot vijftien jaar. Veel vervangingsbesluiten voor de luchtmacht zijn recent genomen en moderniseringsprogramma’s zijn in uitvoering of in planning. Dat bepaalt al een groot deel van de toekomstige capaciteiten. Die zullen bestaan uit bemande jachtvliegtuigen (F-35), onbemande verkenningsvliegtuigen (MQ-9), luchttransport en tankervliegtuigen (MRTT), diverse helikopters en middelen in de ruimte. Desondanks zijn er voor de komende periode relevante ontwikkelingen aan te wijzen die het optreden en de middelen van de Luchtmacht zullen beïnvloeden.

Zo zal de techniek en kennis van onbemande systemen, in combinatie met Artificiële Intelligentie en Big Data-analyse, steeds belangrijker worden. In het komend decennium gaat het om een effectieve teaming van mens en machine. Big Data zal voorts in de logistieke processen rolbepalend worden. Informatie komt steeds centraler te staan, niet alleen als middel (informatiegestuurd optreden), maar ook als doelwit en wapen. Middelen in de ruimte, worden steeds belangrijker, zeker om invulling te geven aan de toenemende behoefte aan goede, snelle en brede Situational Awareness en Situational Understanding (SA/SU). De rollen en taken van Airpower zullen in de kern niet veranderen, maar wel steeds meer ingebed worden in een geïntegreerde benadering van alle instrumenten van macht waarin snel geschakeld moet kunnen worden tussen besluitvormingsniveaus: een multi-domein/multi-niveau aanpak. Daarin dient het CLSK haar rol als effectintegrator te pakken, mede door te investeren in het vermogen tot strategisch denken en handelen.  De luchtmacht dient zich blijvend voor te bereiden op expeditionaire missies, terwijl ook de ‘oude’ taken van afschrikking en verdediging weer aandacht vereisen en ook de uitdagingen van hybride conflictvoering niet mogen worden veronachtzaamd.

Al met al is de Koninklijke Luchtmacht op het juiste pad met haar ‘5e generatie luchtmacht’-visie, maar zijn er relevante ontwikkelpaden die aanknopingspunten voor verdere ontwikkeling bieden.

Download het rapport via de knop aan de rechterzijde.

The Global Security Pulse (GSP) tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide, allowing you to stay ahead in new security developments. This month we present novel developments and must-reads on interstate military competition. As geopolitical competition is regaining prominence and technological advancements are proliferating, interstate military competition is picking up. Simultaneously, the international order has a hard time coping. This month’s Pulse includes topics such as states ramping up investment in dual-use AI, the strategic impacts of geo-engineering, and increased attention for the regulation of possible conflicts in space.

The GSP is a product made in collaboration with the Clingendael Institute. It uses an advanced horizon-scanning methodology which involves a systematic scan of literature, conferences, twitter, and validated expert input. The GSP product is based on the Clingendael Radar and has been further developed by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and the Clingendael Institute. It is part of the Strategic Monitor Program (2018–2019 can be found here, and older publications are listed here), which receives funding from the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

Authors: Hugo van Manen, Esther Chavannes, Tim Sweijs, Alen Hristov (HCSS). Contributors: Connor Dunlop (HCSS), Peter van Ham, Minke Meijnders, Danny Pronk (Clingendael).

Use the button on the right to download the Pulse.

DISCLAIMER

The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

In March 2018, the Dutch government decided to stop natural gas production from the Groningen field as soon as the demand for Groningen gas allows. This implies that gas production will stop in 2030 at the latest and that about 500 BcM of gas will be left in the ground. In this paper we give an overview of the developments leading to this decision; from a geological, financial, political and societal point of view.

From 2012 onwards, a number of legal and regulatory measures were taken that made a long-term continuation of gas production increasingly difficult. A reversal of the burden of proof for damage to houses and the application of a relatively strict safety norm (implying a major house strenghtening program) meant that a long term continuation of production would lead to costs of several tens of billion euros. 

These measures were taken in a setting where the social license to operate for Groningen gas production was gradually lost. Decision makers put a greater emphasis on safety and the environment, at the expense of financial and economic considerations. It is the loss of the social license to operate that we see as the core reason for the termination of Groningen gas production.

As a result of the rapid increase in costs the Groningen gas field had by 2017 become a major liability to Shell and ExxonMobil (the NAM shareholders). The road forward chosen in 2018 also included a more equitable division of costs between NAM and the Dutch state (needed to ensure the continuation of production by NAM) and implied a large reduction in the house strengthening program.

It is not peak fossil demand (and stranded assets due to lack of demand) that may turn out to be the biggest future risk for oil and gas companies but the loss of the social license to operate, which can result in legal and regulatory measures that can turn out to be extremely costly.

Authors: Jilles van den Beukel, independent energy analyst (formerly a principal geoscientist at Shell) & Lucia van Geuns 

Download the paper via the button on the right.

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) has worked in close cooperation with the Leiden Asia Centre (LAC) on an extensive study mapping the risks and challenges of academic and research collaboration with Chinese partners. To this end, the LAC and HCSS conducted over 40 interviews with scientists and university staff in the Netherlands and abroad who have first-hand experience of working with China. Research was also conducted in Poland, Germany and Denmark, and various Chinese researchers were interviewed in order to write this checklist.

Deze publicatie is geproduceerd als onderdeel van het ‘Progress-programma’ voor het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken en het Ministerie van Defensie. Om deze checklist ook met internationale partners te kunnen delen heeft het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken de Nederlandse tekst naar het Engels laten vertalen.