News
Research
Experts
Jobs
Model NATO
Home
  • News
  • Experts
  • Research
  • Jobs
  • Model NATO

Linkedin Facebook Twitter

+31(70) 318 48 40

Rapport
Rapport
Military Competition in Perspective: Trends in Major Powers’ Postures and Perceptions
04 December 2019
As Russian and Chinese defense expenditures pivot towards the acquisition of more sophisticated weapons systems, can Europe keep up on innovation? Hugo van Manen and Tim Sweijs present the latest report on Interstate Military Competition.

New report out now! To read, click here. 

As Russian and Chinese defense expenditures pivot towards the acquisition of more sophisticated weapons systems, can Europe keep up on innovation? Hugo van Manen and Tim Sweijs present the latest report on Interstate Military Competition. 

As geopolitical rivalry is regaining prominence and technology is advancing, states are more actively engaging in interstate military competition (IMC). This is evident in activities such as the ramping up of military investments in dual-use AI technologies and the growing militarization of space. Even though instances of direct military confrontation remain limited, internationalized intrastate conflicts have grown in both their prevalence and intensity. The adversity fostered by these dynamics, combined with the proliferation of new technologies, is placing considerable stress on the international order. This can clearly be seen in, for example, the erosion of existing arms control regimes, as well as in states’ use of proxy actors to circumvent regulations. This results in a significant increase in the threat posed by IMC to the Netherlands. In concrete terms, this threat may manifest in an increased chance of armed conflict on NATO’s territory. The threat level is further raised by the fact that IMC increasingly manifest itself in non-traditional forms, which are associated with a host of negative externalities and effects for economic security and societal cohesion.

The Global Security Pulse (GSP) on IMC was published in February 2019. This research report examines the underlying quantitative and qualitative evidence presented in the GSP’s two trend tables. It covers trends in interstate military competition and international regime developments over the past ten years. It builds on the previously published Strategic Monitor Report (2018-2019) and updates its empirical analysis of contemporary trends in IMC. It does so by gauging states’ intention and capacity to engage in such competition, and their actual activity in this realm. This report continues with an analysis of trends within the international order through an assessment of five interstate military competition-related norms and rules.

Read the report here. 

Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

Topics:
Defense and International Security, Global Power Shifts, National Security Strategy, Strategic Monitor
Download PDF
Conflict In Cyberspace
Conflict In Cyberspace
Conflict in Cyberspace: Parsing the threats and the state of international order in cyberspace
19 November 2019

The Global Security Pulse (GSP) on Conflict in Cyberspace was published in June 2019 and tracked emerging trends in relation to peace and security in cyberspace. This complementary research report delves into the two trend tables presented in the GSP by examining their underlying quantitative and qualitative evidence.

The Global Security Pulse (GSP) on Conflict in Cyberspace was published in June 2019 and tracked emerging trends in relation to peace and security in cyberspace. This complementary research report delves into the two trend tables presented in the GSP by examining their underlying quantitative and qualitative evidence.

First, the ‘Threats in Cyberspace’ trend table, which measures a variety of indicators over a period of ten years, is examined. These indicators measure the seriousness of conflict in cyberspace by gauging the intention and capacity of states to engage in cyber conflict, as well as the level of malicious activity reported in cyberspace. The report continues with an analysis of the second trend table, ‘International Order in Cyberspace’, which measures the acceptance of norms and rules in this contentious field. Lastly, the conclusion illuminates how states can forge norm coherence and adoption in this complex, multi-stakeholder environment in order to enhance stability and peace in cyberspace.

Read the report here. 

 

Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

Topics:
Cyber Security, Defense and International Security, Strategic Monitor
Download PDF
Substantiating the Defence Strategic Challenges
18 November 2019

The three main tasks for Defence can be found in the Constitution, Article 97, which states that a defence force exists to defend the Kingdom and the territory of the alliances (NATO and EU), to maintain and promote the international rule of law and to support the government in upkeeping the law, fighting disasters and delivering humanitarian support. Another way to look at these tasks is in the terms of so-called Strategic Challenges that the Netherlands Armed Forces want to achieve: “to Remain Safe, to Foste

The three main tasks for Defence can be found in the Constitution, Article 97, which states that a defence force exists to defend the Kingdom and the territory of the alliances (NATO and EU), to maintain and promote the international rule of law and to support the government in upkeeping the law, fighting disasters and delivering humanitarian support. Another way to look at these tasks is in the terms of so-called Strategic Challenges that the Netherlands Armed Forces want to achieve: “to Remain Safe, to Foster Security and to Secure Connections”. In this recent report more background and insights to this approach can be found.

Applying the lens of the Strategic Challenges to look at the security environment and the role of the Netherlands therein, has consequences for the types of missions and tasks the Armed Forces must be capable of, and thus for the (future) military capability portfolio. The objective of this Study is to add (1) future-oriented elements to further substantiate the narrative for each of the Strategic Challenges; and thereby (2) to link (the dynamics within) the Strategic Challenges to (future) missions for the Armed Forces and associated defence capability portfolio choices. These results can be used within the context of the next Defence White Paper (presumably labelled as a ‘vision’ with a 10-15-year time horizon), scheduled for publication in the first half of 2020.

Topics:
Defense and International Security, National Security Strategy, Technology and Innovation, Water and Land
Download PDF
The Closing Window: Dutch Relevance in Space Examined
13 November 2019

In this paper Assistant Analyst Liam van de Ven and Strategic Analyst Patrick Bolder examine the opportunities, challenges and urgency of Dutch activity in space. They offer a two-track approach, involving both tailor-made nanosatellites and international constellations. 

 

In this paper Assistant Analyst Liam van de Ven and Strategic Analyst Patrick Bolder examine the opportunities, challenges and urgency of Dutch activity in space. They offer a two-track approach, involving both tailor-made nanosatellites and international constellations. 

 

Topics:
Defense and International Security, Emerging Economies, Global Power Shifts, Governance and International Organization, National Security Strategy, Technology and Innovation
Download PDF
Advancing Cyberstability: Final Report
Advancing Cyberstability: Final Report
Advancing Cyberstability: Final Report
13 November 2019

Cyberspace represents one of the greatest inventions of mankind, reshaping personal, social, business, and political relationships. Unfortunately, due to attacks on and through cyberspace, urgent action is needed to ensure its stability. This concept of cyberspace stability—like its close cousin, international stability—requires a shared vision, one in which all parties recognize that geopolitical disagreements and changes which affect cyberspace must be managed in relative peace, and that cyberspace stability must be assured.

Cyberspace represents one of the greatest inventions of mankind, reshaping personal, social, business, and political relationships. Unfortunately, due to attacks on and through cyberspace, urgent action is needed to ensure its stability. This concept of cyberspace stability—like its close cousin, international stability—requires a shared vision, one in which all parties recognize that geopolitical disagreements and changes which affect cyberspace must be managed in relative peace, and that cyberspace stability must be assured.

The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace began its work convinced that an issue traditionally reserved to states—international peace and security—could no longer be addressed without engaging other stakeholders. Cyberspace is a multistakeholder environment: those who build and manage cyberspace, and those who respond to attacks on and through cyberspace, are as likely to be non-state actors as government officials. Our Commissioners were selected to reflect this characteristic. Besides former senior government officials with experience in international security issues, our ranks included acknowledged leaders from the fields of Internet governance, the human rights and development communities, and technology and industry. Together, our 28 Commissioners from 16 countries provided a wide range of experience and views, and they were aided by public comments in response to Commission outreach.

The Commission’s final report represents three years of hard work. We gratefully recognize those who made this possible: our Commissioners, our advisors and researchers (many of them also volunteers), our financial supporters, and our management board. Finally, our appreciation goes to the Secretariat, which not only ably managed the process but was instrumental in the Commission’s creation as a civil society initiative.

Throughout its work, the Commission remained cognizant of other cyberspace initiatives, both past and present. Our report—Advancing Cyberstability—complements and reinforces the work of others, while providing new ideas for advancing the stability of cyberspace.

Read the full report here or download the PDF on the right. 

 

About the Commission

Launched at the 2017 Munich Security Conference, the mission of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC) is to develop proposals for norms and policies to enhance international security and stability and guide responsible state and non-state behavior in cyberspace. The Commission helps to promote mutual awareness and understanding among the various cyberspace communities working on issues related to international cybersecurity.

The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace was initiated by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), which, together with the EastWest Institute constitute the GCSC Secretariat. In addition to the Commission body itself, the GCSC is supported by a number of partners, including the governments of the Netherlands, Singapore and France, as well as Microsoft, the Internet Society, Afilias, other sponsors and supporters, and a Research Advisory Group that connects the GCSC to the academic community.

For more information, please visit www.cyberstability.org or contact loukfaesen@hcss.nl

Topics:
Cyber Security, Technology and Innovation
Download PDF
Global Security Pulse October 2019: Hybrid Conflict
24 October 2019

The Global Security Pulse (GSP) tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide, allowing you to stay ahead in new security developments.

The Global Security Pulse (GSP) tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide, allowing you to stay ahead in new security developments. This month we present novel developments and must-reads on hybrid conflict. Our research suggests that the international security environment is increasingly characterized by hybrid strategies that fall under military, political, economic, information, and cyber domains. Hybrid threats are characterized by their complexity, ambiguity, multidimensional nature, and gradual impact, making them difficult for states to effectively respond to and posing a significant challenge to the international order. Whilst hybrid tactics in and of themselves are not entirely new, the availability of diverse and sophisticated (technological) tools is enhancing the impact, reach, and congruence of these strategies. This aspect, paired with states’ unprecedented aversion to engage in conventional war due to nuclear, economic and political deterrence, and recent shifts in global power means that hybrid conflict constitutes an increasingly desirable strategy to achieve political goals.

The GSP is a product made in collaboration with the Clingendael Institute. It uses an advanced horizon-scanning methodology which involves a systematic scan of literature, conferences, twitter, and validated expert input. The GSP product is based on the Clingendael Radar and has been further developed by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and the Clingendael Institute. It is part of the Strategic Monitor Program (2018–2019 can be found here, and older publications are listed here), which receives funding from the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

Authors: Bianca Torossian, Tara Görder, Lucas Fagliano (HCSS). Contributors: Tim Sweijs, Hugo van Manen, Dylan Browne-Wilkinson (HCSS), Danny Pronk (Clingendael)

Use the button on the right to download the Pulse or Click Here.

 

DISCLAIMER

The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

Topics:
Cyber Security, Defense and International Security, Technology and Innovation
Download PDF
NATO in
NATO in
NATO’s Futures through Russian and Chinese Beholders’ Eyes
18 October 2019

As NATO celebrates the 70th anniversary of its Founding Treaty this year, many fundamental aspects of its future are widely debated within the Alliance itself. Western views on NATO’s future have, throughout the seven decades of its existence, ranged from those who predicted NATO’s imminent demise to those who claimed that the many ties that bind the two sides of the Northern Atlantic are so deep and enduring that they are bound to last for decades to come. Throughout this period, the center of gravity in this debate has always tended to lean towards the latter view.

As NATO celebrates the 70th anniversary of its Founding Treaty this year, many fundamental aspects of its future are widely debated within the Alliance itself. Western views on NATO’s future have, throughout the seven decades of its existence, ranged from those who predicted NATO’s imminent demise to those who claimed that the many ties that bind the two sides of the Northern Atlantic are so deep and enduring that they are bound to last for decades to come. Throughout this period, the center of gravity in this debate has always tended to lean towards the latter view. More recently, however, the Western outlook on NATO’s future is increasingly being painted in decidedly more somber hues.

But what do other key players in the international system think about NATO’s future(s)? To answer this question, the Dutch ministries of Defense and of Foreign Affairs asked HCSS to take a closer and more systematic look at how Chinese and Russian experts have been analyzing NATO’s future in their languages over the past three years – basically since the beginning of the Trump presidency. Many of the key Chinese and Russian scholars working on these issues also publish in English. Given the nature of these countries’ regimes, however, it is often unclear to what extent they are signaling to the broader Western or international community as opposed to reflecting their own opinions or views. This may differ from publications in their own language primarily targeted at domestic audiences, which also clearly include part of their countries’ elites whose knowledge of the English language might preclude them from being exposed to their projections and ideas.

This document is structured in four sections. After a succinct overview of the method used in Chapter 2, the Chapters 3 and 4 analyze the main findings for the Chinese and the Russian language domains respectively. The final Chapter 5 gives the conclusions as well as some broader reflections on the promise and peril of this type of foresight work for improving the government’s strategic anticipation capacity.

 

DISCLAIMER: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

Topics:
Defense and International Security, Emerging Economies, Global Power Shifts, Governance and International Organization, National Security Strategy, Strategic Monitor
Download PDF
Policy Brief: Geopolitical Influences of External Powers in the Western Balkans
07 October 2019

Based on our recent report by the same name, this Policy Brief by Dr. LLM Arlinda Rrustemi & Professor Rob de Wijk sheds a light on the consequences of foreign influences in the Western Balkans. Furthermore, the Policy Brief highlights challenges and opportunities for Western actors in the region, including setting out a coherent accession plan to the EU and NATO for these states. 

Based on our recent report by the same name, this Policy Brief by Dr. LLM Arlinda Rrustemi & Professor Rob de Wijk sheds a light on the consequences of foreign influences in the Western Balkans. Furthermore, the Policy Brief highlights challenges and opportunities for Western actors in the region, including setting out a coherent accession plan to the EU and NATO for these states. 

Topics:
Defense and International Security, Global Power Shifts, Governance and International Organization, Terrorism, Piracy and Crime
Download PDF
Geopolitical Influences of External Powers in the Western Balkans
30 September 2019

This report examines how and to what extent multiple external actors are increasing their influence over the political elites and peoples of Western Balkans countries.

This report examines how and to what extent multiple external actors are increasing their influence over the political elites and peoples of Western Balkans countries. It considers economic, political, religious cultural and security-related factors, and their impact on the future of peace and state-building processes. Increasingly, Eastern actors have been using hybrid threats (disinformation warfare, covert operations to win the hearts and minds of the population by Russia), spreading violent extremism (Gulf countries), potentially debt-trapping some Western Balkans countries (China), violating the EU laws on arms trade (Gulf countries) and implementing identity reengineering (Gulf countries, Iran, Russia, Turkey) in order to advance their geopolitical interests. Indeed, the Eastern actors often adopt a holistic approach in focusing on winning hearts and minds of the Western Balkans population. 

These security risks can derail the stability of the region in the long term with negative ramifications towards the EU and NATO integration processes as well as EU regional policies. For instance, it has been found that for political reasons, the West is now less attractive to the Western Balkans. Local elites may be less willing to engage with the West because they are reticent to promote the rule of law, or because of a lack of personal ties between the Western Balkans elites and Western counterparts. Moreover, there is fatigue to engage with the West because interaction is very time-consuming and complicated, for instance with regard to obtaining grants. Most importantly, factors such as the lack of coherent strategy from the West, the failed post conflict reconstruction due to the prioritization of stability over democracy, the lack of a realistic EU enlargement agenda, and the lack of engagement with the local population has disillusioned both elites and common people across the Western Balkans region. This is why engagement with Eastern partners often seems more appealing: it is easier to obtain grants for projects, leadership styles are more similar, and local elites feel more secure about their own positions and the maintenance of the status quo, effectively perpetuating the grip on power by illiberal elites.    

The central objective of this report is to outline policy recommendations which can holistically deal with the challenges posed by Western and Eastern actors in the Western Balkans region. In aiming to bolster peace and security in the Western Balkans region, the policy recommendations are grouped from general to specific, focusing on aspects of law, economic, security and social affairs.

Generally, the region may be at a turning point where populations that are generally torn between the West and the East may begin gravitating more towards the latter. The West, therefore, needs to craft a response soon in order to avert further instability in the region. For this purpose, it would be crucial to re-establish legitimacy while strengthening the moral authority of the West, speaking with one voice in the region, and, crucially, maintain a realistic EU Enlargement Agenda, such as opening the membership negotiations for North Macedonia and Albania. It would also be beneficial to award Bosnia and Herzegovina a candidate status, and to agree to visa liberalization for Kosovo. The agenda needs to remain proactive and to be implemented thoroughly. Existing instruments need to be employed and more exposure needs to be generated to show and explain Western engagement with the region, not only aimed at the elites but also at the local population.

It is therefore crucial that Western actors respond swiftly and reinforce their efforts to promote democracy. This in turn would help in winning the hearts and minds of the local population. In addition, it is important to provide alternatives to local governments to prevent them from getting caught in the debt trap diplomacy of China, to counter Turkish authoritarian propaganda, to prevent violent extremism, supported by the Gulf countries and Iran, as well as to counter disinformation warfare conducted by Russia, as well as the rising far right violent extremism identified in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia. 

In the legal sphere, our recommendations call for implementing laws on transparency and strengthening of the judiciary, regulating housing prices and building new mosques. In the security sphere, it is crucial to harmonize security policies of Western Balkans countries with those of the EU and its member states; consider sanctions for arms exports if in violation with the EU laws; promote individual responsibility; strengthen the border control; and to limit the appointment of foreign imams. Regarding economic measures, it is suggested to open the EU Cohesion Fund to Western Balkans countries and to encourage further investment in rural areas. In terms of societal measures, it is important to increase the prominence of public awareness campaigns, and to promote civil society engagement. It is also proposed to challenge the attractiveness of Eastern actors by informing the local public about these countries’ strategies to sow social divisions. It is also important to increase cultural exchanges and language courses. Finally, it is essential to monitor the changes in societal values and beliefs. A combination of these types of measures may assist in strengthening democracy in the region as well as countering external influences. However, this necessitates tailored implementation tracks for each country which requires further in-depth research on how to implement such strategies through a governmental and societal approach. 
 

Topics:
Defense and International Security, Terrorism, Piracy and Crime
Download PDF
Understanding the strategic and Technical Significance of Technology for Security, Implications of Quantum Computing within the Cybersecurity Domain
18 September 2019

On 17 September a report about Quantum Computing was published by HSD Office: Understanding the strategic and Technical Significance of Technology for Security, Implications of Quantum Computing within the Cybersecurity Domain. This report was commissioned by and executed for the Hague Security Delta (https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/).The report was launched during the HSD Café about Quantum Technology. 

On 17 September a report about Quantum Computing was published by HSD Office: Understanding the strategic and Technical Significance of Technology for Security, Implications of Quantum Computing within the Cybersecurity Domain. This report was commissioned by and executed for the Hague Security Delta (https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/).The report was launched during the HSD Café about Quantum Technology. 

For more information, please see the HSD website. 

The objective of the Quantum Technology initiative within the Hague Security Delta (HSD) is to create the practical facilities for cyber security companies to experiment with Quantum Key Exchange technology. These companies can improve practical skills and knowledge and realise innovative solutions for their (encryption) products. In this way we will get prepared for the post-quantum era.

Quantum computers are widely seen as a breakthrough technology, especially when employed in disciplines like artificial intelligence, cryptography, and big data analytics. Yet, with the undeniable promise of quantum computing come vast amounts of hype and confusion, ranging from what a quantum computer precisely entails, to when one can expect a quantum computer, to what sort of applications it might offer. We need to be prepared for this in future.

To download the report, click on the button to the right or visit the HSD website. 

Topics:
Cyber Security, Technology and Innovation
Download PDF
Towards Responsible Autonomy - The Ethics of RAS in a Military Context
12 September 2019

The accelerating arms race in Artificial Intelligence and the diffusion of cheap, technologically advanced military systems among state and non-state actors, compel countries to adopt robotic and autonomous systems (RAS). This is due to not only the prospect of lagging behind allies, but the notion that adversaries use RAS to gain a significant military advantage and escalation dominance. How can countries stay competitive, without violating core national and international ethical principles?

The accelerating arms race in Artificial Intelligence and the diffusion of cheap, technologically advanced military systems among state and non-state actors, compel countries to adopt robotic and autonomous systems (RAS). This is due to not only the prospect of lagging behind allies, but the notion that adversaries use RAS to gain a significant military advantage and escalation dominance. How can countries stay competitive, without violating core national and international ethical principles?

This paper discusses the key ethical challenges spanning human agency, human dignity and responsibility in the operation of RAS. It presents a three-part framework for how to view human control over RAS in an ethical manner:

  • Life cycle perspective
  • Sub-system functionality perspective
  • Observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop perspective

Based on the framework above, the paper presents the following concrete recommendations for actors engaging in the design, development, testing, operation and decommissioning of RAS at the strategic and operational levels:

  • The fundamental principle is to work with ‘ethics by design’: ethical considerations are incorporated in not just the operating of RAS, but all throughout a system’s life cycle;
  • Create an institutional culture of shared accountability concerning all actors involved throughout the RAS life cycle;
  • Build a wider understanding of system behavior by involving end users as early as in the design and testing stages. This way, the users within the military can trace, understand and predict a system’s decision-making process;
  • Develop best practice guidelines for (1) outsourcing to external contractors; and (2) interoperability with technologically advanced allied armed forces that co-deploy RAS;
  • Identify within what sub-system functions of RAS increasing automation and autonomy will present benefits to the military without eliciting major ethical concerns, such as movement controls and computer vision;
  • Embed core rules of engagement (ROEs), along with an open architecture that allows for mission-specific ROEs by mission command;
  • Improve transparency on the uses and contexts of use of RAS in the military domain with the general public and inform policymakers of realistic opportunities and limitations of complex system design.

Dowload the report here.

 

Disclaimer: Responsibility for the content and for the opinions expressed rests solely with the authors. Publication does not constitute an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministry of Defence.

Topics:
Defense and International Security, National Security Strategy, Technology and Innovation
Download PDF
Groningen gas: een verlies van de license to operate
03 September 2019

Dit rapport is in februari 2019 verschenen in het Engels onder de titel: Groningen gas: a loss of a social license to operate.

Dit artikel is gepubliceerd door Jilles van den Beukel, geofysicus en energieanalist & Lucia van Geuns, adviseur energie HCSS.

Dit rapport is in februari 2019 verschenen in het Engels onder de titel: Groningen gas: a loss of a social license to operate.

Dit artikel is gepubliceerd door Jilles van den Beukel, geofysicus en energieanalist & Lucia van Geuns, adviseur energie HCSS.

In Maart 2018 besloot de Nederlandse regering om, zo snel als de vraag naar Groningen gas het toelaat, te stoppen met de gasproductie in Groningen. Dit impliceert dat de gasproductie waarschijnlijk rond 2025, en op zijn laatst in 2030, zal stoppen en dat ongeveer 500 miljard kubieke meter gas zal achterblijven in de bodem. In dit artikel geven wij een overzicht van wat er gebeurd is rond Groningen gas, vanuit een geologisch, financieel, politiek en maatschappelijk oogpunt. Daarbij ligt de focus vooral op de periode van 2012 tot 2018. Het is het verlies van de license to operate, in combinatie met de geleidelijke toename in seismiciteit per eenheid geproduceerd gas, die aan de basis stonden van de beslissing om met de gaswinning in Groningen te stoppen.

Tegen een achtergrond van een verlies aan maatschappelijke acceptatie brachten een omkering van de bewijslast en de toepassing van een relatief strikte norm voor veiligheid (ongeacht het grote economische belang van Groningen gas) een grote toename van de kosten met zich mee (die voor een groot deel door operator NAM werden gedragen). Electoraal viel een lange termijn voortzetting van de Groningen gas productie niet meer te verdedigen; met name niet in combinatie met de herverdeling van kosten en baten tussen staat en NAM die noodzakelijk was om de NAM te bewegen tot een voortzetting van de productie.

Vanuit maatschappelijk oogpunt was het verlies van de license to operate (de achtergrond waartegen politieke en juridische maatregelen tussen 2012 en 2018 genomen werden) de meest in het oog springende ontwikkeling.

Voor de Engelse versie/for the English version: https://hcss.nl/report/groningen-gas-loss-social-license-operate.

 

Topics:
Energy, Environment and Climate, Minerals and Metals, Sustainability and Resource Scarcity
Download PDF
Understanding the Strategic and Technical Significance of Technology for Security The Case of Data Diodes for Cybersecurity
28 August 2019

This report was commissioned by and executed for the Hague Security Delta (https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/).

 

This report was commissioned by and executed for the Hague Security Delta (https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/).

 

Our society is undergoing a digital transformation. The characteristics of this transformation are determined by the convergence of technologies and social activities that blur the boundaries between physical, digital, and biological systems. Moreover, the speed of this transformation is dizzying. Developments such as ‘big data’, ‘cyber crime’, ‘blockchain’, ‘autonomous systems’, artificial intelligence (AI), and ‘smart cities and societies’ will soon be replaced by another pantheon of terms and themes. These technological breakthroughs result in major societal, social and economic changes, leading to considerable challenges, not least in relation to security.

Topics:
Cyber Security, Defense and International Security, Technology and Innovation
Download PDF
Understanding the Strategic and Technical Significance of Technology for Security Implications of AI and Machine Learning for Cybersecurity
28 August 2019

This report was commissioned by and executed for the Hague Security Delta (https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/)

 

This report was commissioned by and executed for the Hague Security Delta (https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/)

 

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has made exponential progress in recent years, especially in terms of Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI) and machine learning. As the amount of data breaches and cybersecurity incidents grow, AI is increasingly being hailed for its new way to automatically spot any malware on a network, guide incident response, and detect intrusions before they even occur. The 2018 Ponemon Institute’s “Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Cyber-Security” study, for example, shows that AI is able to detect 63% of previously undetectable zero-day exploits.1 However, despite the potential benefits of AI being touted as a game-changer, estimates on its impact on cybersecurity still vary widely. Cybersecurity is a field where absolute security is impossible. Instead its objective is to reduce the attack surface to a minimum. The rosy view of what AI can deliver is not entirely wrong, but what next-generation techniques actually do is more muddled and incremental than marketers would want to admit. Fortunately, researchers developing new defense techniques at companies and in academia largely agree on both the potential benefits and challenges. This study explores how machine learning, in particular unsupervised learning, can play a role in cybersecurity.2 Chapter 2 introduces the body of AI and the different forms of machine learning. Chapter 3 looks at the possible application and weaknesses of machine learning to improve cybersecurity, while chapter 4 identifies the macro bottlenecks for the technology. Overall, the study uses recent literature on the subject in light of contextual examples, and presents some suggestions and recommendations for Dutch stakeholders seeking to understand how to best profit from the development from a socio-economic context.

Topics:
Cyber Security, Defense and International Security, Technology and Innovation
Download PDF
Macro Implications of Micro Transformations: An Assessment of AI’s Impact on Contemporary Geopolitics
20 August 2019

The threats and opportunities associated with Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies force liberal societies to grapple with a range of fundamental issues, many of which directly affect the existing economic, social, political, and even the security fabrics that underpin the domestic and global orders.

The threats and opportunities associated with Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies force liberal societies to grapple with a range of fundamental issues, many of which directly affect the existing economic, social, political, and even the security fabrics that underpin the domestic and global orders.

From automated production lines to networked drone swarms on to automated mass surveillance, the combination of ever-more-sophisticated sensory arrays, never-before-seen computing power, and coding know-how is driving paradigm shifts in the creation of wealth, the governance of polities, and the functioning of societies.

This HCSS study seeks to attain a better understanding of threats and opportunities associated with this rapidly evolving technology by conducting an in-depth analysis of Chinese, European, Russian, and American AI programs, and to advise Dutch and European policymakers on optimal correction courses.

The report outlines mitigation options to address challenges within the economic, sociopolitical, and military-security domains. In addition, it formulates five overarching (non-domain-specific) recommendations for addressing shortcomings in the EU’s current AI ecosystem:

1. Support small and medium e-tech companies.

2. Formulate balanced privacy standards.

3. Facilitate academic sector R&D.

4. Ensure shared understanding of AI among Member States.

5. Leverage the EU’s economic weight in international norm-setting.

 

Download the report via the button on the right.

 

DISCLAIMER

The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

Topics:
Global Power Shifts, National Security Strategy, Technology and Innovation
Download PDF

Pagination

  • Current page 1
  • Page 2
  • Page 3
  • Page 4
  • Page 5
  • Page 6
  • Page 7
  • Page 8
  • Page 9
  • Next page ››

CONTACT US

Office Address

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies
Lange Voorhout 1
2514 EA The Hague
The Netherlands

Follow us on:

LinkedIn    Facebook    Twitter   YouTube logo   Soundcloud   iTunes logo

            

Subscribe to our newsletter here

General Inquiries

Telephone +31(70) 318 48 40
E-mail info@hcss.nl
IBAN NL10INGB0666328730
BIC INGBNL2A
VAT NL.8101.32.436.B01

Chamber of Commerce

Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies (HCSS) B.V.
27245148 The Hague

 

Legal

Disclaimer & Privacy
Terms & Conditions (NL)
Terms & Conditions (EN)