HCSS Energy Transition Program releases new report “Energy R&D Made in Germany: Strategic Lessons for the Netherlands.”

The Netherlands and Germany are close partners in the energy transition. They share ambitious climate targets and a need to accelerate the energy transition in a cost-effective manner.

Written by HCSS Strategic Energy Analyst Jan F. Braun, the report aims to promote a strategic discussion between the Netherlands and Germany on long-term bilateral cooperation in energy R&D.

The report provides an overview of Germany’s complex energy R&D policy, detailing actors, aims and financial means. The key message is that the Netherlands can learn from Germany’s long-term and strategically coherent policy approach.

Research findings invite stakeholders from the Netherlands and Germany to step up their cross-border cooperation on a range of energy R&D issues of common interest in a more consistent manner. In strengthening bilateral cooperation between the two countries, the report recommends the establishment of a bilateral ‘Energy Priority Program’.

Shared Dutch-German strategic interests in specific energy R&D subjects include heat, hydrogen, e-mobility and storage. Due to economic and political interdependence, as well as to geographical proximity to the Netherlands, the report pays particular attention to the energy R&D policy of North Rhine-Westphalia.

Download the report via the button on the right

Contact:

Dr. Jan Frederik Braun, Strategic Energy Analyst

Email: janfrederikbraun@hcss.nl

Tel.: +31 (0)6 18 59 31 60

Dit rapport is het resultaat van een beschouwing over de rollen, taken en ontwikkelingen voor de Koninklijke Luchtmacht voor de komende tien tot vijftien jaar. Veel vervangingsbesluiten voor de luchtmacht zijn recent genomen en moderniseringsprogramma’s zijn in uitvoering of in planning. Dat bepaalt al een groot deel van de toekomstige capaciteiten. Die zullen bestaan uit bemande jachtvliegtuigen (F-35), onbemande verkenningsvliegtuigen (MQ-9), luchttransport en tankervliegtuigen (MRTT), diverse helikopters en middelen in de ruimte. Desondanks zijn er voor de komende periode relevante ontwikkelingen aan te wijzen die het optreden en de middelen van de Luchtmacht zullen beïnvloeden.

Zo zal de techniek en kennis van onbemande systemen, in combinatie met Artificiële Intelligentie en Big Data-analyse, steeds belangrijker worden. In het komend decennium gaat het om een effectieve teaming van mens en machine. Big Data zal voorts in de logistieke processen rolbepalend worden. Informatie komt steeds centraler te staan, niet alleen als middel (informatiegestuurd optreden), maar ook als doelwit en wapen. Middelen in de ruimte, worden steeds belangrijker, zeker om invulling te geven aan de toenemende behoefte aan goede, snelle en brede Situational Awareness en Situational Understanding (SA/SU). De rollen en taken van Airpower zullen in de kern niet veranderen, maar wel steeds meer ingebed worden in een geïntegreerde benadering van alle instrumenten van macht waarin snel geschakeld moet kunnen worden tussen besluitvormingsniveaus: een multi-domein/multi-niveau aanpak. Daarin dient het CLSK haar rol als effectintegrator te pakken, mede door te investeren in het vermogen tot strategisch denken en handelen.  De luchtmacht dient zich blijvend voor te bereiden op expeditionaire missies, terwijl ook de ‘oude’ taken van afschrikking en verdediging weer aandacht vereisen en ook de uitdagingen van hybride conflictvoering niet mogen worden veronachtzaamd.

Al met al is de Koninklijke Luchtmacht op het juiste pad met haar ‘5e generatie luchtmacht’-visie, maar zijn er relevante ontwikkelpaden die aanknopingspunten voor verdere ontwikkeling bieden.

Download het rapport via de knop aan de rechterzijde.

The Global Security Pulse (GSP) tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide, allowing you to stay ahead in new security developments. This month we present novel developments and must-reads on interstate military competition. As geopolitical competition is regaining prominence and technological advancements are proliferating, interstate military competition is picking up. Simultaneously, the international order has a hard time coping. This month’s Pulse includes topics such as states ramping up investment in dual-use AI, the strategic impacts of geo-engineering, and increased attention for the regulation of possible conflicts in space.

The GSP is a product made in collaboration with the Clingendael Institute. It uses an advanced horizon-scanning methodology which involves a systematic scan of literature, conferences, twitter, and validated expert input. The GSP product is based on the Clingendael Radar and has been further developed by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and the Clingendael Institute. It is part of the Strategic Monitor Program (2018–2019 can be found here, and older publications are listed here), which receives funding from the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

Authors: Hugo van Manen, Esther Chavannes, Tim Sweijs, Alen Hristov (HCSS). Contributors: Connor Dunlop (HCSS), Peter van Ham, Minke Meijnders, Danny Pronk (Clingendael).

Use the button on the right to download the Pulse.

DISCLAIMER

The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

In March 2018, the Dutch government decided to stop natural gas production from the Groningen field as soon as the demand for Groningen gas allows. This implies that gas production will stop in 2030 at the latest and that about 500 BcM of gas will be left in the ground. In this paper we give an overview of the developments leading to this decision; from a geological, financial, political and societal point of view.

From 2012 onwards, a number of legal and regulatory measures were taken that made a long-term continuation of gas production increasingly difficult. A reversal of the burden of proof for damage to houses and the application of a relatively strict safety norm (implying a major house strenghtening program) meant that a long term continuation of production would lead to costs of several tens of billion euros. 

These measures were taken in a setting where the social license to operate for Groningen gas production was gradually lost. Decision makers put a greater emphasis on safety and the environment, at the expense of financial and economic considerations. It is the loss of the social license to operate that we see as the core reason for the termination of Groningen gas production.

As a result of the rapid increase in costs the Groningen gas field had by 2017 become a major liability to Shell and ExxonMobil (the NAM shareholders). The road forward chosen in 2018 also included a more equitable division of costs between NAM and the Dutch state (needed to ensure the continuation of production by NAM) and implied a large reduction in the house strengthening program.

It is not peak fossil demand (and stranded assets due to lack of demand) that may turn out to be the biggest future risk for oil and gas companies but the loss of the social license to operate, which can result in legal and regulatory measures that can turn out to be extremely costly.

Authors: Jilles van den Beukel, independent energy analyst (formerly a principal geoscientist at Shell) & Lucia van Geuns 

Download the paper via the button on the right.

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) has worked in close cooperation with the Leiden Asia Centre (LAC) on an extensive study mapping the risks and challenges of academic and research collaboration with Chinese partners. To this end, the LAC and HCSS conducted over 40 interviews with scientists and university staff in the Netherlands and abroad who have first-hand experience of working with China. Research was also conducted in Poland, Germany and Denmark, and various Chinese researchers were interviewed in order to write this checklist.

Deze publicatie is geproduceerd als onderdeel van het ‘Progress-programma’ voor het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken en het Ministerie van Defensie. Om deze checklist ook met internationale partners te kunnen delen heeft het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken de Nederlandse tekst naar het Engels laten vertalen.

The strengthening of the stability of the South-East Europe/Western Balkans (SEE/WB) constituted a specific thematic priority of the Austrian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, which ran from July until December 2018.

In this context, experts from EU Member States, the European External Action Service, and SEE/WB convened in Vienna at the occasion of the EU StratCom Seminar, hosted by the Austrian Ministry of Defence in cooperation with The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) in July 2018. The delegates participated in a StratCom Capability Game in which they conducted an in-depth analysis of existing StratCom capabilities at the EU, Member State and SEE/WB State level; identified which capabilities required (further) strengthening; and devised a set of concrete recommendations for both the participants and their constituencies, as well as the broader communities with regard to the development and implementation of a stronger set of StratCom capabilities.

This HCSS Security Paper describes the results of the StratCom Capability Game. It shows that the EU as a whole, its Member States and the SEE/WB partners already possess a large number of StratCom capabilities that help enhance the EU’s profile and the profile of its Member States and partners, expose disinformation, and increase media literacy of populations and policymakers across Europe. The strongest need to strengthen existing capabilities was identified at the Member State level, while the strongest need to develop new capabilities was identified at the SEE/WB level. A number of capabilities were prioritised, most prevalent amongst them were those aimed at promoting SEE/WB within the EU, both at the EU and at the Member State level.

Download the paper via the button on the right.

Manifestations of hybrid threats are in the news. The general public has become aware, maybe not of the full concept, but certainly of some of the more striking incidents. Institutions like NATO and the EU write policy papers and organize symposia and workshops to discuss it. Government officials warn us about it. But what exactly is this hodgepodge of little green men, disinformation campaigns, online recruiting of jihadists, cyber-attacks, strategic acquisitions, meddling with elections, etc.? TNO and HCSS have joined forces to explain to the interested lay person what hybrid threats are. In a small booklet the What ( what is it?), the Why (why should we care?), and the How (how should we deal with its challenges?) of everything hybrid is discussed. A number of key issues and themes are introduced, and illustrated by examples. But be warned: the booklet does not provide final answers. Not because we want to keep the answers to ourselves, or that these answers are too complicated to explain, but for the simple reason that the very nature of the phenomenon itself makes it impossible to pinpoint what hybrid threats exactly are.

In this paper, an analysis is made of the stability of the international order across Europe’s periphery. The purpose is to see to what extent various cornerstones of the international order are under threat: is the Westphalian system failing in the Middle East? Will disputes over water lead to conflict? Specifically, this paper looks at five different ‘regimes’, or sets of international rules: the state sovereignty regime, the human rights regime, the international justice regime, the environmental regime, and the sea transportation regime. The main conclusion is that for those domains in which states — including external power — have a direct stake, the rules-based systems are holding. Meanwhile, in those where they do not — human rights and international justice — the system has collapsed, for all intents and purposes.

Read the paper here.

Photo: Georges Jansoone (JoJan) CC BY-SA 3.0], from Wikimedia Commons

The notion of Middle Powers is well established in academic literature, but not always used with success in practice. In a volatile world, there is much value in seeking partners that can help to uphold the current international order. In this paper, we develop criteria to define middle powers, and distinguish between ‘established’ middle powers (which share a liberal-democratic outlook) and ‘emerging’ middle powers (which can go either way). Secondly, the paper identifies specific middle power partners for the Netherlands across a number of relevant policy domains in the area of peace and security. Finally, the geopolitical ramifications of the ‘power shift to the East’, away from the US to China, are considered for middle powers, with a suggestion to create a global alliance of like-minded middle powers that is willing to uphold liberal-democratic values.

Read the paper here.

Authors: Willem Oosterveld and Bianca Torossian.

Photo: © PR UN, New York

The European periphery sometimes appears to present an unending series of violent events and sudden upheavals. For policy-makers, this raises questions about what to expect in terms of trends in political violence, their impact on the international order, and how to tackle the underlying causes. In this paper, we analyze trends in political violence and corresponding threats that could possibly materialize in Europe and the Netherlands. The main conclusion is that political violence remains at substantial levels across the periphery, and this is likely to remain so.

Read the paper here. 

Authors: Willem Oosterveld and Bianca Torossian.

Photo by alisdare1 on Visualhunt.com / CC BY-SA

European Defence Fund: Challenges and Opportunities for Dutch Participation

Confronted with numerous challenges at home and abroad, European defence is at a turning point. The European Commission has launched various initiatives to boost and strengthen European defence in general and the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base in particular. The European Defence Fund (EDF) constitutes a core element in these efforts. The EDF is intended to facilitate Member States in cooperating on research and development of key strategic defence capabilities, and in making defence materiel cooperation the norm.

Although the foundations have been laid, many aspects of the EDF remain to be determined. The window of opportunity for Member States (including the Netherlands) to shape the EDF agenda according to national interests and priorities is still open. The coming two years will be crucial for the establishment of a solid base for a national strategy on the EDF, and for the identification of the objectives to be pursued during the first seven-year cycle of the Programme. It is therefore crucial that the Netherlands is fully committed and prepared from the onset of the EDF, and that it maximises the preparation efforts necessary to become a successful participant.

This HCSS Security Paper examines the opportunities and the challenges for the Netherlands associated with the implementation of the EDF, outlines steps that can be taken at the national level to overcome these challenges, and offers a number of recommendations for relevant  stakeholders to ensure optimal added value of the EDF for the Netherlands.

Authors: Eric Wilms, Lotte de Jong, Katarina Kertysova, Frank Bekkers, Karlijn Jans

Read the paper here.

The internal cohesion of the European Union (EU) is being tested by both internal and external challenges. These include mass migration, rising populism, a lack of respect for the rule of law, terrorism, and economic and monetary difficulties. These challenges have placed a huge strain on the bonds between EU Member States and has illuminated the fragility of European unity and solidarity. Member States are increasingly unwilling to share sovereignty and comply with existing agreements, key norms and rules, and the rule of law. The result is an increase in vertical tensions between national and European levels of government — i.e., between the collective European interests — represented by the European Parliament (EP) and the European Commission (EC), and the national interests of individual EU Member States.

Some take these vertical tensions as a sign that the EU is falling apart. Others, like EC President Jean-Claude Juncker, claim that that EU Member States are actually working more closely together towards a common goal, in particular due to the current geopolitical situation. The latter rationale is driven by the erosion of the transatlantic Alliance, increasing aggression from belligerent powers such as China and Russia, and the chaos surrounding the Brexit process.

To which extent is the EU coming together or falling apart when it comes to key policy dossiers? Does the EU, as a regime, have the capacity to manage or channel increasing tensions with and between its Member States?

This paper defines regimes as “a set of implicit and explicit principles, norms and rules and decision-making procedures around which the actors converge in a particular area of international relations.”

Within regimes, norms are defined as standards of appropriate behavior. In the EU regime, norms are found in primary and secondary EU legislation and provide direction to the Union’s dealings in complex subject matters such as those central to this paper. These include solidarity, consensus, shared sovereignty, compliance, and values of democracy and the rule of law. Rules are defined as concrete actions in policy dossiers as well as the general rules of EU decision-making.

In this paper we examine these claims by looking at six norms and rules that represent critical components of EU cooperation. These rules are identified in the 2018 State of the Union:

• Economic and Monetary Union (Banking Union);
• Migration;
• The Schengen Zone;
• Defense cooperation;
• Sounds public finances;
• Tax harmonization;
• Principles of decision-making;
• Democracy and rule of law.

This paper first analyzes the current state of affairs in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), migration, defense cooperation and the Schengen Zone. The analyses of these topics include the definition of the regime at hand, the vertical tensions that pertain to it, and a key take-away. The paper will then look at two extra dimensions along which we measure how vertical tensions are influencing EU cooperation: 1) the principles of decision-making, and 2) democracy and the rule of law. The conclusion will provide an overall assessment of where and how the EU is coming together or falling apart and to what extent the EU regime has the capacity to manage or channel vertical tensions.

Read the paper here.

This paper, part of the Strategic Monitor 2018-2019, conducts an empirical analysis of trends in interstate military competition. It gauges the perceptions and intentions, capabilities, and conflict activities of leading military powers in the international system for the period 2008-2018. The principal conclusion is that interstate military competition is intensifying, and can be expected to continue doing so for the foreseeable future.  

Combined with the dramatic rise of internationalized intrastate conflict, there is a considerable risk of escalation from indirect to direct state-on-state conflict. For the Netherlands, the key implications of increasing military competition reside in the risks to the territorial and economic security of the Netherlands and its allies, and the erosion of international law. Read the paper here.

Authors: Tim Sweijs, Director of Research and Floris Holstege, assistant analyst. 

Nederland heeft er belang bij om bedrijven binnen haar grenzen te halen, samen te werken met buitenlandse ondernemingen of diensten uit te besteden om zo economische toegevoegde waarde te genereren. Voor nationale en regionale overheden en gemeenten is de economische ontwikkeling een topprioriteit waarbij innovatie in een open setting als belangrijk wordt gezien. Tegelijkertijd wordt onderkend dat dit niet zonder consequenties is en verantwoordelijkheid vraagt van allerlei partijen in het onderkennen van de risico’s die dat met zich mee brengt met betrekking tot bijvoorbeeld IP-diefstal of de ongewilde introductie van afhankelijkheid van buitenlandse partijen.

Naar aanleiding van vraagstukken met betrekking tot investeringen en aankopen in Nederland door buitenlandse ondernemingen  speelt steeds de vraag of bepaalde bedrijven wel of geen toestemming zou moeten worden geweigerd. Het gaat daarbij om investeringen dan wel het verwerven van het eigenaarschap van belangrijke bedrijven en infrastructuren, vooral als die mogelijk van belang zijn voor de (nationale) veiligheid.

Om deze vraag te kunnen beantwoorden heeft HCSS een analyse gemaakt van de bestaande regelgeving die hiervoor in Nederland voorhanden is.

Dit heeft geresulteerd in dit concept toetsingskader. Dit toetsingskader heeft geen officiële status en HCSS pretendeert ook zeker niet compleet te zijn, het is vooral een leidraad. Wel is onze inschatting dat met dit kader er een goed overzicht op nationaal niveau is gecreëerd dat als startpunt kan worden gebruikt bij de bepaling van de wenselijkheid van vestiging van buitenlandse organisaties, bedrijven of instellingen in Nederland.

Download de paper met de knop rechts of klik hier voor de mobiele versie. 

Since the dawn of the atomic age, nuclear deterrence in Europe has been primarily provided by the US, first through bilateral alliances and later within the NATO framework. Within this structure, US tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) are currently based in the Netherlands (although this has never been confirmed nor denied by The Hague) and four other European non-nuclear NATO allies, and US strategic nuclear weapons cover European NATO territory.

In recent years the strength and cohesion of NATO has been jeopardized by rising tensions in the transatlantic relationship based on disagreements on defense spending. At the same time, Russia has been accused of violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, while EU-Russia relations have significantly worsened because of a series of other conflicts. This dynamic has weakened the perception of extended deterrence and increased the fear of decoupling USA and EU. It has prompted recent debates in EU states, for instance in Germany, on whether a European nuclear deterrent may be the way forward.

This snapshot gives a concise overview of the status quo of nuclear deterrence in Europe and the design of NATO nuclear sharing, explains the theoretical concept of extended nuclear deterrence, and offers a set of policy options for the EU and its member states to start addressing their changing strategic environment.

Download the snapshot via the button on the right or click here for the mobile version.

Authors: Mihailo Jovetic (former Assistant Analyst) and Michel Roelen (Strategic Analyst).