Russia’s dependence on revenues from oil and gas production is now higher than that of the Soviet Union in the 1980’s. The prospects for fossil fuels however, have deteriorated in recent years.

US shale oil gives a downward pressure on oil prices and the ever-increasing determination to actively combat climate change is expected to result in decreased oil demand. In addition, it is becoming increasingly challenging to maintain Russia’s oil production at its current level. Although Russia’s gas reserves are plentiful, making money from them is getting more and more difficult, partially because LNG has become the dominant way for long distance gas transport.

How does the Russian oil and gas industry, and the Putin regime in general, deal with these challenges and what are its prospects?

Find out in this new HCSS paper by Jilles van den Beukel and Lucia van Geuns.

Download the Factsheet here. 

Moderne conflictvoering neemt steeds vaker hybride vormen aan, waarbij het onderscheid tussen oorlog en politiek, conflict en vrede, soldaat en burger en gevechtsveld en veilig gebied vervaagd. Hierbinnen zijn militaire organisaties permanent actief, in een bredere omgeving en vanuit een breder palet aan te bereiken effecten. Militaire cyberoperaties vormen daarom een belangrijke spil in het takenpakket van een moderne krijgsmacht.

In dit nieuwe rapport identificeren Louk Faesen, Tim Sweijs, Frank Bekkers en Timon Domela Nieuwenhuis Nyegaard wat de mogelijke rol van de Koninklijke Landmacht in het cyberdomein kan of moet zijn en welke capaciteiten de Landmacht dient te ontwikkelen.

Drie tactische effecten staan centraal:

• het beschermen van netwerken, individuen en platformen
• het vergroten van situational awareness & understanding
• het vermeerderen van de slagkracht

De auteurs doen concrete aanbevelingen op het gebied van doctrine, organisatie en commandovoering, opleiding en training, personeel, materieel en faciliteiten, beleid, en interoperabiliteit.

Download het rapport hier. 

Hybrid threats are increasing, and the Netherlands, together with partners in its network of alliances, requires a new strategic posture to counter these threats. This report by TNO & HCSS serves as a background document in preparation of a hybrid conflict game organised by TNO in collaboration with HCSS.

Download the report here.

Authors Tim Sweijs, Samuel Zilincik, Frank Bekkers and Rick Meessen present a strategic framework that describes and explains relations between strategies and counter-strategies in dealing with hybrid threats and offer considerations to select those dominant strategies that are to be part of the Dutch strategic posture.

The framework presented in the report consists of two escalation axes. The vertical axis consists of five general strategies: (1) cooperation, (2) persuasion, (3) protection, (4) coercion, and (5) control. The horizontal escalation is comprised of the well-know DIMEL categorization of instruments and measures of state power.

The above-mentioned five strategies can be employed simultaneously or sequentially in order to counter hybrid threats. Additionality, these strategies can be exercised through and across the six DIMEL-domains of diplomacy, information, cyber, economy, military, and legal.

These theoretical propositions however, need to be further developed and tested. In light of this, these insights will be refined in a simulation environment in the form of a table-top game. By doing this, further light will be shed on how the strategies presented in this report function in a (simulated) competitive setting and subsequently help refine and inform the crafting of effective cross-domain strategies in real world scenarios.

Download the PDF here.

Environmental resources and related infrastructure have long been used as both an instrument and strategy of military conflict and terrorism. However, due to global trends, the unlawful use of environmental resources or systems to function as both a target and an instrument of armed conflict is growing in frequency and efficiency. 

In this snapshot, assistant analyst Femke Remmits and strategic analyst Bianca Torossian shed light on the risk environmental terrorism poses in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). 

The use of environmental resources and related infrastructure by terrorist actors as a strategy or instrument of conflict can be considered a hybrid tactic. The application of this tactic by terrorist groups in the MENA-regions is already evident and likely to increase considering that climate change is projected to intensify resource scarcity and livelihood insecurity globally.  

How can environmental terrorism best be addressed? 

Download Snapshot.

The year 2020 is one to remember. The corona crisis changed the world at an unprecedented rate and many developments are still ongoing. Existing trends are accelerating, geopolitical relations are under pressure and the way we travel, work and spend our free time has changed radically.

This Annual Report contains food for thought, as we focus on some of the 2020 highlights and on future developments in the world. This can help us to look ahead to a brighter future beyond the gloom of the daily headlines.

At HCSS we do not pretend to know the future, to solve all highly complex problems with our analyses, or to instantaneously improve the relations between nations or mankind in an age of technology breakthroughs. But we expect that our fact-based analyses contribute to an increased understanding of the future path of the world and to provide ideas of how governments, businesses, individuals, and all of us can help to make this world a better and safer place to live in.

The HCSS team wishes you a Merry Christmas and a happy New Year!

Download the PDF here.

Leidt persistent engagement tot meer stabiliteit in cyberspace, of tot misinterpretaties en escalatie? In een artikel voor Militaire Spectator beschrijven Louk Faesen (Strategisch Analist bij HCSS) en Deborah Lassche (onderzoeker bij TNO) de mogelijke gevolgen volgens voor- en tegenstanders en wat persistent engagement kan betekenen voor Nederland.

In het najaar van 2018 haalde het Cybercommando van de Verenigde Staten (CYBERCOM) de Russische trollenfabriek Internet Research Agency offline. Deze offensieve cyberactie wordt gezien als een eerste test van CYBERCOM’s nieuwe strategie van persistent engagement. Volgens voorstanders zou het nieuwe optreden moeten leiden tot meer stabiliteit in cyberspace, geloofwaardigere afschrikking en het beter markeren van rode lijnen over wat wel en niet acceptabel is in cyberspace. Critici vrezen echter voor gebrek aan communicatie of overcommunicatie, misinterpretaties, escalatie en een ondermijning van de internationale rechtsorde. Als gevolg hiervan zou persistent engagement het algehele strategische landschap veranderen en de deterrence posture van kleine tot middelgrote landen zoals Nederland.

Lees het hele artikel hier bij Militaire Spectator of download hier de PDF.

To date, the current COVID-19 pandemic has infected over 45 million people worldwide and resulted in almost 1.2 million fatalities, with economic consequences that are already staggering. 

What are the security implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for Europe? In this new article for Atlantisch Perspectief, HCSS Director of Research Tim Sweijs and Assistant Analyst Femke Remmits discuss how the COVID-19 pandemic is above all an accelerator, an exacerbator and a catalyst of prevailing security dynamics.

Download the PDF here. 

For the fulfilment of their geopolitical ambitions, both the Netherlands and the European Union are highly dependent on a secure supply of critical raw materials and manufactured goods. This is problematic given the fact that other countries, in particular China, control large market shares in these sectors. In this extensive report, Irina Patrahau, Michel Rademaker, Hugo van Manen and Lucia van Geuns, together with Ankita Singhvi and René Kleijn from the Centrum voor Milieuwetenschappen (CML), identify strategies and policy instruments that the Netherlands, in collaboration with the EU, can apply in order to reduce important dependence on critical raw materials.  

Download Report | Download Factsheet: ENG & NL

The energy-, transport- and digital technologies-sectors, and more specifically, wind turbines, photovoltaic solar power, geothermal, energy grid infrastructure, carbon capture & storage, electric vehicles and semiconductors, are all highly dependent on China, not only in terms of technology, but also in terms of components and raw materials.  

In the Netherlands and other Western countries, the industry has been securing critical supplies independently from governments, whereas China has been pursuing a long-term strategy which deeply involves the government in the industrial extraction and production of raw materials. Furthermore, China is currently – and has been for the past decade - employing a wide range of strategies in order to develop states of domestic supply chains, secure access to strategic resources abroad as well as to enhance their grip on complete values chains.  

What can the Netherlands do to secure its supply of critical materials and technologies? First and foremost, the Netherlands needs to prioritize the development of a long-term national strategy that reflects the needs of industrial actors in securing their supply chains. Other recommendations include supporting industrial alliances, multilateral and multilevel programming and policy coherence, and more.  

Read the entire report. 

And/or....

Download the Factsheet: ENG & NL

Setting standards is becoming increasingly important for securing critical raw materials and technologies – which in turn are essential for meeting climate and digital ambitions. Especially technical standards are of major strategic importance, as they offer a venue for fostering dependence. What can the Netherlands and EU do to mitigate risks caused by Chinese standardization activities?  

Download report | Download Factsheet: ENG or NL

In this report, Irina Patrahau, Hugo van Manen, Tycho de Feijter and Michel Rademaker, set out to assert if Chinese standard setting initiatives pose a threat to the Netherlands’ and EU’s national security. They do so by identifying the critical raw materials (CRMs) which are set to increase in relevance, analysing ways in which standards are established internationally, mapping types of standards and finally, suggesting actions that the Dutch government can undertake to mitigate unwanted effects.   

Over the decades, standardization has developed into an increasingly politicized policy tool. States and/or actors enjoying a quasi-monopoly seek to formulate standards in order to benefit from “first mover”-advantages in their products’ reach. This enables them to shape standards to their own liking.  

China has identified standard setting as a national priority and has deployed coordinated, long-term strategies such as Standards 2035 and Main Points 2020. China’s quasi-monopoly in the extraction of critical raw materials and the development of related technologies lead to domestically introduced standards to be de facto established internationally. Moreover, Beijing’s strategic, coordinated approach to standardization results in corporations and state agencies representing China in international organizations being incentivized by realizing Beijing’s strategic ambitions.  

Currently, Chinese influence within international standard setting organizations is significant, but not yet dominant. Generally speaking, EU countries have, as a whole, a strong representation in committees and organizations such as the ISO, IEC and ITU and enjoy a stronger presence in value-based initiatives.  

Dutch governmental institutions and policy makers should recognize standardization as a strategic instrument through the creation of a Dutch national standardization strategy. A long-term, coordinated approach is imperative in order to preserve Dutch international regulatory and innovative power. Furthermore, a coordinated European approach towards standard setting could assist in mitigating risks caused by Chinese international standardization activities.  

Read the entire report.

And/or...

Download the Factsheet: ENG or NL

From 5G to the data streams in military hardware to the SWIFT messaging system, our modern society depends on the speedy, secure, and uninterrupted flow of information. But what if these worldwide flows are threatened and disrupted?

“Managing tangible and intangible resources and flows is key to new power strategies. The high seas, air space and outer space and the digital realm, common spaces that inter­penetrate each other and complicate our understanding of the issues, are becoming or are once again arenas for power struggles and at times, confrontation.” – Emmanuel Macron

In a hyper-connected world, the ability to influence or control flows is key to new coercive strategies. This HCSS report aims to contribute to a better and more detailed understanding of the notion of flow security and of the policy options for both the Netherlands and Europe to effectively contribute to flow security to protect vital interests and values

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In order to do this, this report considers three cases – each from a different perspective:

1. 5G Networks and Standards from an economic angle
2. The continuous development of the F35 fighter plane from a military perspective
3. Entanglements in the financial system through an institutional lens

Regarding potential flow security risks for the 5G case, this report finds that there is a strong nexus between national security considerations and the deployment of 5G; that security incentives directly contradict economic incentives & that dependence on Chinese technology harms European innovation.

Key takeaways from analysis of the second case are, among others, that the many benefits of US-Dutch military collaboration are contingent on sharing information and that critical information-sharing agreements are necessary to keep Dutch F35’s operational.

Thirdly, financial entanglements have the potential to create international financial disruptions and highlight the financial sector’s dependency on technological innovation.

Concluding, the three cases each represent technology flows that come with high, potentially unacceptable, levels of risk to Dutch national security – which requires proactive management at the national and at the European level. Failure to do so will severely limit Europe ability to set and pursue its own geopolitical objectives and, as a result, curtail European strategic autonomy.

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Deze notitie is opgesteld in het kader van het project Militaire toepassing van robot- en autonome systemen (RAS) dat het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies (HCSS) uitvoert voor het Commando Landstrijdkrachten. Het onderwerp is het proces van innoveren, en in het bijzonder kortcyclisch innoveren. In deze notitie kijken Frank Bekkers, Patrick Bolder en Michel Rademaker hoe innovatie binnen de defensieorganisatie vorm c.q. kan of moet krijgen, welke mogelijkheden en drempels daarbij optreden, en hoe deze mogelijkheden te benutten en drempels te slechten.

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The conjunction of multiple, cascading extreme weather events with precarious demographic and socioeconomic trends produces massive humanitarian disasters in the coastal megacities of the Asia-Pacific. The intensity and frequency with which tropical storms are occurring in highly vulnerable urban hotspots reveal the risk of climate change becoming a driver of instability and insecurity.

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In this snapshot, Femke Remmits and Laura Birkman analyze the exposure of megacities in the Asia-Pacific region to extreme weather events and how adapting to rising sea-levels and more frequent and extreme weather events will form a major challenge to the Asia-Pacific region.

To address and adapt to expanding climate induced insecurity and risk, it is important that decision-makers, urban planners, and other relevant stakeholders are aware of and consider the indirect security risks produced by natural disasters in the world’s most densely populated areas. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) seems well placed to take on a leadership role in this regard.

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Space as a military domain is becoming increasingly important. Global powers are investing huge amounts of money into the development and construction of new (military) space assets and it seems as though we’re on the eve of a new ‘space race’. In a new HCSS snapshot, Patrick Bolder and Esther Chavannes shed light on the opportunities and challenges these military space developments go hand in hand with.  

Read the snapshot.

From observation and communication applications to weapon delivery, space will become indispensable to military operations. While major global powers are investing heavily in military space infrastructure and assets, societies’ dependency on space is also increasing rapidly.    

Societies’ dependency on space and the prospect of space as the military domain of the future, raises questions which require answers. To be able to answer these, it is imperative to define how the military can use and protect space assets. At the same time, protection of our daily life on Earth – already highly dependent on accurate and unincumbered functioning of many space assets – requires careful consideration as well. 

Download the complete snapshot here.

“The world is badly under-prepared for even modest biological threats, leaving us vulnerable to potentially huge impacts on individual lives, societal well-being, economic activity and national security. Revolutionary new biotechnologies promise miraculous advances, but also create daunting challenges of oversight and control.” – World Economic Forum 

De moordaanslag op Navalny, het meervoudige gebruik van chemische wapens in Syrië, de recentelijke brand in een Russisch biologisch lab - dergelijke incidenten zijn weliswaar onwaarschijnlijk, maar in potentie hebben ze een gigantische impact. Hoe goed is Nederland hierop voorbereid? In dit rapport analyseren Paul Sinning, Stephan de Spiegeleire en Frank Bekkers actuele biologische en chemische dreigingen en of de Nederlandse B/C-kennisinfrastructuur in het licht van deze dreigingen voldoet.

Download het rapport.

Het verleden toont aan dat zowel de chemische als de biologische dreiging reëel is. Daarnaast is er momenteel sprake van een aanzienlijke drempelverlaging op dit gebied: de technische en praktische waarschijnlijkheid van B/C-aanslagen is de laatste jaren alleen maar toegenomen.  

De huidige kennis over B/C-strijdmiddelen en de organisatie hiervan kent diverse tekortkomingen. Gelukkig hebben er in Nederland nauwelijks noemenswaardige incidenten met B/C-middelen plaatsgevonden. De keerzijde hiervan is dat dit de Nederlandse casuïstiek weinig houvast biedt op de vraag of in Nederland sprake is van een acceptabel basisniveau van kennis en of deze kennis in de praktijk zijn waarde heeft bewezen.

Tegen deze achtergrond maakt het rapport de volgende aanbevelingen:

1. Neem het thema ‘CBRN’ op in de nationale risicobeoordeling;
2. Programmeer een nationale B/C-strategie;
3. Formuleer een gemeenschappelijk afwegingskader voor de prioritering van de kennisinfrastructuur;
4. Richt kennissturing op systeemniveau in;
5. Organiseer het overdragen en delen van kennis naar en tussen first responders
6. Investeer in een integrale kostenbewuste benadering van nationale risico’s

Download het rapport.

De strategische dreigingen van de toekomst zijn in toenemende mate hybride: militaire middelen en cyberoperaties, beïnvloedingscampagnes en economische sancties worden georkestreerd ingezet. Hoe kan de Koninklijke Landmacht hier het beste op inspelen? Je leest het in het nieuwe HCSS rapport van Rob de Wijk, Tim Sweijs en Frank Bekkers.

Download het rapport hier.

Hybride oorlogsvoering kent een lange voorgeschiedenis, maar is recente tijden vooral door Rusland toegepast en gepionierd. Deze hernieuwde Russische assertiviteit dwingt de NAVO om een nieuwe balans te vinden tussen traditionele collectieve verdediging en operaties buiten het Verdragsgebied enerzijds, en hybride dreigingen en operaties anderzijds.

In dit nieuwe HCSS rapport analyseren Rob de Wijk, Tim Sweijs en Frank Bekkers wat de hybride dreigingen van de toekomst zijn en wat voor rol de Koninklijke Landmacht op dit vlak kan spelen. Dit doen zij door de Russische wijze van hybride oorlogsvoering te analyseren en vervolgens te duiden wat het antwoord van de Koninklijke Landmacht hierop kan of moet zijn.

Lees het complete rapport hier.