The notion of Middle Powers is well established in academic literature, but not always used with success in practice. In a volatile world, there is much value in seeking partners that can help to uphold the current international order. In this paper, we develop criteria to define middle powers, and distinguish between ‘established’ middle powers (which share a liberal-democratic outlook) and ‘emerging’ middle powers (which can go either way). Secondly, the paper identifies specific middle power partners for the Netherlands across a number of relevant policy domains in the area of peace and security. Finally, the geopolitical ramifications of the ‘power shift to the East’, away from the US to China, are considered for middle powers, with a suggestion to create a global alliance of like-minded middle powers that is willing to uphold liberal-democratic values.

It is time for an informal alliance of middle-sized powers that are interested in supporting a global rules-based order. … [C]ollectively, they have a chance of working together to preserve a world based around rules and rights, rather than power and force.”
– Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, May 28, 2018

1. Introduction

The Netherlands is often regarded as a middle power.[1] But what does it mean to be a middle power, and what does it do to a country’s standing in the international arena? As one author argued, “today’s so-called middle powers are not really middle powers, and the true middle powers do not want to be regarded as such.”[2] Hence, the middle power label can easily be taken to mean accepting second-rank status in world politics. However, middle powers are also known for their predisposition to pursue diplomatic solutions that embrace compromise, good international citizenship, and inclusive multilateralism. In that sense, middle powers are critical sinews that keep the liberal-democratic world order together.

That liberal-democratic world order is under pressure. As the world is undergoing a phase transition in which power is shifting from West to East, the United States no longer holds the position of undisputed guardian of the global order that it wrought after the Second World War. This puts the onus on middle powers to decide whether and how to uphold the international architecture in which they have been able to thrive for decades. Indeed, two prominent foreign relations experts are calling for a coalition of nine middle power countries “to act more boldly in their own interest [to preserve the liberal world order].”[3]

The purpose of this paper is threefold: one, to define what we mean by middle powers; two, to examine how they function in a changing global landscape. In that context, we will distinguish between ‘established’ and ‘emerging’ middle powers, and reflect on how they can evolve and reposition themselves in a changing world. The third purpose is to identify useful partners for the Netherlands across a number of middle-power themes. A key premise of this report is that coalition-building among middle powers can make a real difference in advancing thematic agendas, even if support from one or more great powers is not forthcoming.

To begin with, we will unpack, and then repack, the notion of middle powers. Following this, we will propose criteria for identifying middle powers focusing on power and influence and explain why these criteria are relevant in a diplomatic context. In the next section, we will apply a set of normative criteria in order to identify countries that are particularly suitable for the Netherlands to team up with in five different contexts: peacekeeping, environmental protection, human rights and humanitarianism, refugee support, and peacemaking. At the same time, we will also identify a number of middle powers that may not necessarily share the same outlook on international affairs as the Dutch, and briefly discuss their perspectives and goals vis-a-vis the global order. This analysis then serves as a basis for broader geopolitical reflections on middle powers in a changing global order, while also taking the ramifications for the EU into account.

2. What is a Middle Power? A Brief Conceptual Overview

The relevance of middle powers is a function of how power is distributed across the international system. This is why the concept of middle powers first emerged in 16th-century Italy, where city-states such as Venice and the Papal state took middle positions between France, the Habsburgs, and the Ottoman Empire.[4] In the modern era, Canada and Australia have pushed the concept most notably, both in theory and in practice. In brief, they posit that middle powers are countries which actively labor to uphold and promote global legal standards and thus contribute to a stable world order. They have both the ability and, to some extent, the clout to pursue these ends, which makes them important flag-bearers of the international order. Middle powers have a uniquely privileged position. On the one hand, based on their economic and military strength, they are not assumed to do the heavy lifting or take global responsibility in the way that great powers are. Yet they have enough power and influence to be able to conduct a normative foreign policy in which they can not only promote their self-interest, but also the interests of the larger community, or indeed the global community. Finally, the ‘middle power’ label is valuable since it confers a degree of respectability and signals a country’s good standing in the international community.

There are thus good reasons for wanting to be labeled a middle power. At the same time, the parameters of middle power as a category have remained relatively undeveloped in academic and policy communities. Indeed, the notion has been described as “a role in search of an actor,”[5] meaning that there is a degree of understanding of what a middle power is supposed to be, but defining who those middle powers are poses quite a challenge. For policy-making purposes though, it is not enough to be able to say, borrowing from American Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, that “I know it when I see it.” Only when clarity on positions and commitments of countries is gained can coalitions be cobbled together for political purposes.

Middle powers have been described and identified on the basis of various criteria, but there is no single authoritative definition. In essence, middle powers can be identified on the basis of assessments of capabilities that a state possesses (‘power’, corresponding to the positional perspective), the extent to which they can get things done (‘influence’, corresponding to the functional perspective), and the degree to which states pursue a foreign policy that befits a middle power (the ‘normative’ dimension, corresponding to the behavioral perspective).[6] One definition of middle powers broadly frames them as “states that are neither great nor small in terms of international power, capacity and influence, and demonstrate a propensity to promote cohesion and stability in the world system.”[7]

3. Identifying Middle Powers

The remainder of this paper identifies middle powers in a way that borrows from each of the three conceptual perspectives outlined in the attached methodological annex. In general, we will aim to identify two kinds of middle powers: those that can be considered ‘normative’ or established middle powers, and what we will call ‘emerging’ middle powers.

3.1 The ‘Power’ of Middle Powers

To identify middle powers, the first step is to assess their potential capacity to exert influence at the international level. For this sake, we consider three essential categories: population size, economic power, and military prowess.[8] These categories are widely considered relevant for estimating a country’s strength.[9] What is more, while the GDP criterion is likely to favor more established middle powers, the population criterion implicitly acknowledges emerging middle powers with fast-growing populations such as Egypt, Nigeria, and Pakistan.

In order to separate middle powers from great powers, we apply a set of criteria. One is membership of the UN Security Council, as well as distinct criteria regarding the amount of power they hold in proportion to the world as a whole.[10] These criteria are also applied to differentiate between three kinds of great powers.[11] The first is the United States as the sole remaining superpower, and the only one to indisputably possess global shaping power. The second is made up of the other members of the UN Security Council. The third consists of India, Germany, and Japan. Excluding these powers from the middle power category yields the following map (Figure 1):[12]

Figure 1
Great Powers and Potential Middle Powers
Great Powers and Potential Middle Powers

Source: Data compiled from various sources by HCSS

3.2 The Influence of Middle Powers

With this first criterion in mind, having power in itself is not a sufficient operational mechanism to enable a country to put its stamp on world affairs. Presence and reputation are preconditions for exerting influence, which is why it is worthwhile to consider the diplomatic network a country is embedded in, as well as membership of key international bodies — something which invariably only occurs with the approbation of the great powers, as well as a substantial part of an organization’s membership. After all, to be elected to such bodies, a country must demonstrate that they have the resource capabilities to play a constructive role in the organization, and also show their commitment to upholding the policies and values that large parts of the membership appreciate and subscribe to. Thus, following the implementation of the ‘Power’ criterion, we consider two indicators of influence: the size of a country’s diplomatic network, and membership in key international organizations (The UN Security Council (UNSC) and/or the Human Rights Council (HRC)). Accordingly, the following middle power countries (Figure 2)[13] emerge as the most influential at the world level:[14]

Figure 2
Potential Middle Powers after Factoring in Influence Indicators
Potential Middle Powers after Factoring in Influence Indicators

Source: Data compiled from various sources by HCSS

What is striking about this map is that it shows that no fewer than six countries in Latin America have the power and influence to act as middle powers — and in many instances they do so. From the point of view of the sustainability of the liberal world order, this is highly relevant because, in general, these countries have fewer geopolitical axes to grind, in the sense of being at the heart of civilizational struggles (say, in comparison to countries in the Middle East or Southeast Asia), and thus are better able to play a ‘middling’ role between ‘East’ and ‘West’. What is more, in view of misgivings about Chinese involvement in this part of the world, they are not expected to necessarily toe the line of Beijing as a consequence.[15]

3.3 Identity Politics: Established and Emerging Middle Powers

The final differentiation to be made is between the established, ‘normative’, middle powers, and emerging middle powers. The basic distinction here is between those countries that by and large invest in upholding liberal-democratic norms at home and abroad, and those that are inclined to subscribe to alternative versions of world order, such as the Beijing consensus. Of course, this is never a neat distinction, nor is it so over time, but it helps in understanding how the international order is evolving, and in identifying emerging powers to reckon with. The two criteria applied here are commitment to global development (using contributions to the UN Development Program (UNDP) as a proxy) and commitment to upholding basic human rights at home (measured by a country’s classification in the Freedom House Index (FHI)). Based on those criteria, the countries emphasized in Figure 2 can be further classified as follows (Figure 3):[16]

Figure 3
Established and Emerging Middle Powers
Established and Emerging Middle Powers

Source: Data compiled from various sources by HCSS

The map shows that established and emerging middle powers tend to cluster in some locations. Perhaps remarkably, large swathes of Latin America make up one such cluster. Another observation is that many emerging middle powers cluster around the Mediterranean and in the Middle East, some of which make meaningful contributions to development or have achieved solid levels of respect for basic rights. In other words, there is room for cooperation on middle power agenda issues with these countries, even if they do not always share our values or outlook.

4. Towards Coalitions of Like-Minded Middle Powers

Having identified established and emerging middle powers, we are now at a point where we can consider potential coalitions of like-minded middle powers that may serve to advance certain issues on the global agenda. Here, we consider peacekeeping, environmental protection, human rights and humanitarian support, refugees, and peacemaking.

4.1 A Liberal-Democratic Coalition

4.1.1 Peacekeeping

Middle powers tend to be influential players in peacekeeping activities, both in UN and regional contexts. To a large extent this is because the great powers, especially the five permanent UN Security Council members (P5), do not seek to become closely involved in thorny disputes in which they do not have a direct stake. Historically speaking, Australia, Canada, Sweden, and Norway have been particularly influential.[17] Today, however, it should be acknowledged that — budget-wise — the United States, China, Japan, and Germany alone provide about 55 percent of the total UN peacekeeping budget (Table 1), while the top ten middle power countries provided just under 30 percent in total.

Middle powers can be important agenda-setters on this issue too. For instance, the Netherlands successfully managed to make strides in reforming the UN’s peacekeeping policy this past year as a member of the UNSC, with a presidential statement on peacekeeping reform that “includes a significant amount of new language.”[18] But there are other examples. For instance, countries such as Canada, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands provided significant financial and in-kind support to the creation of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO)[19] report in 2015, while dozens of middle powers have already endorsed the Secretary General’s Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative.[20] Canada, the country that helped create peacekeeping in the 1960s, continues to be active in this field, having hosted the 2017 Peacekeeping Summit in Vancouver,[21] and having recently engaged in Mali (MINUSMA).[22]

Table 1
Contributions to Peacekeeping[23]

UN Peacekeeping Fund (2017)

Rank

Overall Top 10

Contributions (%)

Top 10 minus Great Powers

Contributions (%)

1

United States of America

28.4344

Italy

3.7480

2

China

10.2377

Canada

2.9210

3

Japan

9.6800

Spain

2.4430

4

Germany

6.3890

Australia

2.3370

5

France

6.2801

Republic of Korea

2.0390

6

United Kingdom

5.7683

Netherlands

1.4820

7

Russian Federation

3.9912

Switzerland

1.1400

8

Italy

3.7480

Saudi Arabia

1.0601

9

Canada

2.9210

Sweden

0.9560

10

Spain

2.4430

Belgium

0.8850

Of course, financial contributions do not necessarily reflect all the contributions made by what we call emerging middle powers. In the list above, Saudi Arabia is the only one of these countries to make it into the top ten among middle power donors. However, if we look at troop contributors, we notice that at present, among the top ten are four emerging middle powers (Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt, and Indonesia), with Bangladesh providing just over 7,000 troops, while the highest-contributing established middle power (Italy) provides just over 1,000.[24]

4.1.2 Environmental protection

Especially for middle power countries, environmental protection has become an important element in their multilateral diplomacy. Indeed, of the Conference of Parties (COP) meetings of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to date, all except two have taken place in middle power capitals, with fourteen meetings held in established middle powers.[25] The voting tallies of a recent resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly, “Towards a Global Pact for the Environment,” is an interesting indication of the division lines between the various powers. Two of the great powers (Russia and the US) voted against the resolution, which was counterbalanced by all established middle powers who were present and most of the emerging ones.[26] However, two emerging middle powers, Turkey and the Philippines, also voted against it. When considering funding for environmental protection at the global level, established middle powers also dominate in regard to funding for UNEP, which is entirely voluntary in nature. In that sense, the data in Table 2 reflect the fact that caring for the environment is still very much a quintessential middle power concern.

Table 2
Contributions to Environment

UN Environment Protection Fund (2017)

Rank

Overall Top 10

Contribution in USD

Top 10 minus Great Powers

Contribution in USD

1

Germany

$8,314,940.90

Netherlands

$6,437,400.00

2

France

$7,550,550.00

Sweden

$4,892,998.89

3

Netherlands

$6,437,400.00

Belgium

$4,687,600.00

4

United States of America

$6,063,730.00

Switzerland

$4,000,100.00

5

Sweden

$4,892,998.89

Norway

$3,000,000.00

6

Belgium

$4,687,600.00

Italy

$2,945,750.00

7

United Kingdom

$4,283,070.00

Canada

$2,313,260.20

8

Switzerland

$4,000,100.00

Denmark

$1,430,144.59

9

Norway

$3,000,000.00

Finland

$1,159,700.00

10

Italy

$2,945,750.00

Republic of Korea

$575,930.75

There are multiple examples of middle powers pushing for, or at least supporting the international environmental agenda. A notable one is South Korea’s ‘green growth’ initiative which centered on the energy transition.[27] Chilean President Michelle Bachelet’s leadership in environmental policy is proof that even established middle powers who are less wealthy than their counterparts are capable of acting as forces for ‘good’, having almost tripled Chile’s renewable energy production in just four years.[28]

4.1.3 Human rights and humanitarianism

Given that established middle powers are closely wedded to the notions of human rights and humanitarianism, they are logically also strong supporters of the human rights regime, helping to uphold such norms at the global level. Indeed, OHCHR, the UN’s main human rights watchdog, was created following the World Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna in 1993. A middle power preoccupation with human rights and humanitarianism is also reflected in their contributions to the chief UN bodies in these two domains (see Table 3 and Table 4 below):

Table 3
Contributions to Human Rights

UN Human Rights (2017)

Rank

Overall Top 10

Contribution in USD

Top 10 minus Great Powers

Contribution in USD

1

United States of America

$ 20,160,912

Sweden

$ 15,994,423

2

Sweden

$ 15,994,423

Norway

$ 15,559,270

3

Norway

$ 15,559,270

Netherlands

$ 9,803,069

4

Netherlands

$ 9,803,069

Switzerland

$ 7,504,461

5

Germany

$ 9,143,552

Canada

$ 4,718,048

6

Switzerland

$ 7,504,461

Denmark

$ 4,591,309

7

United Kingdom

$ 7,201,458

Belgium

$ 3,976,662

8

Canada

$ 4,718,048

Finland

$ 2,873,315

9

Denmark

$ 4,591,309

Saudi Arabia

$ 2,732,079

10

Belgium

$ 3,976,662

Ireland

$ 2,652,989

Table 4
Contributions to Humanitarianism

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2017)

Rank

Overall Top 10

Contribution in USD

Top 10 minus Great Powers

Contribution in USD

1

United States

$ 48,383,161

Sweden

$ 24,582,361

2

United Kingdom

$ 31,595,453

Norway

$ 14,390,097

3

Sweden

$ 24,582,361

Qatar

$ 10,220,000

4

Germany

$ 18,578,297

Netherlands

$ 8,572,535

5

European Commission

$ 17,461,466

Australia

$ 8,177,376

6

Norway

$ 14,390,097

Canada

$ 7,947,516

7

Qatar

$ 10,220,000

Denmark

$ 7,536,936

8

Netherlands

$ 8,572,535

Switzerland

$ 6,479,407

9

Australia

$ 8,177,376

Belgium

$ 4,388,651

10

Canada

$ 7,947,516

Ireland

$ 4,244,473

It is significant that in both domains, unlike in peacekeeping, middle power contributions are not overshadowed by those of the great powers. A concrete example of a middle power taking decisive action in these realms is Canada’s celebrated sponsoring of the Ottawa Process to adopt a ban on land mines — a campaign that attracted the signatures of 161 state parties and culminated in a Nobel Peace Prize in 1997. In the lists above, the contribution of Saudi Arabia stands out in both domains, being a top contributor on human rights and among the top-five contributors on humanitarian aid in 2018 (not shown). This is remarkable in light of the fact that the country never even signed the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and is currently prosecuting a war in Yemen whilst violating humanitarian law. Equally remarkable is Qatar as the 17th-largest contributor to the OHCHR in 2017 and 3rd-largest contributor on the humanitarian front.[29] While it is unclear what motivates these Gulf states to contribute these funds, it is likely that the bulk is used to support the Palestinian people.[30]

4.1.4 Refugees

In regard to relief for refugees around the world, established middle powers also top the list in terms of financial contributions to the principal agency charged with this issue, UNHCR (see Table 5). Refugee support was born out of the tragedy of World War II and since then has traditionally been a top agenda item for such middle powers. It is significant, though, that in this area great powers also do a lot of the heavy lifting.

Table 5
Contributions to Refugee Commitments

UN High Commissioner for Refugees

Rank

Overall Top 10

Contribution in USD

Top 10 minus Great Powers

Contribution in USD

1

United States of America

$1,450,360,238

Sweden

$111,958,945

2

Germany

$476,918,668

Norway

$98,941,956

3

Japan

$152,359,773

Canada

$81,879,293

4

United Kingdom

$136,219,370

Netherlands

$75,711,468

5

Sweden

$111,958,945

Denmark

$58,370,565

6

Norway

$98,941,956

Italy

$51,417,322

7

Canada

$81,879,293

Australia

$39,715,089

8

Netherlands

$75,711,468

Switzerland

$35,402,490

9

Denmark

$58,370,565

Belgium

$23,017,552

10

Italy

$51,417,322

Finland

$22,049,595

Emerging middle powers hardly play a role when it comes to providing financial support for refugee needs, although as an exception again, Saudi Arabia (not shown) is the highest-ranked of such middle powers, having provided just over $18 million in 2018, followed in 20th place by the United Arab Emirates with around $5.5 million. However, when it comes to hosting refugees, a somewhat different picture unfolds as several emerging middle powers play host to significant numbers of refugees, often from countries in their own region. Examples are Turkey — the world’s top host country with some 3.5 million people — followed by Pakistan (1.4 million), and further down by Bangladesh (932,000) and Jordan (almost 700,000). The highest-ranked established middle power is Italy with over 240,000 refugees, while the great power hosting the most refugees is China with 321,000 refugees on its soil.[31]

4.1.5 Conflict prevention, resolution and diplomacy

Middle powers have established a strong reputation stretching over decades in facilitating conflict resolution, mediation, and similar peace-seeking activities. While the most notable in this regard are the legacies of Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, countries such as Finland, Belgium, and Austria have also facilitated peace diplomacy on multiple occasions. Such middle powers also tend to participate in various contact groups to resolve regional crises. For instance, the contact group for Somalia contains Norway, Sweden, and Italy. The Friends of Syria group contains Canada and Italy, while the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) contains Italy, the Netherlands, and Canada, among others. These middle powers also often host institutes and organizations dedicated to peacemaking: Stockholm is home to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Folke Bernadotte Academy; Geneva to the International Peace Bureau; Vienna to the International Peace Institute; and The Hague to the OPCW and Brussels to the International Crisis Group.

These middle power contributions are also reflected in contributions to the UN Department of Political Affairs, the UN’s chief branch dedicated to conflict prevention and resolution. Indeed, according to Table 6, the top contributors include Norway (3.2mn), Canada, the Netherlands (2.9mn) and Canada (2mn). The only great power here shouldering an outsized burden is Germany, which contributed 6.4mn in 2017, and 10.5mn overall in 2016.

Table 6
Contributions to Diplomacy and Mediation

 

UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA)

Rank

Overall Top 10

Contribution in USD

Top 10 minus Great Powers

Contribution in USD

1

Germany

$6,453,000

Norway

$3,275,000

2

United Kingdom

$3,665,000

Netherlands

$2,883,000

3

Norway

$3,275,000

Denmark

$2,610,000

4

Netherlands

$2,883,000

Canada

$2,086,000

5

Denmark

$2,610,000

Sweden

$1,669,000

6

Canada

$2,086,000

Korea

$1,605,000

7

Sweden

$1,669,000

Italy

$1,175,000

8

Korea

$1,605,000

Australia

$967,000

9

France

$1,312,000

New Zealand

$729,000

10

Italy

$1,175,000

Qatar

$500,000

Of course, these financial contributions do not tell the entire story. For instance, while Qatar is a top-10 contributor, its neighbor Saudi Arabia also engages in peacemaking activities, having hosted a conference in Riyadh of Syrian opposition,[32] and more recently, having mediated a peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea.[33] Encouragingly, established and emerging middle powers also collaborate in this area, as they do for instance in the Friends of Syria group and in the ISSG which contain a number of Middle Eastern countries.

What this brief overview shows is that in many areas of concern to established middle powers, they possess not only real clout, but are also capable of mustering real convening power in order to effect change and promote their values at the global level. Particularly in the areas of human rights, humanitarianism, environmental protection, and peace-making, they can be said to play an outsized role and not play ‘second fiddle’ to the great powers.

Two findings stand out here. One is that, given their clout and standing in the international community, Latin American countries could prove to be useful partners for European middle powers (and thus for the Netherlands) when it comes to pushing normative issues such as the ones discussed above. For instance, these countries could perhaps be encouraged to increase their financial contributions; or otherwise their reputational power can be used to prod other countries that belong to the Global South in order to support, for instance, a peacekeeping reform agenda. Another takeaway is that rich Middle Eastern countries, especially from the Gulf region, are proving to be important contributors to causes that established middle powers such as the Netherlands are interested in.

4.2 The European Union: A Middle Power or Shaping Power?

Assessing the power of the European Union (EU) poses a tricky theoretical problem with real-world consequences. On the one hand, the EU — being the single largest economy in the world — is often deemed a ‘great power’ in its own right, and has also proven to be able to live up to that epithet in regards to pushing forward the Iran nuclear deal[34] and in getting the Paris Climate Accord to come to fruition.[35] What is more, the EU’s recent Global Strategy speaks about the need for “a realistic assessment of the current strategic environment” which requires “credibility in security and defence.”[36]

However, what dominates in the Strategy (and in EU foreign policy in general) is an EU that wishes to operate as a normative actor, i.e., one that guides its security-related interventions on the basis of how they contribute to promoting basic human rights.[37] Indeed, the Strategy states unapologetically that the EU “has always prided itself on its soft power – and it will keep doing so, because we are the best in this field.”[38] Meanwhile, while the EU (and its Member States) is the largest dispenser of development aid in the world[39] and is a key player in supporting humanitarian operations and promoting human rights, it still operates as a patchwork of countries in terms of commitment to established middle power positions (see Figure 4).[40] Global pressures on the Union may possibly lead to a rift in the consensus that exists on the EU as a normative player. For instance, the issue of how to deal with refugees is already causing friction between Member States,[41] while commitment to upholding human rights at home and therewith, credibility as a middle power actor — is also wavering in some Member States.[42] However, that is not the case in all EU states. In fact, the 2017 initiative by the Netherlands to create a ‘Hanseatic League 2.0’ under its aegis, and which united it with Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, is a good example of proactive policy by established middle powers to seek to preserve their core values.[43]

Figure 4
The EU Power Assortment
The EU Power Assortment

Source: Data compiled from various sources by HCSS

In view of this possible rift, Europe needs to decide what it wants to be on the world stage: a middle power or a shaping power in the military sense as well. As Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said: Europe has always been “a global payer but it is time we started being a global player too.”[44] Hence, he realizes that the EU’s middle power behavior pays dividends, but that more is needed to truly be able to set the agenda on global security issues. If not for expanding Europe’s influence elsewhere in the world, more is also needed in order to ensure that the bloc remains cohesive, as multiple Member States are now also under the umbrella of China’s 16+1 initiative.[45]

4.3 Agenda-Setting by Emerging Middle Powers

A spirit of common purpose is not only something which unites the established middle powers. Emerging middle powers also convene across different issue areas at times. For instance, countries such as Mexico, Turkey, Egypt, South Africa, Thailand, and Indonesia have all been important agenda-setters at the regional level, and often as a consequence at the world level as well. Within many of the traditional groupings such as the G77 and the Non-Aligned Movement, larger countries such as Brazil and India have often been among the leading nations. However, more recently, middle-tier countries have begun to be acknowledged as (regional) leaders in their own right. In terms of economic power, the CIVETS group of countries,[46] devised by the Economist Intelligence Unit, speaks to the autonomous economic weight that these countries bring to the international table.

Figure 5
Divergence among Emerging Middle Powers
Divergence among Emerging Middle Powers

Source: Data compiled from various sources by HCSS

The emerging middle powers are not a homogeneous group (see Figure 5).[47] Some countries match the established middle powers in terms of freedoms at home (Greece, Portugal), while others are strongly involved in global development but do not meet high governance standards domestically (Saudi Arabia, Egypt).

So what do emerging middle powers seek to achieve? As ‘leading lights’ in what is often called the Global South, these countries have been instrumental in pushing forward alternatives to the world trade architecture. A well-known example is the World Social Forum, first held in 2001 in Porto Alegre in Brazil, as a clear pendant to the Davos-based World Economic Forum. Within the recent Doha rounds, positions of emerging middle powers are determined as a rule through consultations in the G77. On environmental issues, while pushing for ‘climate justice’ has been a mantra among developing countries, positions have started to diverge in recent years, as countries in the Global South reach different stages of development with correspondingly different needs and interests.[48] Hence, these countries sometimes act in a ‘counter-hegemonic’ way.[49]

At the same time, the distinction between established and emerging middle powers does not mean they never cooperate in joint fora. For instance, in global trade, two countries at the extremes of the Americas are said to be able to make a difference: “Given they are not on the front line of the foreseeable confrontation, Argentina and Canada are in a good position as the G20 and G7 chairs to broker solutions to contain the damage [of the US challenge to the world trade rule system.] [...] Their role could be to put greater emphasis on understanding and addressing both the positive and the negative impacts of trade.”[50] Another example is MIKTA — Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and Australia — which brings together powers of different stripes for the sake of promoting global cooperation on transnational crime, energy security, and climate change, among others.[51] Arguably the best-known example is the G20, which gathers the likes of Australia, Japan, and the US as well as Brazil, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.

5. Geopolitics and Middle Powers: Defending the Status Quo, Going with the Flow, or Making the World Anew?

From a geopolitical perspective, the evolution of relations between the great powers ─ especially the shift of power and influence from the United States to China ─ will have a profound impact on the ability of middle powers to exert themselves, and also be determinative of the balance between the established and emerging middle powers. In general, both types of middle powers ought to benefit from a world without a clear hegemon, where the former are more likely to thrive in a multilateral world order, while the latter are expected to benefit from a multipolar world in which global normative standards are less prevalent.

For established middle powers, the epochal rise of China means that they need to reassess the viability of the liberal-democratic world order, and whether they are able to uphold it in the long run — especially the face of a wavering United States. Beijing’s confession of allegiance to the norms of these middle powers[52] may only be temporary lip service as it seeks to wean countries away from Washington. With its 16+1 policy in eastern Europe, it already has an active strategy in place in regards to the EU. In the face of this development, the creation of an established middle powers coalition, for instance along the lines of what Ivo Daalder and Jaome -and therewith, cremes Lindsay call the “Committee to Save the World Order”[53], can help to tilt the global balance of power. In fact, established middle powers should expect to be able to rely on support from great powers which pursue middle power diplomacy, the prime examples being Germany and Japan, and to a somewhat lesser extent also France and the UK.

For emerging middle powers, the evolving global order provides by and large much more exciting opportunities for assertive policy. Where the established powers seek to maintain the status quo, the emerging powers could seek an alternative order altogether. In particular, countries with strong economic growth rates could find themselves being courted by East and West, thus increasing their ability to play a role at the international level.[54] Among the best examples in this vein are Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia.

What is important to note is that by distancing themselves from the US, or rather, by adopting a position of deliberate ambiguity towards the declining hegemon, emerging middle powers do not necessarily (wish to) hew close to China, the hegemonic heir apparent. It is true that emerging middle powers such as Angola, Algeria, and Pakistan have developed strong ties with Beijing, but it cannot be taken for granted that they will accept a subordinated status towards their Chinese paymasters in the same vein as the US managed in the Cold War. What is more, countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and Turkey are likely to deliberately keep Beijing at an arm’s length for as long as is possible. Emerging middle powers, like their established kin, benefit from multipolarity because it inherently allows them freedom to manoeuver between the great powers.

In the longer run, emerging middle powers could develop in three ways: 1) being supportive of the liberal-democratic order; 2) seeking to maintain balance between competing great powers; or 3) being ‘counter-hegemonic’ forces, or ‘spoilers’. Examples of the first can be countries in Latin America, some of which have developed societies with governance standards that sometimes envy those of Europe. Examples of the second category could be countries such as Morocco and Indonesia, which are unlikely to adopt an activist foreign policy that risks upsetting regional or outside actors. In the third category might fall countries such as Turkey, the Philippines, and perhaps Pakistan, depending on how the leadership in these countries evolves.[55]

Of course, as with the G20, a world in phase transition continues to provide opportunities for middle powers of different hues to cooperate. For instance, with regard to the South China Sea dispute, one study suggests that as middle powers, Australia, South Korea, and Indonesia could join forces so that they “can develop and deepen spoke-to-spoke networks [and] decrease the leeway for hub countries (such as China and the US) to unilaterally shape the regional order.”[56] It is also possible that countries in both the South and the North that are committed to multilateralism (say, for instance, Brazil and Chile, and Sweden and the Netherlands) could work together more closely so as to take responsibility for global security, and thus help to prop up peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts.

6. Conclusions

A world in phase transition provides many challenges to middle power countries. The key challenge is how to respond to the global shift in power and influence from the United States to China. Middle powers thus face a choice between defending the status quo, adapting to the new circumstances, or actively trying to shape a new order. In this paper, we have distinguished between two kinds of middle powers: established and emerging. Established middle powers are wedded to the existing liberal-democratic world order and committed to supporting and upholding it. In contrast, emerging middle powers have the same degree of power and influence on the world stage as established middle powers, but are not necessarily committed to the current arrangement in world affairs.

Established middle powers tend to emphasize the importance of global public goods and the global commons. Hence their strong support for endeavors such as peacekeeping, human rights and humanitarianism, environmental protection, refugee support, and peacemaking. Emerging middle powers do not necessarily have to be opposed to the aims and objectives of established middle powers For instance, countries like Colombia, Mexico, Ukraine, and South Africa could develop into established middle powers themselves in the near future, while countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, are in fact important contributors to sustaining the global goods that established middle powers care about. This opens up the possibility for coalitions that combine established and emerging middle powers, thus demonstrating a capacity for both kinds of powers to cooperate.

In conclusion, for established middle powers, the power shift towards China does not need to portend an end to an era in which they have been able to prosper, given that some great powers such as Germany, Japan, and, to some extent, the EU itself, in essence behave like middle powers, and thus provide critical support on multilateral issues such as international trade or environmental regulations. In addition, some emerging middle powers could develop as allies of the current crop of established middle powers. This applies especially to countries in Latin America.

6.1 Implications for the Netherlands

The Netherlands is by every measure an established middle power: in terms of power and influence, as well as by the fact that among the five policy domains examined here, the Netherlands is among the top-ten middle power contributors. This means that, more than many other countries, the Netherlands has an interest in ensuring the continuation of the liberal-democratic world order. The most potential for creating new global alliances or cooperation networks to advance such liberal-democratic norms lies in Latin America. At the same time, it is important to focus on keeping fellow EU Member States committed to the existing liberal-democratic world order. Achieving this is a sine qua non to being successful and efficient elsewhere in the world.

In the end, middle powers derive their legitimacy and global clout from the fact that they are able and prepared to provide to a considerable extent for global public goods such as peacekeeping. Only for as long as the rest of the world is prepared to acknowledge the importance of this contribution to international peace and stability can middle powers such as the Netherlands persist and prosper.

Methodological Annex

In the literature, there are three basic perspectives to defining middle powers: the positional, the functional, and the behavioral.

Positional Perspective

Also termed the hierarchical approach, this perspective prioritizes an objective ranking of states and relative hierarchies. Correspondingly, quantifiable factors such as military size and spending, political significance, and economic power all contribute to the ‘ranking’ of a state and their middle power status. The major drawback of this approach is the absence of normative criteria, i.e., whether and how they use their power to promote diplomatic solutions and good international citizenship. Indeed, emerging powers and regional powers may actually be guided by a revisionist outlook, or may have no intention of shaping peaceful and collaborative solutions.

Functional Perspective

First articulated by Canadian diplomat Hume Wrong, this approach asserts that status as a middle power is dependent upon the extent to which a state is capable of contributing to an issue in question, is self-interested in the outcome, and is significantly involved in the process.[57] Briefly put, what matters is that a “voice in decisions should correspond with strength in enforcement.”[58] This model assumes that status as a middle power can dramatically fluctuate according to the demands of the policy issue.[59] Therefore, whilst this approach is useful in identifying the relevant middle powers to call upon when a specific policy challenge arises, it is an unstable model and, subsequently, is less useful as a means to discuss the parameters of middle power status in the long run.

Behavioral Perspective

This approach asserts that middle powers are classified by their distinct diplomatic characteristics and their willingness to play by the rules of the game.[60] In other words, what matters is whether a country wants to (be seen to) play the role of a middle power (self-identification).[61] Attributes such as having strong regional or issue-relevant leadership and being a good international citizen, neutral mediator, and/or a catalyst for change, contribute to the identification of a middle power.[62] According to this conceptualization, middle powers are seen to have a vital role in global politics as effective counter-balancers and stabilizers.[63]

In consideration of these three approaches, a set of key characteristics emerges that can be used to distinguish today’s middle powers:

Power: A state should have adequate capacity to draw authority, bring weight to the negotiation table, and shape solutions.

Influence: A state should be strongly embedded in the international community.

Identity: A state should portray an identity that signifies a capacity and willingness to act towards diplomatic solutions, is specifically geared towards promoting good international citizenship, and has a reputation for upholding civil and political rights domestically.

These characteristics shaped the parameters of Steps One, Two, and Three of the study, respectively.

Step One: The ‘Power’ of Middle Powers

Firstly, in order to separate middle powers from great powers, we apply the ‘5% doctrine’. That is, any country that is to be a great power has to hold a dominating share of the world’s population or economy, or military power. Five countries, namely the US, China, Russia, Japan, and Germany, singularly possess at least 5 percent, and collectively possess 54.2 percent, of the world’s power according to the HCSS/Pardee Center’s Global Power Index. The US, China, and Japan all appear again in reference to the size of their GDP, militaries, and populations, and India graduates to the great power category due to its share of the population. A second criterion, permanent membership to the UN Security Council, is also included, adding France and the UK to the category as the 7th and 8th great powers.

To distinguish middle powers from small powers, three measures of quantifiable power (GDP, population size, and military prowess) are also analyzed, and countries are ranked according to the data in absolute terms. With the eight great powers excluded, the next sixty countries in the categories of GDP and military expenditure are given one point per indicator. For population size, any country (excluding the great powers) with more than four million people is given one point. As a result, fifty countries qualify for our ‘potential middle powers’ list by falling within the threshold consistently and earning a three out of three total score.

Criterion

Indicator

Source

Economic power

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (2017 figures, in absolute terms).

The World Bank.[64]

People power

Population size (2017, in absolute terms).

The World Bank.[65]

Military power

Military expenditure in absolute terms (average figure across five years: 2013–2017).[66]

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).[67]

Step Two: The Influence of Middle Powers

From the list of ‘Potentials’, this stage gauges whether a country is also strongly embedded internationally. Here we look at the strength of the diplomatic network of a country and membership of the UN Security Council and/or the UN Human Rights Council. The extent of a diplomatic network is deemed to be reflective of a country’s international presence, and thus, (potential) influence. Temporary membership of the UNSC is considered relevant because in order to be elected, they must demonstrate that they have the resource capabilities to play a constructive role on the Council, and also must show their commitment to upholding the policies and values that large parts of the membership appreciate.

In order to operationalize this concept, the number of external embassies and high consulates are recorded for each of the fifty countries remaining after Step One, along with the number of terms they served on the UNSC since 1998, and the UNHRC since 2006. In accordance with the distribution of ‘number of embassies’, we determine that in order to qualify as having substantial diplomatic network and political clout, a country should have at least fifty embassies and high consulates abroad, and should have been elected to the UNSC or UNHRC at least once. Upon execution of Step Two, 45 countries qualify as middle powers of some kind.

Criterion

Indicator

Source

Size of the diplomatic network

Number of embassies and permanent missions worldwide.

Based on counts from Embassy Pages.[68]

Membership in key international bodies

UNSC (temporary) membership and/or membership of the Human Rights Council.

Based on records from the UNSC Membership Database[69] and UNHRC documents.[70]

Step Three: Identity Politics

Having identified countries on the basis of their capacity and ability to execute a good citizenship role in world affairs, we now look at countries’ investment in that role in order to split the cohort into established and emerging middle powers. The first step is to assess their contributions to global development. This is done by examining financial support to the UN Development Program (UNDP) from 2013 to 2017 and calculating an average contribution for each donor country. Then, we calculate the contribution of each country as a percentage of the averaged total funding pool. A threshold of 0.1 percent of the total contributions was implemented. UNDP data is deemed a sufficiently reliable proxy because 1) UNDP activities largely cover the whole remit of development activities; 2) UNDP contributions are (mostly) voluntary, and thus express a genuine willingness on the part of donors; and 3) the number of countries contributing to the UNDP is larger than that of the OECD, which is widely considered to be the standard in measuring Official Development Aid (ODA) contributions. Yet in terms of ranking countries, the UNDP and OECD lists match to a sufficient extent, confirming that the UNDP list also provides a fair assessment of the contributions made to development by non-OECD members.

The second criterion of this step is to gauge countries’ commitment to upholding civil and political rights at home, i.e., to see if countries ‘practice what they preach.’ A standard of ‘Free’, according to the classification of the Freedom House Index (FHI) is observed.

Criterion

Indicator

Source

Spending on development aid

Total contributions to UN Development Program from 2012–2017.

UNDP Transparency Portal.[71]

Human rights upheld at home

Freedom status according to Freedom House Index 2018 Survey edition (year under review: 2017).

Freedom House.[72]

Unlike the previous steps, the thresholds observed in Step Three does not disqualify states from being a middle power. Rather, the group of 45 was split into countries that fit all criteria perfectly (Established Middle Powers) and countries who contributed less than 0.1 percent (or nothing at all) to the UNDP’s total funding, and/or are categorized as ‘Not Free’ or ‘Partly Free’ according to the FHI (Emerging Middle Powers). Listing all middle power countries per category along with the great powers results in the following overview (Table 7).

Table 7
Middle Power and Great Power Categories

 

Insufficient FHI Score (Not Free) & UNDP Contribution

Insufficient FHI Score (Partly Free) & UNDP Contribution

Insufficient FHI Score (Not Free)

Insufficient FHI Score (Partly Free)

Insufficient UNDP Contributions

Meet all criteria

Great Power

China

Russia

USA

France

UK

India

Japan

Germany

Middle Power

Emerging

Established

Algeria

Angola

Iraq

Kazakhstan

Thailand

Vietnam

Bangladesh

Indonesia

Malaysia

Morocco

Nigeria

Pakistan

Sri Lanka

Egypt

Saudi Arabia

Turkey

United Arab Emirates

Colombia

Kuwait

Mexico

Philippines

Ukraine

Czech Republic

Greece

Poland

Portugal

Romania

South Africa

Argentina

Australia

Austria

Belgium

Brazil

Canada

Chile

Denmark

Finland

Italy

Netherlands

Norway

Peru

South Korea

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

Agenda-Setting by Emerging Middle Powers

In acknowledgement of the typical, niche domains that middle powers tend to excel in and meaningfully contribute to, we also look at the following indicators along with qualitative, case-by-case research.

For each of these, we pick financial contributions to various UN programs as proxies for assessing commitments. This is not because we are necessarily interested in UN commitments, but because 1) except for peacekeeping, all of the contributions made are mostly of a voluntary nature; 2) the UN agencies and programs selected invariably act as hubs for the issues they deal with; and 3) financial contributions enable comparisons across issue areas.

Thematic issue area

Indicator(s)

Source

Peacekeeping

Financial contribution to UN Peacekeeping (as a percentage of the total donor funding).

United Nations Peacekeeping.[73]

Environment

Financial contribution to The United Nations Environment Program Environment Fund (UNEP) (2017 figures, in absolute terms).

UNEP.[74]

Human rights and humanitarianism

Financial contribution to The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and to The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (both 2017 figures and in absolute terms).

OHCHR and OCHA.[75]

Refugees

Financial contribution to UNHCR (2017 figures, in absolute terms).

UNHCR.[76]

Diplomacy and mediation

Financial contribution to The United Nations Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) (2017 figures, in absolute terms).

UNDPA.[77]

Notes

External evaluation by Dr. John Kotsopoulos (Global Affairs Canada, Ottawa). Reviewed by Rob de Wijk and Tim Sweijs. Edited by Esther Chavannes.
Dutch Foreign Minister Eelco van Kleffens already spoke of the Netherlands as a “middle power” (“middelgrote mogendheid”) in 1942. See Duco Hellema, Nederland in de wereld: de buitenlandse politiek van Nederland, 6th Edition (Spectrum, 2016); Rob de Wijk et al., “Een Kompas Voor Een Wereld in Beweging: De Rol van Buitenlandse Zaken in Het Borgen van Nederlandse Belangen” (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, February 15, 2017), link.
Adam Chapnick, “The Middle Power,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 7, no. 2 (January 1, 1999): 79, link.
Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Australia, South Korea, Japan, Canada, and the European Union. See Steven Erlanger, “Is the World Becoming a Jungle Again? Should Americans Care?,” The New York Times, September 23, 2018, sec. World, link.
The concept was first coined by a 16th-century Italian theorist named Giovanni Botero. See Meltem Müftüler Baç, “Middle Power,” Encyclopedia Britannica, Politics (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., July 2, 2017), link.
Cox (1989:827) in Chapnick, “The Middle Power,” 75.
For a further explanation of the positional, functional, and behavioral perspectives, see the attached methodological annex.
Eduard Jordaan, “The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers,” Politikon 30, no. 1 (May 1, 2003): 165, link.
This tripartite notion borrows from Organski and Kugler, who defined power as Power = (Economic Production per Capita x Population) x Relative Political Capacity. See Jacek Kugler and Abramo FK Organski, “The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation,” in Handbook of War Studies (Unwin Hyman, 1989), 171–94, link.
See Bruce Gilley and Andrew O’Neil, eds., Middle Powers and the Rise of China (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014); Joel David Singer and Melvin Small, The Wages of War, 1816-1965: a statistical handbook (Wiley, 1972); Chapnick, “The Middle Power,” 74.
See the methodological annex for a precise breakdown of these criteria.
As discussed in Rob deWijk, Power Politics: How China and Russia Reshape the World (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2016).
Figure 1 illustrates the classification of countries as either Potential Middle Powers (according to sufficient economic power, population size, and military prowess), or as Great Powers. For the latter, shading indicates the type of Great Power according to the criteria explained in the text. For simplicity, all maps in the subsequent figures will portray Great Powers as a single group.
Figure 2 shows the countries considered as Potential Middle Powers after our measures of influence (diplomatic network and membership to international bodies) were applied in conjunction with our measurements of power.
Excluded from this map are New Zealand, Ecuador, Singapore, Iran and Israel, either because they do not have a sufficient number of embassies, or because they have never been a member of the UNSC or the HRC, and are therefore not considered sufficiently influential based on the criteria applied here.
See also the upcoming HCSS Study on China in the Caribbean: The BRI Goes East: Political Implications of China’s Economic Forays in the Caribbean and the South Pacific.
Figure 3 illustrates the distinctions between Established and Emerging Middle Powers. Established Middle Powers meet all criteria, while Emerging Middle Powers do not, for the different reason(s) indicated.
Maline Meiske and Andrea Ruggeri, “Peacekeeping as a Tool of Foreign Policy,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, World Politics (Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, September 26, 2017), link.
“Peacekeeping Presidential Statement,” What’s In Blue, May 11, 2018, link.
United Nations General Assembly and United Nations Security Council, “Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People” (United Nations, June 17, 2015), 4, link.
United Nations Peacekeeping, “Action for Peacekeeping (A4P),” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed September 26, 2018, link.
United Nations Peacekeeping, “UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial Conference, Vancouver, Canada,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed September 26, 2018, link.
“Canada to Send over 200 Soldiers to Mali in UN Peacekeeping Mission - National | Globalnews.Ca,” Global News Canada, March 16, 2018, link.
For illustrative purposes, this table and all subsequent tables use blue coloring to denote great powers, orange coloring to denote emerging middle powers, and grey to denote non-middle powers.
See United Nations Peacekeeping, “Troop and Police Contributors,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed September 26, 2018, link.
See “UNFCCC Calendar,” United Nations Framework on Climate Change, July 12, 2018, link.
“Voting Record: Towards a Global Pact for the Environment- Resolution / Adopted by the General Assembly. A/72/L.51.,” United Nations Bibliographic Information System, May 10, 2018, link.
Iain Watson and Chandra Lal Pandey, “Environmental Security and New Middle Powers: The Case of South Korea,” Asian Security 10, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 70–95, link.
UN Environment, “Inspirational Environmental Leaders from Chile, China and United States Win UN’s Top Environmental Honour,” United Nations Environment Programme, December 5, 2017, link.
OHCHR, “UN Human Rights Report 2017: Funding” (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2017), link.
Based on the fact that these countries are traditionally donors to the Palestinian Authority, and that most of the funds committed in 2017 (see fn. 30) are dedicated to the Middle East.
UNHCR, “UNHCR Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017” (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2017), link.
Suleiman Al-Khalidi and Stephen Kalin, “Syria Opposition Meeting in Riyadh Sees No Role for Assad in Transition,” Reuters, November 24, 2017, link.
Jon Gambrell, “Leaders of Ethiopia, Eritrea Sign Accord in Saudi Arabia,” AP News, September 16, 2018, link.
See e.g. Steven Blockmans and Astrid Viaud, “EU Diplomacy and the Iran Nuclear Deal: Staying Power?” (Centre for European Policy Studies, July 14, 2017), link.
Stefan Lehne, “Is There Hope for EU Foreign Policy?” (Carnegie Europe, December 5, 2017), link.
See European External Action Service, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy. Brussels” (European External Action Service, June 2016), link.
See e.g. Nathalie Tocci, “The European Union as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor,” Working Document (Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2008), link.
European External Action Service, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy. Brussels.”
European Commission, “EU Remains the World’s Leading Donor of Development Assistance: €75.7 Billion in 2017,” International Cooperation and Development, April 10, 2018, link.
Figure 4 illustrates how the EU 28 differ in power according to our criteria. 
See e.g. Julia Fioretti and Jan Strupczewski, “EU Backs Refugee-Sharing Plan, Exposing East-West Rift,” Reuters, September 22, 2015, link; and more recently, Michael Peel, “EU Migration Crisis: Where the Faultlines Lie,” Financial Times, June 20, 2018, link.
See e.g. Luining Michiel, “The EU’s Anxieties of Guaranteeing the Rule of Law,” Clingendael Institute, June 11, 2018, link; and as discussed in Tim Sweijs and Stephan De Spiegeleire, “The Rise of Populist Sovereignism: What It Is, Where It Comes from and What It Means for International Security and Defense | HCSS” (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, September 14, 2017), link.
Jim Brunsden and Michael Acton, “The Hanseatic League 2.0,” Financial Times, November 7, 2017, link.
Jean-Claude Juncker, “State of the Union Address 2015: Time for Honesty, Unity and Solidarity” (Speech, September 9, 2015), link.
These countries are the Baltic states, Poland, Czech republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Croatia. See Investment and Development Agency of Latvia (LIAA), “About 16+1,” CEEC-China (16+1), n.d., 16, link.
Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa.
Figure 5 zooms in to focus only on the Emerging Middle Powers and the reason(s) as to why they are not considered 'Established'. Specifically, a country's categorization according to the Freedom House Index is indicated along with whether they met our designated threshold for development aid.
Jen Iris Allan and Peter Dauvergne, “The Global South in Environmental Negotiations: The Politics of Coalitions in Redd+,” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 8 (September 1, 2013): See e.g., link; Cécile Barbière, “Climate Negotiations Reveal New Alliances in the Global South,” trans. Samuel White, Euractiv.Com, January 29, 2015, sec. Climate change: The road to Paris, link.
As discussed in Jordaan, “The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations.”
Oonagh Fitzgerald and Hector Torres, “Middle Powers Can Lead in Trump Era,” Centre for International Governance Innovation, January 30, 2017, link.
Alex Oliver, “MIKTA: Where Middle Powers Proudly Meet,” The Interpreter, November 28, 2013, link.
Jinping Xi, “Jointly Shoulder Responsibility of Our Times, Promote Global Growth” (Keynote Speech, January 17, 2017), link.
Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, “The Committee to Save the World Order,” Foreign Affairs, September 30, 2018, link These countries are Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Australia, South Korea, Japan, Canada and the European Union. See also footnote 3 of this paper.
Tim Sweijs and Willem Oosterveld, “Why Are Pivot States so Pivotal? The Role of Pivot States in Regional and Global Security” (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, July 9, 2014), link.
Jordaan, “The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations.”
Brendan Taylor et al., “The South China Sea: Middle Power Perspectives,” Discussion Paper, The Centre of Gravity Series (Australian National University Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, September 27, 2016), link.
Chapnick, “The Middle Power.”
Lionel Gelber, “Canada’s New Stature,” Foreign Affairs, January 1, 1946, link.
Chapnick, “The Middle Power,” 74.
Emel Parlar Dal, Middle Powers in Global Governance: The Rise of Turkey (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2018), 6, link.
Martijn Klem and Johannes Kester, “Het Buitenlandse Beleid van Middelgrote Mogendheden” (The Hague: Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, 2011), 10.
Chapnick, “The Middle Power,” 75.
Parlar Dal, Middle Powers in Global Governance, 6.
The World Bank DataBank, “GDP (Current US$),” database, The World Bank, n.d., link.
The World Bank DataBank, “Population, Total,” database, The World Bank, n.d., link.
See here for methodology: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Sources and Methods,” SIPRI, accessed October 17, 2018, link.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” SIPRI, n.d., link.
EmbassyPages, “Embassies and Consulates around the World,” Embassy Pages, October 11, 2018, link.
UNSC, “Membership since 1946,” United Nations, 2018, link.
OHCHR, “Current Membership of the Human Rights Council, 1 January - 31 December 2018,” United Nations Human Rights Council, 2018, link; OHCHR, “List of Past Members of the HRC,” United Nations Human Rights Council, 2018, link.
United Nations Development Program, “Donors,” UNDP Transparency Portal, accessed September 18, 2018, link.
Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2018,” January 13, 2018, link.
United Nations General Assembly, “Implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 55/235 and 55/236,” United Nations, December 28, 2015, link.
UN Environment, “Your Contributions,” UN Environment, accessed September 18, 2018, link.
United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, “Voluntary Contributions to OHCHR in 2017” (OHCHR, 2017), link.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Contributions to UNHCR for Budget Year 2017” (UNHCR, February 14, 2018), link.
United Nations Department of Political Affairs, “2017 Annual Report” (UNDPA, 2017), 44, link.