Abstract: To protect its vital interests, the Netherlands needs to have strong partners abroad. In a volatile world, it becomes less easy to know who you can rely on, or who may be partners for the future. This paper helps policy-makers by deploying five criteria in order to identify such partners, looking at our bilateral ties with countries based on diplomatic, economic, military and values-based consideration, as well as state visits. The main conclusion is that as ties with traditional Western partners continue to be the strongest, ties with countries in eastern Europe are fraying. Meanwhile, there is emerging potential for strengthening economic ties with countries in Southeast Asia, as well as with countries in the European periphery, especially in light of the ongoing turmoil in the latter.
1. Introduction
To protect its vital interests, the Netherlands needs to have strong partners abroad. As an open economy, a hub for internet traffic, and a crossroads of international transport, the Netherlands relies as much on foreign partners as they do on the Netherlands. However, knowing who you can rely on in an ever-increasingly volatile world can be complicated. In a world that is experiencing a phase transition—where the fulcrum of political and economic power is shifting to the East—this can be even more confounding.
In this study, an inventory is made of the strength of Dutch ties with other countries in order to ascertain which countries have been the most reliable partners in the recent past, as well as to see where future opportunities lie for strengthening ties. As part of the Strategic Monitor, it builds on last year’s Dutch Foreign Relations Index (DFRI),[1] and links to a related study on Middle Powers. However, rather than measuring a country’s compatibility or political importance across various issue areas, this study looks at the strength of our mutual ties with other countries. Also, in contrast to the Middle Powers study, we here examine the strength of mutual ties regardless of the international standing of partner countries.
1.1 Why Examine Partnerships?
As the Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte said in an interview on ‘Prinsjesdag’ in September 2018, the Netherlands needs to be well prepared for the future because “we do not live on an island.”[2] The Netherlands is surrounded by three key international players (the UK, France, and Germany) which together already account for 33 percent of Dutch trade and which are among the top destinations for Dutch citizens living abroad.[3] Hence, in various respects, the Netherlands is highly dependent on its foreign partners, near and far.
However, the caprices of world politics mean that today’s friends can be tomorrow’s foes, and vice versa. Fortunately, dramatic turnarounds are quite rare, but cultivating a solid network of international partners remains a priority for Dutch foreign policy in the years to come. Partners are not only important for what they can provide us bilaterally, but also for how they can be helpful as coalition partners to get things done at the multilateral level. For the Netherlands, Brexit, developments in the United States, and the continuing rise of China all merit a reconsideration of partnerships for the future. This reassessment of partnerships is not just about how their positions affect bilateral ties, but also about the knock-on effect on third countries. For instance, the rise of China could make countries in the Asia-Pacific region wary and search for new allies elsewhere. Brexit means that the Netherlands will need to forge new ‘winning coalitions’ in order to maintain its influence inside the European Union. These are all reasons for identifying our partners today, and to keep a close eye on how mutual ties are likely to evolve.[4]
This study unfolds as follows. First, we will describe what we mean by partnership, and what kind of partners the Netherlands needs to advance its national interests. Then we will identify our partners based on four key criteria. To conclude, we will analyze the results and highlight where opportunities beckon for striking up new partnership arrangements, and where possible setbacks may occur.
2. What Is a Partnership?
Having a partnership with a country means that relations with that country go beyond the transactional and what is required for the purposes of maintaining friendly diplomatic relations. In essence, what counts here is to have reliable channels of communication to advance interests and settle disputes, should they arise. The best indicator for this is membership of international bodies, or other structural forms of cooperation between the Netherlands and another country.[5] Where trade is fickle, institutional ties are not, which is why a premium is given in this study to NATO and EU membership.
2.1 Purpose of a Partnership
The central purpose of partnerships is to provide insurance against future risks, i.e., to hedge against a volatile world. For instance, a military or security partnership provides certain guarantees against future threats, whether they be physical or otherwise. Cooperation at the economic plane is not only important for day-to-day prosperity, but also to ensure that in the long term, price volatility is curbed, and that trade flows remain as unfettered as possible. A second reason is that partnerships are indispensable for achieving foreign policy objectives. For instance, none of our current or past military engagements could have been successful without the help of partner countries. The same goes for upholding human rights standards across the world. Finally, partnerships are critical for creating added value, whether through trade, information exchange, or simply creating transport connections. Thus, in a successful partnership, ‘the whole should be greater than the sum of its parts.’ These are the key benchmarks for assessing the quality and depth of partnerships.
2.2 What Kind of Partners Do We Need?
The kinds of partners that the Netherlands should seek to cultivate or acquire depend on our current and future foreign policy interests. In view of the triad “prevent, defend and strengthen,”[6] our European partners are naturally the first ports of call for most foreign policy initiatives. This is the case for many of the objectives outlined in the Integrated Security Strategy 2018-2022, be they migration, disarmament, tackling terrorism or addressing cross-border crime.[7] At the same time, the recently issued Defence White Paper stresses the need to address instability in the ring around Europe, suggesting that we do not only need strong partners on Europe’s southern rim, but also on the Mediterranean’s southern and eastern littorals, as well as to the east of Poland.
Nevertheless, a world in transition also requires orientation on forging partnerships that are less traditional. For instance, dealing with the migration crisis implies a need to develop stronger ties with countries in West Africa, while upholding basic free trade arrangements around the world can require forging stronger ties with emerging interested parties, for example in Asia. Of course, on multiple fronts, the Netherlands is already active in doing exactly that. In the remainder of this study, we will see with which countries and regions we already have solid ties, and where there is room for developing or strengthening others.
3. Who Are Our Partners?
3.1 Identifying Our Partners
We consider partners for the Netherlands, and therefore look at how important these partners are from a Dutch perspective. For the conceptualization of Dutch partnership specifically, we consider the following dimensions of partnership with other states[8] and explain why they are relevant:
Because these categories do not necessarily capture all of the nuances of partnerships, state visits by or to the Dutch monarch have been added to the index.
For each category, a specific score is assigned and compiled. If a country scores 13 points or more, they are considered critical partners of the Netherlands. If they score between 10–12 points, they are generally relevant across a number of dimensions, but not all. Countries scoring between 7 and 9 are quite relevant in one or two dimensions, while other states have minor relevance (4–6 points) or otherwise do not distinguish themselves as being of great relevance for the Netherlands in these dimensions (0–3 points). By scoring all states on the four different dimensions,[9] the following countries emerge as the current critical partners for the Netherlands:
| Country |
Score (2017) |
Economic |
Military |
Diplomatic |
Values |
State visit |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Belgium |
17 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
1 |
| Germany |
17 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
1 |
| France |
16 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
1 |
| United Kingdom |
15 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
0 |
| Italy |
15 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
1 |
| Spain |
14 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
1 |
| Poland |
14 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
1 |
| United States |
14 |
3 |
4 |
3 |
4 |
0 |
| Luxembourg |
13 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
1 |
| Norway |
13 |
2 |
4 |
2 |
4 |
1 |
| Sweden |
13 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
1 |
| Czechia |
13 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
0 |
| Denmark |
13 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
1 |
| Portugal |
13 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
1 |
The United States, Canada, and Norway are the only countries in the top fourteen that are not EU members. Across all categories, Belgium and Germany prove to be the Netherlands’ top partners. Indeed, ties between the two Benelux countries are such that the Dutch prime minister is comfortable in leaving Dutch foreign policy in the hands of his Belgian counterpart (see below).
Even so, the strength of ties with particular countries does not have to reflect their strategic importance to the Netherlands. For instance, Belgium, a country that is culturally very close to us, does not carry the same strategic weight as Germany. In addition, and as will be illustrated below, countries such as Turkey and Russia, both of which the Netherlands has issues with, continue to be important even if diplomatic ties are not always in stellar shape. When plotting partner countries on a world map, the following overall picture emerges:
Source: Data drawn from various sources and compiled into index by HCSS
Several significant conclusions emerge. First, Western countries, and especially other EU members, prove to be the most important partners for the Netherlands. Second, the Netherlands has relatively strong ties with a number of major players in the Global South: Brazil and India (both 10 points), as well as South Africa and China (9 points). Also notable is that ties with countries in South America are, by and large, stronger than those with African countries, which corresponds to findings in the adjacent study on middle powers. When we look at how relations with the top countries have evolved over time, Figure 3 gives the following picture:
The strength of ties with the top ten countries has remained largely constant over time. The fluctuations in regard to the UK and Spain can be explained by minor variations in trade. Italy’s change is the only substantial one, which can be explained by a state visit from Italy’s president to then Queen Beatrix in 2012.[11]
When looking at the world as a whole, the strongest increases in ties over the past two years were achieved with Croatia (5), Myanmar (4), Albania, Colombia, Mexico, and Montenegro (all 3 points). Other significant risers are Georgia, Kosovo, Tunisia, and Vietnam, as well as Trinidad & Tobago, Belarus, and Turkmenistan. Among the ties that have been fraying are those with Hungary, Iran, Tajikistan, and Turkey, which suffered a 2-point drop over a ten-year period.
Source: Data drawn from various sources and compiled into index by HCSS
3.1.1 Economic Ties
Economic ties in this study are based on mutual trade volumes. On that basis, a stark picture emerges depending on where the weight of our economic interests lie.
Source: Data drawn from various sources and compiled into index by HCSS
By far the largest percentage of our trade is still done inside the European Union, and about 20 percent of Dutch two-way trade is done with Germany alone. While there has been much talk about the rise of the East, the only non-Western trade partner that truly stands out is China, with which trade has steadily increased over the past ten years, comprising 8.8 percent of our total imports and exports in 2017, versus 5.3 percent ten years earlier.[12] Another significant finding is that Russia continues to be an important trade partner to the Netherlands, in spite of sanctions imposed following the annexation of Crimea. Our cumulative trade share with Russia, which in terms of imports consists of almost 70 percent of petroleum products,[13] has decreased from 3.4 percent in 2008 to 2.4 percent in 2017. Several counties in Southeast Asia are amongst those that the Netherlands has increasingly good economic relations with. Bilateral trade with Cambodia and Myanmar has increased more than tenfold since 2008, and there are other big trade increases with Laos, Bangladesh, Vietnam, and Bhutan.
3.1.2 Diplomatic Ties
The strength of diplomatic ties is determined by our diplomatic presence in a given country, and whether or not a given country shares EU membership, which is given extra weight because of the fact that many diplomatic initiatives that the Netherlands supports are forged within the EU.
Source: Data drawn from various sources and compiled into index by HCSS
As a result, EU members prove to be more important than any non-EU partners. At the same time, Dutch diplomatic ties are evenly balanced around the world, with embassies present in most countries throughout Asia and South America. It is significant that our presence is rather thinly spread in countries in North Africa that are at the core of today’s migration crisis. However, it was recently decided that two new embassies would be opened in Burkina Faso and Chad to meet regional needs.[14] The shrinking size of the Dutch network until now has reflected on partnership scores within this dimension in Central and South America, which show decreases since 2008 in Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Uruguay due to the closing of embassies or consulates. It is notable is that Brazil is the only country in Central and South America with a high partnership score. This is reflective of the economic importance of this country to the Netherlands given that São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro both host a diplomatic representation.
3.1.3 Military Ties
In assessing our military ties, both arms transfers and the strength of structural/institutional ties have been taken into account, primarily with NATO partners.
Source: Data drawn from various sources and compiled into index by HCSS
In general, military ties reflect the strength of our partnerships through NATO. Significantly, it also shows the relative weakness of ties with countries in the ring around Europe (except Turkey), as well as with Sweden and Finland, two countries which currently struggle with their ties to Russia. Also significant is that ties with countries where Dutch troops have served in the recent past such as Iraq, Afghanistan and UNMISS (South Sudan) have not left a noticeable legacy of cooperation. It is also notable that our military relations with Iran were significantly better in 2008 than they are today. This reflects the fact that, despite the increase in economic relations with Iran since JCPOA, arms trade with Iran has decreased.
3.1.4 Values-Based Ties
Compatibility in terms of values has been measured on the basis of comparable standards in respect for basic freedoms, based on the Freedom House Index.
Source: Data drawn from various sources and compiled into index by HCSS
Here, rather than a North–South division, an East–West division emerges, demonstrating strong affinities with countries in the Americas contrasting against weak affinities with Middle Eastern and a host of Asian countries. With the exceptions of Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, two countries which stand out east of Suez are India and Mongolia, both of which have geopolitical importance in terms of their relations to a rising China. In Africa, Ghana, and South Africa hold the most promise for cooperation in multilateral fora where basic values are at stake.
Values-based ties have shifted more than other domains. Interestingly, the average value score was steady until 2013, and has declined since then. There are several countries of which the decline is especially notable. For instance, while Poland currently still scores high, its freedom scores have gradually decreased since 2016, mostly due to recent stresses on its judiciary and freedom of the press. Also close to home are the decreases of Turkey and Hungary: both countries’ scores have been slipping since 2013.
3.1.5 State Visits
When canvassing state visits that have taken place over the past twenty years, a mixed picture is what stands out, with official state visits taking place in all major emerging countries within the Global South, including pivotal states such as Egypt and Turkey.
Source: Data drawn from various sources and compiled into index by HCSS
The last state visit to the United States took place under President Reagan in the 1980s. It is significant to note that a dichotomy is present between countries that have and have not received a state visit. Almost all of the countries which are our close partners have enjoyed a state visit by the Dutch monarch, whereas very few of those who are not close partners have not. Interestingly, the only countries with scores below 8 points that were nevertheless visited by the monarch or whose heads of state have visited us are Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE.
Put together, the individual maps reinforce the notion that ties with Western partners are uniformly strong across all dimensions, and that ties with the major powers in Asia, such as India and China, are growing—with the former in terms of values, and with the latter in the economic realm. However, what also stands out is that in the European periphery, ties with countries are relatively weak across the board. On average, ties in this zone are the strongest (albeit decreasing) with Turkey, which is a concern due to the challenges the relationship between The Hague and Ankara has faced over the past two years, even if relations were patched up in October 2018.[15] Hence, there is certainly room (and a need) for improving ties with various nations in the ring of instability, as there also is in some other parts of the world.
4. Where Can the Netherlands Get More Mileage Out of Its Partnerships?
In searching for opportunities to strengthen existing partnerships or to develop new ones, three recent policy documents are taken as benchmarks: The Integrated International Security Strategy, the Defence White Paper, and Investing in Global Prospects.
4.1 Promoting Our Economic Interests
Some of the fastest growing markets in the world, among which are some that have seen the strongest growth in bilateral trade with the Netherlands, are in Southeast Asia. At present, no fewer than five countries in this region (Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam) each have up to 1.25 percent of the total trade share of the Netherlands (imports plus exports), making these countries together as important as a large European trade partner. Hence, it is worthwhile to consider strengthening ties with these nations, whose importance as export destinations is growing, as the Investing in Global Prospects paper claims.[16] Reinforcing its presence in this region can thus pay dividends.
Another promising region is Central and Eastern Europe, with Czechia, Poland and Hungary all in the top twenty economic partners. Scandinavian partners such as Sweden and Norway also embody further potential. With Brexit around the corner, binding such countries closer to the Netherlands in addition to those already part of the so-called new ‘Hanseatic League’ would provide added insurance against an uncertain economic future for EU countries.[17]
4.2 Promoting Our Geopolitical Interests
From a geopolitical point of view, various regional and thematic interests continued to vie for precedence. Geographically, the priority region is the ‘ring of instability’ around Europe. As an extension of this region, the Sahel, South Asia, and the Horn of Africa are also critical in light of security risks such as migration, terrorism, cross-border crime, and weapons proliferation, all of which have roots in these zones or are afflicted by them.[18] As was concluded above, Dutch ties with these regions are generally not as developed as those with countries in East Asia or South America. The Dutch government’s plan to reinforce the diplomatic network in this part of the world (including reinforcing its presence in Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, and Tripoli) is thus a welcome addition. Furthermore, adding military attachés to several of the embassies in the region will also help to boost our geopolitical profile.
When regarding global themes in relation to flow security, natural resources, or climate change, a broader perspective is warranted with a focus on, for example, the Great Lakes region, the Indian Ocean basin, and the Caribbean. This could, for instance, culminate in the strengthening of our physical presence in East Africa and the Red Sea region (Somalia and Eritrea), and, perhaps, militarily in these latter countries as well as in Sri Lanka. In the Caribbean, military ties with Panama and Guyana deserve consideration for reinforcement, especially in view of the rising influence of China.[19] In a letter to Parliament on October 8, 2018, the Minister for Foreign Affairs announced that a number of embassies in these very regions will be better staffed in the coming years, including in Addis Ababa, Khartoum, and Cairo.[20] This portends a more instrumental approach, focusing on countries that pose strategic challenges rather than those with which we have much in common.[21]
4.3 Promoting Our Values Abroad
In terms of promoting the international legal order and associated values in the areas of human rights and democracy, there is room for progress with those countries with which diplomatic ties have been the most steadfast. Arguably, the best prospects for this are in the Middle East, specifically Egypt, Jordan, and Oman. From the point of view of multilateral diplomacy, countries in South America, southern Africa, and India could potentially be bridges to other parts of the Global South and, at the same time, be elements in a coalition to shore up the current international order. Meanwhile, there is also a need to shore up shared values inside the EU, and in particular in regard to Hungary and Poland. This is because in the face of global power shifts, a common front on promoting inclusive values is needed to protect our strategic interests, whether vis-a-vis China, the Middle East, or even the United States.
5. Conclusions
In a rapidly changing world, partnership ties that the Netherlands enjoys and cultivates are still very much dominated by institutional ties through the EU and NATO. This is also reflected in our values-based ties, and, to a lesser extent, our economic ties. At the same time, there are also clear indications of the potential to develop ties in other parts of the world. On the economic front, this is primarily the case for Southeast Asia, and to some extent also in Central and Eastern Europe. In terms of values and military ties, strengthening bonds with countries in the Americas has much potential, including with countries around the Caribbean Sea.
The most even-handed kind of ties that the Netherlands maintains are those in the diplomatic realm, where every continent is endowed with at least a minimum degree of representation. The one continent which stands out in all contexts in terms of a lack of engagement is Africa. Together with the Middle East and Central Asia, this continent has, relatively speaking, the weakest ties with the Netherlands, with the only exceptions being Ghana and South Africa. This situation is expected to improve with the opening of a number of new embassies in the Sahel region, but can be improved with more structural engagement.
This is especially important from a geopolitical point of view, given the fact that the Netherlands wishes to address root causes of violence and instability in the ring around Europe. The fact that there are no countries with positive partnership scores between Turkey and India, and Spain and Ghana should give one pause for thought. At the same time, relations with countries such as Tunisia, Algeria, Kazakhstan, and Saudi Arabia have shown improvement since 2008 and may thus provide gateways to improving relations in these countries’ respective regions. Thus, the Netherlands can use its strong ties with its immediate neighbors as a starting point for building stronger geopolitically critical ties with its neighbors beyond.